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As noted by Franoise Tulkens, then a judge of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), Ôissues of Òdtentions prventivesÓ are among the most problematic ones in so far as 
application of human rights in international criminal proceedings is concernedÕ.1 These issues are 
considered problematic as regards international human rights law (IHRL) since international 
criminal proceedings last for several years, meaning that the accused remain in detention with no 
real prospect of provisional release despite still being presumed innocent and despite the fact that 
an acquittal is far from being a remote possibility. For example, Bagambiki spent eight years in 
the detention centre of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) despite his 
acquittal at first instance, six years after his arrest. After his acquittal on appeal, he was released to 
a safe house where he was detained for another year before being authorized to enter Belgium 
where his family lived.2 Likewise, Ndindiliyimana spent 11 years in the detention centre of the 
ICTR before his release was ordered at first instance. After this order for his release, 
Ndindiliyimana spent nearly three years in detention in a safe house and was finally acquitted on 
appeal in 2013. It was only in September 2014, when he finally obtained a visa to enter Belgium 
to join his family, that he could leave the safe house.3 Their cases could even be considered 
fortunate if compared with Ntagerura who is still in the same safe house since his first acquittal in 
February 2004 and his acquittal on appeal in February 2006.4 These are only three of thirteen 
acquittals by the ICTR. Acquittals were also fairly common before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), where the total stands at eighteen. Admittedly, 
Ôdtentions prventivesÕ were slightly less problematic in this case because the proceedings before 
the ICTY were more expeditious than before the ICTR5 and because, notwithstanding the ICTY 
                                                
1 Speaking in her personal capacity (as cited in S. Golubok, ÔPre-Conviction Detention before the International 
Criminal Court: Compliance or Fragmentation?Õ (2010)9(2) Law & Practice of International Courts & Tribunals 297). 
2 K. J. Heller, ÔWhat Happens to the Acquitted?Õ (2008)21(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 664. 
3  ÔRwanda : Acquitted Rwandan General to Go to BelgiumÕ All Africa (17 September 2014) available at 
allafrica.com/stories/201409171541.html (last accessed 4 January 2016). 
4 Andr Ntagerura Trial Watch (22 October 2012) available at http://www.trial-ch.org/fr/ressources/trial-
watch/trial-watch/profils/profile/565/action/show/controller/Profile/tab/legal-procedure.html (last accessed 4 
January 2016). 
5 J. A. Meernik, ÔIs Justice Delayed at the International Criminal Court?Õ (2008-2009)91 Judicature 286. 
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policy of detention during the trial, a significant number of its accused had been granted 
provisional release before their trials opened.6  
 
Would the statement of Judge Tulkens also be applicable to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC)? In other words, is pre-trial detention and/or detention pending trial before the ICC 
also problematic in light of IHRL? To date, the ICC has granted interim release only to those 
charged with the commission of offences against the administration of justice Ð and this after 
nearly one year of detention. None of the accused charged with international crimes has ever 
been granted interim release, and there is already one acquittal out of three judgments: that of 
Ngudjolo, who was acquitted after 22 months of pre-trial detention and 38 months of detention 
pending trial. In addition, Mbarushimana spent 14 months in detention before the ICC declined 
decided to decline to confirm the charges against him. It is true that, unlike the ICTY and the 
ICTR, the ICC can provide for compensation in case of a miscarriage of justice.7 Nonetheless, an 
acquittal or a dismissal of the charges does not necessarily imply a miscarriage of justice.8  
 
Why would a judge of a human rights court, or more generally IHRL, care about issues 
arising before international criminal courts? The answer is simple: because international criminal 
proceedings may affect the rights of the accused who are protected by IHRL. For example, pre-
conviction detention represents an infringement of the liberty of the person detained; in 
particular, it concerns the detention of a person who has not yet been judged and who should 
therefore still be presumed innocent. The right to liberty and the presumption of innocence are 
thus endangered by such detention and even more so if the right to be tried within a reasonable 
time is not respected.9 Furthermore, apart from the infringement of the right to liberty, detention 
                                                
6 ICTY website, available at http://www.icty.org/sid/291 (last accessed 4 January 2016). 
7 Article 85 of the ICC Statute (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into 
force 1 July 2002), 2187 UNTS 3). 
8  M. Fedorova, S. Verhoeven and J. Wouters, ÔSafeguarding the Rights of Suspects and Accused Persons in 
International Criminal ProceedingsÕ (June 2009) Working Paper n¡27 available at 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp137e.pdf (last accessed 4 January 2016) 26; C. L. Davidson, 
ÔNo Shortcuts on Human Rights: Bail and the International Criminal TrialÕ (2011)60(1) American University Law Review 
61; A. Trotter, ÔPre-Conviction Detention in International Criminal TrialsÕ (2013)11 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 374. 
9 B. Farrel, ÔThe Right to a Speedy Trial before International Criminal TribunalsÕ (2003)19 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 99; D. J. Rearick, ÔInnocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTRÕ (2003)44 Harvard 
International Law Journal 577; M. A. Fairlie, ÔThe Precedent of Pretrial Release at the ICTY: A Road Better Left Less 
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on remand also impacts on other human rights, such as the right to a family and private life or 
the right to freedom of assembly, association and expression.10 It also touches upon the right to a 
fair trial. Indeed, detention challenges the finding of evidence and of witnesses and makes contact 
with counsel difficult given, inter alia, the strict time limits. Consequently, detention complicates 
the respect of the right of the accused to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of 
his or her defence and to communicate with counsel of his or her own choosing, which are 
minimum guarantees for a fair trial.11 This explains why IHRL protects the accused on trial in 
international proceedings.  
 
But why should international criminal tribunals care about the human rights of their 
accused? Are they under an obligation to do so? Focusing on the issue of pre-conviction 
detention before the ICC, this is one of the questions I attempt to answer in this thesis. To this 
end, I explain the extent to which the ICC is bound to respect the right to liberty and I examine 
the conformity of its legal framework with that right. I also study the manner in which the ICC 
deals with this right in practice, through an extensive analysis of its case law regarding interim 
release up to 31 December 2015. The analysis of these decisions reveals that it may seem illusory 
in practice to require the respect of the right to liberty by the ICC. The problem, it is argued is 
would be that the right to liberty is defined according to the context in which a domestic criminal 
tribunal operates, which differs from that of the ICC. For instance, while contemplating the 
possibility of an interim release, the ICC needs to take into account the fact that a territory is 
required to implement this release, a condition arguably not envisaged by IHRL. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
TraveledÕ (2010)33(4) Fordham International Law Journal 1108-1110; Davidson (n8) 13; K. Doran, ÔProvisional Release 
in International Human Rights Law and International Criminal LawÕ (2011)11 International Criminal Law Review 708; R. 
Sznajder, ÔProvisional Release at the ICTY : Rights of the Accused and the Debate that Amended a RuleÕ (2013)11(1) 
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 112. 
10 M. Macovei, The right to liberty and security of the person. A guide to the implementation of Article 5 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 2004) 6; Davidson (n8) 24; M. Schnteig, ÔThe overuse of pre-trial detention: 
causes and consequencesÕ (2013)92(1) Criminal Justice Matters 18-19. 
11 Article 14 of the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171); article 6 of the ECHR (Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953, as amended) 
213 UNTS 222); article 8 of the AmCHR (American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, 
entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123); article 7 of the AfCHPR (African Charter on Human and PeoplesÕ 
Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58). 
9 
 For this reason, this thesis does not focus merely on the first research question related to 
the legal obligation incumbent upon the ICC to take this right into account. It also focuses on the 
issue of the ability of the ICC to respect the right to liberty of its accused despite the specific 
context in which it operates. To determine this specificity, the context in which other 
international tribunals operate is thus examined. It is thereby revealed that the ability of the ICC 
to respect the right to liberty of its accused mostly depends on the goodwill of the member states 
and of the ICC. The legal possibilities for the ICC or for the accused to influence this goodwill 
are therefore studied. The study focuses especially on the Netherlands and on Belgium. Indeed, 
the former is the host state of the ICC and consequently a key actor for interim release issues. 
The latter is the only state so far that has signed an agreement with the ICC aiming at the 
implementation of decisions of provisional release. It should be noted that the expression 
Ôinterim releaseÕ is used in the provisions of the ICC whereas the rules of the ICTY and the ICTR 
refer to Ôprovisional releaseÕ, but this difference in terminology is of no significance to the 
discussion.  
 
Instead of using arguments related to the place of human rights in the hierarchic order or 
to the need for the ICC to respect human rights in order to sustain its legitimacy,12 I adopt a legal 
positivist approach with a view to determining whether the ICC has a legal obligation to take into 
account the right to liberty and, if so, the extent to which the Court is capable of meeting this 
obligation. I also study the obligations of the states parties deduced from the ICC obligation as 
well as those deriving from their accession to human rights treaties. By positivism, I do not refer 
to the classical perspective according to which ÔLaw is regarded as a unified system of rules that 
[É] emanate from state willÕ and to which ÔLaw is Ôan ÒobjectiveÓ realityÕ that strictly needs to be 
distinguished from law Òas it should beÓÕ. 13 Indeed, it is now widely recognized among positivists 
that legal orders cannot be purely value-neutral and that, if the consent of states is still primordial 
                                                
12 See G. Sluiter, ÔAtrocity Crimes Litigation: Some Human Rights Concerns Occasioned by Selected 2009 Case LawÕ 
(2010)8(3) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 257; B. Swart, ÔDamaska and the Faces of International 
Criminal JusticeÕ (2008)6(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 100; M. Klamberg, ÔWhat are the Objectives of 
International Criminal Procedure? Ð Reflections on the Fragmentation of a Legal RegimeÕ (2010)79(2) Nordic Journal 
of International Law 283; L. Gradoni, D. A. Lewis, F. Mgret, S. M. H. Nouwen, J. David Ohlin, A. Reisinger-Coracini 
and S. Zappal, ÔGeneral Framework of International Criminal ProcedureÕ in G. Sluiter and others, International 
Criminal Procedure. Principles and Rules (OUP, 2013) 59. 
13 B. Simma and A. L. Paulus, ÔThe Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A 
Positivist ViewÕ (1999)93 American Journal of International Law 304; I. Gillich, ÔThe Normativity of Principles. Within 
the Positivist Theory of International LawÕ (2015-2016)41 North Carolina Journal of International Law 1-9. 
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to establish the validity of international law, this consent can also be established by their direct 
practice or even by their indirect practice through their membership in international 
organisations. 14  SimmaÕs Ôenlightened positivismÕ or modern positivism is one of the 
representatives of this evolution. 15  Simma challenges the classical view of positivism by 
recognizing that Ôinternational law should serve certain ends of justiceÕ, by looking at the practice 
of international institutions to interpret international law and by recognizing that Ôinternational 
law has moved from a set of bilateral relations among states, each advancing its own interest, to 
one of community interestÕ so that there is a Ôthe need to bolster the protection of individual 
human rights even as it might offend the sensibilities of statesÕ.16 This PhD thesis adopts SimmaÕs 
approach of positivism and, as positivism requires, uses the formalist method that analyses the 
traditional sources of international law.  
 
The positivist approach is the most appropriate to address the human rights obligations 
of the ICC for two reasons. First, only an analysis of the sources of international law can identifiy 
the extent of these obligations. Secondly, a legal analysis is more likely to convince the ICC and 
its member states of the necessity to take into account these obligations than arguments related 
to the legitimacy and supremacy of human rights since the impact of the latter arguments would 
depend on their individual moral sensibilities and the larger political interests.17 It is also the most 
appropriate given the ICC as subject of analysis since, as noted by Cryer, 
 
The dominant philosophy that can be seen in relation to both the Rome Statute and the 
                                                
14 For a presentation of this evolution: M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870-1960 (CUP, 2001) 243-246; J. Waldron, ÔNormative (or Ethical) PositivismÕ in J. Coleman (ed), Hart's 
Postscript. Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law (OUP, 2001); R. Cryer, ÔDj vu in International LawÕ (2002)65 
The Modern Law Review 946-947; J. Kammerhofer, ÔInternational Legal PositivismÕ August 2014, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477317 (last accessed 6 September 2016) 2-14; Gillich (n13) 
1-9. 
15 Simma and Paulus (n13) 308, 311. 
16 Simma and Paulus (n13) 308; Gillich (n13) 6; S. Ratner, ÔFrom Enlightened Positivism to Cosmopolitan Justice: 
Obstacles and OpportunitiesÕ in U. Fastenrath (eds.) From Bilateralism to Community Interest. Essays in Honour of Bruno 
Simma (OUP, 2011) 157-165; E. Stein, ÔBruno Simma, The Positivist?Õ in U. Fastenrath (eds.) From Bilateralism to 
Community Interest. Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (OUP, 2011) 20-22. 
17 Simma and Paulus (n13) 303. 
Also about A. Cassese: R. Cryer, ÔInternational Criminal Tribunals and the Sources of International Law. Antonio 
CasseseÕs Contribution to the CanonÕ, (2012)10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1048. 
11 
early practice of the ICC is legal positivism, with a strict understanding of legality (nullum 
crimen sine lege) on the part of the drafters on one hand, and a concern with giving the 
drafters what they wanted, rather than setting out their own view of international justice 
on the part of the judicial branch of the Court (at least in the AC).18  
 
The suitability of using positivism to address human rights issues has been questioned, 
especially because of its formalist method. One of the criticisms is related to the fact that the 
traditional sources of international law are supposed to determine the content of legal obligations 
existing between states.19 Nonetheless, as shown in Part I., section 3.3. and in Part II., section 5, 
this criticism is largely misguided. Simma rightly held that, Ôas a matter of law, human rights 
conventions are no different from other treaties with respect to the centrality of reciprocity and 
the possibility of inter-state enforcementÕ20 and that Ôhowever, formal sources remain the core of 
international legal discourse. Without them, there is no Òlaw properly so-calledÓ.Õ21 As noted 
earlier, bypassing traditional sources of international law, and therefore state consent, because of 
the ÔexceptionalÕ character of human rights, is less likely to convince states who are precisely the 
actors that require convincing. This is illustrated by the distinction that Simma and Paulus make 
between instinct and professionalism: 
 
The applicability of humanitarian law to internal armed conflicts appears to us to be a 
good test case for the practical use of the methodologies chosen: On the one hand, the 
changing reality, in which international conflicts increasingly give way to internal vio- 
lence, militates in favor of a concomitant change in the law. Our humanitarian instincts 
strongly demand that we treat the legal consequences of distinctions between 
international and internal conflicts, between wartime and peacetime atrocities, as 
irrelevant. On the other hand, our professionalism does not allow us simply to follow this 
urge [instinct] without regard to Òinternational law as it is,Ó as compared to Òhow it 
                                                
18 R. Cryer, ÔThe philosophy of international criminal lawÕ in A. Orakhelashvili (ed.), Research Handbook on the Theory 
and History of International Law (Elgar Publishing, 2011) 253. 
19 See e.g. F. Mgret, ÔInternational Human Rights LawÕ in A. Orakhelashvili (ed.), Research Handbook on the Theory and 
History of International Law (Elgar Publishing, 2011) 211; F. Mgret, ÔThe Apology of Utopia: Some Thoughts on 
Koskenniemian Themes, with Particular Emphasis on Massively Institutionalized International Human Rights LawÕ 
(2013)27 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 463.  
20 In Ratner (n16) 160. 
21 Simma and Paulus (n13) 308. 
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should be.Ó Governments charged with violations of humanitarian law constantly remind 
us of that very difference, which seems so utterly out of place from a humanitarian 
standpoint. After all, it usually is governments we are dealing with when we present our 
views of Òthe law.Ó In our view, it is precisely this need to get our legal message through 
to other people, especially representatives of states who might not share our individual 
moral or religious sensibilities, that constitutes one of the main reasons for the adoption 
of a positivist view of international law.22  
 
In this case, my instinct is to pursue the cosmopolitanism ideal, namely the fact that Ôthe 
individual human being is the relevant ÒunitÓ of moral worthÕ and that Ôthis moral worth should 
be applied to all human beings equally and universally across the globe, regardless of an 
individualÕs place of birth or affiliation to other local communities. 23  Nonetheless, my 
professionalism implies that I use a positivist approach to address the human rights obligations 
by the ICC instead of my instinct.  
 
This professionalism however does not mean that positivism is incompatible with my 
instinct and that positivism leads necessarily to a conservative point of view, as is argued by some 
of its detractors24. Indeed, this criticism disregards the fact that a legal analysis does not lose its 
legal character because a political project sits behind it.25  
 
This political project will reveal itself in the choice of interpretations. Koskenniemi rightly 
held that, if international law is a universal language understood by everyone, this does not imply 
                                                
22 Simma and Paulus (n13) 302-303. 
23  R. Cryer, T. Hervey, B. Sokhi-Bulley and A. Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2011) 46. 
Regarding cosmopolitanism, see T. W. Pogge, ÔCosmopolitanism and SovereigntyÕ (1992) 103 Ethics 48-75; P. 
Hayden, ÔCosmopolitanism and the Need for Transnational Criminal Justice. The Case of the International Criminal 
CourtÕ (2004) Theoria 69-95; P. McAuliffe, ÔFrom Watchdog to Workhorse: Explaining the Emergence of the ICCÕs 
Burden-sharing Policy as an Example of Creeping CosmopolitanismÕ (2014)13 Chinese Journal of International Law 264-
265. 
24 E.g. L.L. Fuller, ÔPositivism and Fidelity of Law Ð A Reply to Professor HartÕ (1958)71 Harvard Law Review 630; J. 
D. Goldsworthy, ÔThe Self-Destruction of Legal PositivismÕ (1990) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 458.  
25  H. L. A. Hart, ÔPositivism and the Separation of Law and MoralsÕ (1958)71(4) Harvard Law Review 612 ; M. 
Koskenniemi, ÔThe Politics of International LawÕ (1990)1 European Journal of International Law 9 ; M. Koskenniemi, The 
Politics of International Law (Hart, 2011) 153. 
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that there is only one right answer.26 Simma and Paulus also recognize that Ôit is obvious that the 
interpretation of law Ð as of any text Ð is subject to the individual preferences and political 
choices of the lawyerÕ.27 Enlightened positivism is thus not insensitive to BassiouniÕs contention 
that Ôas objective or pragmatic as one might desire a rule-finding process to be, it is nevertheless 
always predicated on certain values, just as much as such a process seeks or aims to achieve a 
value-orientated goalÕ.28 Nevertheless, the difference is that positivism does Ônot give up the claim 
to normativity and the prescriptive force of lawÕ.29  Indeed,  
 
[m]aybe a decision maker will decide to disobey a rule-for whatever reason, moral or 
immoral, egoistic or altruistic, humanitarian or state-interested. But the lawyerÕs role is not 
to facilitate the decision makerÕs dilemma between law and politics (and, occasionally, 
between law and morals), but to clarify the legal side of things.30 
 
Another criticism of positivism is linked to the fact that positivism does not integrate 
extra-legal factors whereas such factors also influence actors of international law and their 
reaction to it.31 In this case, the legal analysis reveals that the ability of the ICC to respect the 
right to liberty of its accused mostly depends on the goodwill of the member states and of the 
ICC. Their answers to plural requests from the ICC or from the accused are therefore studied. 
Despite this studyÕs finding that extra-legal considerations influence the reaction of the ICC and 
its member states towards their human rights obligations, this influence does not make the 
analysis any less legal. Indeed, if these factors lead the state to violate its obligations, it does not 
mean that there was in fact no obligation. Therefore, it is relevant to examine the legal 
instruments that could have an impact on the goodwill of the ICC and of its member states, 
whether because of an obligation stemming from the ICC cooperation regime or because of an 
                                                
26 Koskenniemi (n14) 490, 502-517; Cryer (n14) 947; J. A. Beckett, ÔRebel Without a Cause? Martti Koskenniemi and 
the Critique Legal ProjectÕ (2006)7(12) German Law Journal  1051. 
27 Simma and Paulus (n13) 303. 
28 M. C. Bassiouni, ÔA Functional Approach to ÒGeneral Principles of International LawÓÕ (1989-1990)11 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 775.  
29 Simma and Paulus (n13) 308. 
30 Simma and Paulus (n13) 307. 
31 E.g. Fuller (n24) 630, 641; Goldsworthy (n24) 449, 456. 
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obligation stemming from IHRL. This faith in law 32  does not prevent that these extra-legal 
factors might lead the state not to respect its legal obligation or even to disengage itself of its 
obligation by opting out from the system that imposes it (e.g. a treaty). The fact that international 
law finds its source in state consent does not mean that the state has to give its consent each 
time. A state ought to respect its commitments or follow the adequate procedure in order to 
escape its commitments. A violation of commitments caused by extra-legal factors does not 
diminish the legal nature of the obligation. Therefore, although the role of these extra-legal 
considerations is recognised,33 it will not be examined in detail in this doctoral thesis, which 
focuses on the legal aspects of the obligations of the ICC.  
 
To summarize, in this thesis I endeavour to answer the research question whether the 
ICC has a legal obligation to respect the right to liberty and, if so, whether it has the capacity to 
do so. I also put forward a framework wherein this capacity is made compatible with the legal 
obligation to respect the right to liberty incumbent upon the ICC and its State Parties. For this 
purpose, the law that the ICC has to respect is analysed first. Secondly, the human rights regime 
regarding pre-conviction detention is defined and the respect thereof by the ICC is studied. 
Thirdly, following the presentation of the arguments related to the pertinence of an application 
of the right to liberty given the specific context in which the ICC appears to operate, this 
allegedly specific context is examined and compared with the context of other international 
tribunals. Finally, after outlining the specificities of the ICC context, several ways to legally 
eliminate these specificities are envisaged through an analysis of the ICC cooperation regime and 
the enforcement regime of international human rights instruments such as the International 
                                                
32 As held by Scott, Ôlegal positivists believe that law should be obeyed even if it is notÕ (S. V. Scott, ÔInternational Law 
as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship between International Law and International PoliticsÕ (1994)5 European 
Journal of International Law 314). 
33 See : D. Bosco, Rough Justice: the International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics (OUP, 2014) 4;  V. Peskin, 
ÔAssessing the Contemporary International Criminal Tribunals: Performance, Persuasion, and PoliticsÕ (2014)108 
ASIL Proceedings 122-125; C. De Vos, S. Kendall and C. Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice. The Politics and Practice of 
International Criminal Court Interventions (CUP, 2015); O. Bekou and D. Birkett (eds.), Cooperation and the International 
Criminal Court. Perspectives from Theory and Practice (Brill, 2016); R. H. Steinberg (ed.), Contemporary Issues Facing the 
International Criminal Court (Brill, 2016) 445-452. 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)34 or the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)35. 
 
If this thesis might be seen as a guide for a defence lawyer at the ICC since it aims to 
foster the application of human rights, this by no means negates the fact that it is based on a legal 
analysis recognizing the role of state consent. Furthermore, it raises theoretical issues, on the one 
hand regarding the appropriateness of the traditional sources of international law for IHRL and 
of the application of IHRL to international organizations, and, on the other hand, regarding the 
coherence of the legal regime of the ICC, its use by the judges in light of the wishes of its 
founding fathers and its limits due to external factors. It also points to practical aspects regarding 
the right to liberty which states should consider before setting up an international tribunal. These 
issues have never been presented in this light in the literature. Furthermore, the apparent 
contradiction between the interpretation of the legal sources of the ICC and their application by 
its judges has never been demonstrated on the basis of an expansive study of the case law of the 
ICC on a specific right, i.e. the right to liberty. Admittedly, there already exist a number of studies 
on the right for provisional release before the ICTY but, as will be seen later, their findings 
cannot be transposed as such to the ICC given the existing institutional differences. Furthermore, 
in contrast to this thesis, the authors of those studies do not attempt to define the right to liberty 
despite the fragmentation of IHRL and do not search for solutions in the IHRL regime capable 











                                                
34 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 
35 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, entered 









PART. I. THE RESPECT BY THE ICC OF THE RIGHT 
TO LIBERTY 
 
1.! Determination of the law applicable to the ICC: Article 38 of the ICJ Statute versus 
Article 21 of the ICC Statute 
 
Determining whether the ICC ought to take into account the right to liberty of its 
accused requires the examination of the law applicable to the ICC. This applicable law is 
identified using the formalist method, namely through the analysis of the traditional sources of 
international law, the ICC being subject to international law.  
 
Other approaches could be used to justify the necessity for the ICC to respect the right to 
liberty. Focusing on the concept of delegation is one of them.36 Starting from the principle that 
the ICC would not be allowed to act in violation of the pre-existing obligations of its states 
parties, this approach would determine the law by which the 123 states parties to the ICC are 
                                                
36 See C. M. Chaumont, ÔLa signification du principe de spcialit des organisations internationalesÕ in J. Baugniet 
(eds.), Mlanges offerts  Henri Rolin. Problmes de droit des gens (Pedone, 1964) 59; R. McCorqodale, ÔInternational 
Organisations and International Human Rights Law: One Giant Leap for HumankindÕ in K. Kaikobad and M. 
Bohlander (eds.), International Law and Power Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice (Brill, 2009) 145, 155; O. De Schutter, 
ÔHuman Rights and the Rise of International Organisations: the Logic of Sliding Scales in the Law of International 
ResponsibilityÕ in J. Wouters, E. Brems, S. Smis and P. Schmitt (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by 
International Organisations (Intersentia, 2010) 63; F. Naert, ÔBinding International Organisations to Member State 
Treaties or Responsibility of Member States for their Own Actions in the Framework of International OrganisationsÕ 
in J. Wouters, E. Brems, S. Smis and P. Schmitt (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International 
Organisations (Intersentia, 2010) 134; Gradoni, Lewis, Mgret, Nouwen, David Ohlin, Reisinger-Coracini and Zappal 
(n12) 84; S. Vasiliev, ÔFairness and its Metric in International Criminal ProcedureÕ, 18 April 2013, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2253177 (last accessed 21 March 2013) 37-38.   
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bound. In addition to the obvious difficulties linked to the number of states parties and to the 
access to their legislation, De Schutter rightly notices that Ôthis line of reasoning ultimately fails 
on practical grounds, as it results in excessive obstacles being imposed upon international co-
operationÕ.37 Another approach would be to start from the principle that IHRL benefits from a 
hierarchic position in international law due to the fact that some human rights could pretend to 
the status of ius cogens or of rights erga omnes.38 This method would therefore examine to what 
extent the right to liberty could qualify as such right and could potentially be applicable to the 
ICC because of this superior position. The problem is the lack of agreement on a list of these 
ÔsuperiorÕ rights and the weak legal analysis that thus stems from it.39 Thirdly, the applicability of 
human rights to the ICC could also be justified with policy arguments. This is the idea that the 
ICC is a tool for the fight against impunity for international crimes and the associated massive 
violations of human rights. 40  Therefore, as Sloane puts it, Ô[i]t would be ironic and 
counterproductive were [international criminal law] trials to undermine some international human 
                                                
37 De Schutter (n36) 54. 
38 See S. Stapleton, ÔEnsuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statutory Interpretation and the 
Impermissibility of DerogationÕ (1999)31 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 546; D. Shelton, 
ÔHierarchy of Norms and Human Rights: Of Trumps and WinnersÕ (2002)65 Saskatchewan Law Review 307; G-J. A. 
Knoops, Theory and Practice of International and Internationalized Criminal Proceedings (Kluwer Law International, 2005) 17; 
O. De Schutter, International Human Rights Law (CUP, 2010) 61; J. Vidmar, ÔNorm Conflicts and Hierarchy in 
International Law: Towards a Vertical International Legal System?Õ in E. De Wet and J. Vidmar (eds.), Hierarchy in 
International Law. The Place of Human Rights (OUP, 2012) 13-41. 
39 See B. Simma and P. Alston, ÔThe Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General PrinciplesÕ 
(1988-1989)12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 82-108; A. Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law 
(OUP, 2006); C. Tomuschat and J-M. Thouvenin, The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order. Jus Cogens and 
Obligations Erga Omnes (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) 1-19; M. Milanovic, ÔNorm Conflict in International Law: 
Wither Human Rights?Õ (2009-2010)20 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 69-132; M. Addo, The Legal 
Nature of International Human Rights (Martinus Nijfhoff, 2010) 60-79. 
40 Preamble of the ICC statute: ÔAffirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as 
a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the 
national level and by enhancing international cooperation, 
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention 
of such crimesÕ;  
See Swart (n12) 100; Klamberg (n12) 283; J. David Ohlin, ÔA Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure: 
Vindicating the Rule of LawÕ (2009)14 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 83; Gradoni, Lewis, 
Mgret, Nouwen, David Ohlin, Reisinger-Coracini and Zappal (n12) 59; Sluiter (n12) 257. 
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rights standards in an effort to vindicate othersÕ.41 Nonetheless, this type of argument is rather 
subjective and is not so obvious when applied to the right to liberty. Indeed, Gaynor rightly 
illustrated the ambivalence concerning this right by noting that Ôfew of us would wish to 
encounter at the local bookshop a person accused of mass murder, perusing the shelves; freed on 
provisional release while he waits for his trial to begin but most of us would express unease at the 
concept of a person, presumed innocent, detained in a prison block for several years before his 
trial, and for several more until the trial concludesÕ.42  
 
In contrast with these approaches, the examination of the sources of international law, as 
required by the formalist method, is feasible and would lead to a legally confirmed answer. To 
determine the law applicable to the ICC, the instinctive reaction is to turn to Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)43, which sets out the law applicable to the ICJ. 
This article is usually considered as the starting point to examine the sources of international law 
binding upon its subjects.44 According to this article, these sources are: 
 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 5945, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
 
                                                
41 R. D. Sloane, ÔThe Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and 
the Potential of International Criminal LawÕ (2007)43 Stanford Journal of International Law 39, 42 (as cited by Davidson 
(n8) 11). 
42 F. Gaynor, ÔProvisional Release in the Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former YugoslaviaÕ in J. 
Doria (ed.), The Legal Regime of the ICC: Essays in Honour of the Professor J. P. Blishchenko (Brill, 2008) 184. 
43 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945), 15 
UNCIO 355 
44 Bassiouni (n28) 782; Shelton (n38) 45; V-D. Degan, ÔOn the Sources of International Criminal LawÕ (2005)4(1) 
Chinese Journal of International Law 49; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (OUP, 2008, 7th edition) 5; 
M. Shaw, International Law (CUP, 2008, 6th edition) 71. 
45 Article 59: The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that 
particular case. 
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This article is considered to be applicable to the ICC since, as an international 
organization benefiting from international legal personality,46 the ICC is bound by international 
law, as defined in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.47 This view is supported by the advisory opinion 
of the ICJ on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, which 
states that international organizations Ôare subjects of international law, and as such, are bound by 
any obligation incumbent upon them under general rules of international lawÕ48.49  
 
The recourse to Article 38 is the method of choice of the ad hoc tribunals to determine the 
law applicable to them. As noted by Vasiliev, Ôin identifying sources of applicable law, ICTY 
judges naturally resorted to categories listed in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, thereby assuming 
their applicability and relevance to the work of the courtÕ.50 The reason is that Ôthe normative 
corpus to be applied by the Tribunal principaliter, i.e. to decide upon the principal issues 
submitted to it, is international lawÕ.51 However, even if this is the approach adopted by some 
scholars to determine the law applicable to the ICC, the issue of the determination of the 
obligations Ôincumbent uponÕ the ICC remains so that this view is not really helpful to resolve the 
issue in this case.52   
                                                
46 Article 4(1) of the ICC Statute: The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall also have such legal 
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes. 
See W. Rckert, ÔArticle 4Õ in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Beck/Hart, 2008) 121-127. 
47 L. Gradoni, ÔInternational Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Bound by Human Rights Norms É or Tied DownÕ 
(2006)19(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 851; G. Acquaviva, ÔHuman Rights Violations before International 
Tribunals: Reflections on Responsibility of International OrganizationsÕ (2007)20(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 
614; N. Croquet, ÔThe International Criminal Court and the Treatment of Defence Rights : A Mirror of the 
European Court of Human RightsÕ Jurisprudence ?Õ (2011)11(1) Human Rights Law Review 98.  
48 ICJ, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory Opinion) (1980) ICJ Rep 73, 
89-90 ¤37. 
49 Shelton (n38) 307; Gradoni (n47) 851; K. Zeegers, ÔDe Invloed van Internationale Mensenrechten op 
Internationaal StrafprocesrechtÕ in D. Abels, M. M. Dolman and K.C.J. Vriend (eds.), Dialectiek van Nationaal en 
Internationaal Strafrecht (Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2013) 53-55. 
50 Vasiliev (n36) 11. 
Regarding the applicable law of the ad hoc tribunals, see Gradoni (n47) 847-873; Gradoni, Lewis, Mgret, Nouwen, 
David Ohlin, Reisinger-Coracini and Zappal (n12) 66-73; Vasiliev (n36) 8-35. 
51 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kupre!kić et al., Case No.  IT-95-16-T, TC, ICTY, 14 January 2000 ¤539.   
52 Vasiliev (n36) 12; Zeegers (n49) 57; C. Deprez, ÔThe Authority of Strasbourg Jurisprudence from the Perspective 
of the International Criminal CourtÕ (2015)3 European Journal of Human Rights 280. 
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In addition, in comparison with the ad hoc tribunals which are subsidiary bodies of the 
United Nations (UN), the ICC is an international organization set up by treaty. Its status in 
international law is therefore different.53 Besides, in contrast to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and 
to the other international criminal tribunals,54 Article 21 of the ICC Statute lists its own applicable 
law. Therefore, debates regarding the applicability of the rules of international law due to their 
status in international law are less relevant for the ICC since the drafters of the ICC settled this 
issue by developing their own hierarchy of the applicable rules.55 Consequently, one must be 
aware that the reasoning followed in this thesis cannot be transposed as such to the other 
international or internationalized criminal tribunals since Article 21 of the ICC Statute does not 
apply to these tribunals. For this reason, regarding the case law of other international tribunals, 
the ICC is of opinion that Ôdecisions of other international courts and tribunals are not part of 
the directly applicable law under Article 21 of the [Rome] StatuteÕ and that Ôthe precedent of the 
ad hoc Tribunals is in no sense binding on the Trial Chamber at this CourtÕ.56 Nonetheless, the 
fact that the precedent of the ad hoc tribunals is not binding does not mean that the ICC would 
not refer to them when it finds them relevant, as demonstrated by the ICC case law.57  
                                                
53 A. Pellet, ÔApplicable LawÕ in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary Vol. II (OUP, 2002) 1052; G. Sluiter, ÔNaleving van de rechten van de mens door 
internationale straftribunalenÕ (2002)27 NJCM-bulletin 703; A. Cassese, ÔThe Influence of the European Court of 
Human Rights on International Criminal Tribunals Ð Some Methodological RemarksÕ in M. Bergsmo (ed.), Human 
Rights for the Downtrodden: Essays in Honour of Asbiorn Eide (Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) 19; Gradoni (n47) 849; D. Akande, 
ÔSources of International Criminal LawÕ in A. Cassese (ed.) The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (OUP, 
2009) 53. 
54 G. Hochmayr, ÔApplicable Law in Practice and TheoryÕ (2014)12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 655. 
55 The debate regarding ius cogens subsists but is, as seen later, irrelevant for the purpose of this thesis since the right 
to liberty is applicable to the ICC through a combination of Article 21(1)(a) and 21(3) of the ICC Statute. 
56  Decision regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving Testimony at Trial, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 30 November 2007 ¤44. 
57 Decision on the ProsecutionÕs Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, PTCI, ICC, 4 March 2009 (ÔAl Bashir arrest 
warrantÕ); Decision on application for interim release, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-
01/08, PTCII, ICC, 14 April 2009 (ÔBemba interim release decision of 14 April 2009Õ); Judgment on the appeal of Mr 
Katanga against the decision of Trial Chamber II of 20 November 2009 entitled ÒDecision on the motion of the 
defence for Germain Katanga for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of proceedingsÓ, Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, AC, ICC, 7 
December 2010; Decision on the ProsecutorÕs Application under Article 58, Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Mudacumura, Case 





Article 21 of the ICC Statute stipulates that: 
 
1. The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules 
of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed 
conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would 
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not 
inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized 
norms and standards. 
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions. 
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent 
with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction 
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, 
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
wealth, birth or other status. 
 
Despite being similar to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, Article 21 does not merely restate it. 
Rather, it presents some particularities. Firstly, it does not use the same language; for example, 
there is no explicit reference to custom. Secondly, it follows from the expressions Ôin the first 
placeÕ and Ôin the second placeÕ that Article 21 installs a hierarchy among the sources.58 Thirdly, it 
                                                                                                                                                   
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 13 July 2012 entitled ÒDecision on the ÔRequte de la Dfense demandant la 
mise en libert provisoire du prsident GbagboÕÓ, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, AC, ICC, 
26 October 2012 (ÔLaurent Gbagbo interim release judgment of 26 October 2012Õ); Third Decision on Bosco 
NtagandaÕs Interim Release, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, PTCII, ICC, 17 July 2014; 
G. Bitti, ÔArticle 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the treatment of sources of law in the 
jurisprudence of the ICCÕ in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 299.   
58 It is commonly admit that Article 38 does not: Brownlie (n44) 5; Shaw (n44) 5; R. Cryer, ÔRoyalism and the King: 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the Politics of SourcesÕ (2009)12 New Criminal Law Review 393-394; M. Elewa 
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departs from Article 38 as it does not mention the Ôteachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nationsÕ as a potential source. These particularities demonstrate the 
intention of the founding states to derogate from Article 38 and to make Article 21 lex specialis of 
Article 38.59 For this reason, contrary to other scholars who combine Article 38 and Article 21 to 
examine the law applicable to the ICC,60 I have referred exclusively to Article 21 for this analysis 
of the applicable law to the ICC even if it will be shown that these two articles do not really differ 
in practice.  
 
Bassiouni does not agree with the conclusion that Article 21 is lex specialis of Article 38. 
For him, the founding states intended to make Article 10 of the ICC Statute61 prevail over Article 
21.62  This position is isolated, however, and Bassiouni does not explain where or when the 
founding states expressed this intention. In addition, Bassiouni admits that, had the intent of the 
drafters not been expressed, Ôthe specificity of Article 21 would control over the generality of 
Article 10Õ.63 Given the lack of proof of this intent, in line with Vasiliev, Deprez and Zeegers,64 in 
this thesis I adopt the position that Article 21 is lex specialis of Article 38. 
 
Therefore, the different sources stated in Article 21 are studied in order to determine 
whether and to what extent human rights, especially the right to liberty, are applicable to the ICC 
and its judges.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Badar and N. Higgins, ÔGeneral principles of law in the early jurisprudence of the  ICCÕ in T. Mariniello (ed.), The 
International Criminal Court in Search of Its Purpose and Identity (Routledge, 2015) 265. 
59 For a similar view: C. Deprez, ÔExtent of Applicability of Human Rights Standards to Proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court: On Possible Reductive FactorsÕ (2012)12 International Criminal Law Review 729; Vasiliev 
(n36) 13; Zeegers (n49) 58. 
See also ILC, ÔReport on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the diversification and 
expansion of international lawÕ, Fifty-Eight session, (1 May Ð 9 June and 3 July Ð 11 August 2006) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/L.682, 34-65.  
60 Eg.: Gradoni (n47) 854; Deprez (n52) 280. 
61 Article 10 of the ICC Statute: Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing 
or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute. 
62 M.C. Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, 2nd Edition) 657. 
63 Bassiouni (n62) 657. 
64 Deprez (n59) 729; Vasiliev (n36) 13; Zeegers (n49) 58. 
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1.1! Article 21(1) and 21(2) of the ICC Statute: The classical sources  
 
According to Article 21(1)(a), the ICC has first to apply the Statute, the Elements of 
Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE). The first step is thus to look at these 
sources to examine whether they recognize the right to liberty explicitly or through provisions on 
provisional release. A first glance reveals that, if the right to liberty is not expressly recognized by 
the ICC provisions, Articles 58 and 60 of the Statute, in combination with Rules 118Ð120 of the 
RPE and Regulation 51, regulate the process of issuing an arrest warrant and the possibility of 
interim release. Therefore, Article 21(1)(a) requires that these provisions constitute the core ones 
to be applied by the ICC judges when dealing with interim release issues. The absence of explicit 
recognition of the right to liberty means that, independently of Article 21(3), this right would 
apply as such only to the extent that these core provisions reflect it. Since, as demonstrated in 
section 4, the ICC legal regime does not really suffer lacunae regarding its interim release 
provisons, the other sources of Article 21(1) will not be used for this study because the hierarchic 
order used in Article 21(1) provides for their use only when the ICC provisions leave a situation 
unregulated. Nonetheless, it is interesting to present these other sources in order for the analysis 
to be complete. 
 
Article 21(1)(b) then specifies that, in a case where the ICC provisions do not regulate a 
situation, and only in this case,65 the judges shall apply Ôapplicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed 
conflictÕ. Some authors argue that the expression Ôapplicable treatiesÕ could refer to human rights 
treaties.66 However, other scholars rightly reject this possibility since these treaties are addressed 
to states and since they only bind their member states.67 This view is strengthened by the fact 
that, as shown by the travaux prparatoires, the drafters did not refer to human rights treaties such 
as the ICCPR during the discussions on this article.68 Be that as it may, even assuming that this 
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provision left the door open to the application of such human rights treaties, the problem of the 
identification of the treaties applicable to the ICC would arise given the obscurity of the 
expression Ôapplicable treatiesÕ and the fact that not all the states parties to the ICC are bound by 
the same treaties. Consequently, I do not contend that human rights could be applied to the ICC 
through their conventional form.  
 
The second paragraph of Article 21 also refers to Ôthe principles and rules of international 
lawÕ. For most scholars, these principles and rules correspond to customary international law.69 
The ICC seems to share this point of view.70 The fear of potential breaches of the principle of the 
legality of offences and punishment would explain the avoidance of the term ÔcustomÕ.71 For 
McAuliffe deGuzman, this expression might also Ôreflect the draftersÕ intention to enable the 
Court to apply principles that are neither derived from national laws nor part of customary 
international law. Such principles might derive from (É) international legal conscience, the 
nature of the international community, and natural law.Õ72 The only explanation offered by the 
working group is that it refers to international public law. 73  These Ôprinciples and rules of 
international lawÕ have to be distinguished from the general principles of law referred by Article 
21(1)(c).74 It can be concluded from this paragraph that human rights would thus be applicable to 
the ICC as long as there is a lacuna in the ICC legal regime, which is not the case for the interim 
release regime, and as long as they could qualify as customary international law.  
 
Article 21(1)(c) mentions, as third subsidiary source, the Ôgeneral principles of law derived 
by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the 
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national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that 
those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and 
internationally recognized norms and standardsÕ. These general principles of law correspond to 
those referred to by Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.75  
 
Next to these mandatory sources, Article 21(2) stipulates that Ôthe Court may apply 
principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisionsÕ. At first glance, the insertion of 
this paragraph is a bit puzzling. As noted by Verhoeven, Ôit would be sheer nonsense to affirm 
that the Court is forbidden to apply principles and rules as interpreted in its previous decisionsÕ 
since Ôthis would imply that it is obliged to change its interpretation in each of its judgmentsÕ.76 Be 
that as it may, this source is not very helpful for the determination of the applicability of the right 
to liberty to the ICC as it does not solve the problem of the first application.  
 
The analysis of these sources reveals that, save for the hierarchy established by Article 21, 
the sources are similar to those of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. Admittedly, Article 21 does not 
expressly refer to doctrine as direct source. Nevertheless, it does not prevent the ICC from using 
this source to define the unwritten law,77 so that this exclusion is just apparent. Consequently, the 
debate of the primacy of Article 21 ICC Statute or of Article 38 ICJ Statute does not have real 
consequences in practice if the analysis is limited to the sources listed by Article 21(1) and (2). 
Nonetheless, in contrast with Article 38, Article 21(3) adds a general principle of interpretation 
that has, or at least should have, an impact on the use of the classical sources referred to by these 
two articles. The examination of this principle is crucial for this analysis since it expressly refers 
to human rights. 
 
1.2! Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute: a rule of interpretation 
 
Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute provides that: 
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The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded 
on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, 
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth 
or other status.  
 
This paragraph adds thus an explicit reference to human rights and an anti-discrimination 
clause. The examination of this anti-discrimination clause is beyond the scope of this study due 
to its lack of relevance for this topic. 
 
Despite appearances, this reference to human rights does not mean that the issue of the 
applicability of the right to liberty to the ICC is solved. Young rightly points out that: 
 
Such a phrase could denote reference to a wide variety of sources of law, including 
customary international law, (É) widely ratified treaty law, (É) and even regional human 
rights instruments (É). The broad notion of Ôhuman rightsÕ could encompass both Ôsoft 
lawÕ and more traditional sources of law. It could potentially entail reference to 
jurisprudence of international courts, tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies and even to the 
law of national legal systems.78 
 
Interestingly, in spite of the existence of these numerous potential interpretations, due to 
the vagueness of the expression Ôinternationally recognized human rightsÕ, the travaux prparatoires 
reveal that, in comparison to the anti-discrimination clause, the choice of this reference was not 
debated. 79  This is surprising because, as implied by Young, the choice of inserting such a 
paragraph raises several issues: the legal status of this paragraph, the scope of ÔinternationallyÕ and 
the definition of ÔrecognizedÕ.  
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1.2.1! The legal status of Article 21(3) 
 
The status of Article 21(3) raises the first issue. Is it a distinct source of law applicable to 
the ICC80 or rather a rule of interpretation81? As seen in section 2, the ICC judges do not give a 
consistent answer to this question. 
 
The interpretation of Article 21(3) as a rule of interpretation is the most convincing one 
and is the one generally accepted.82 As argued by Young, 
 
The purpose of paragraphs (1) and (2) [of Article 21] is to identify specific sources of 
applicable law for the Court. They do so by commencing with the language: Ôthe Court 
shall apply. ÉÕ and Ôthe Court may applyÕ (emphasis added) respectively. Article 21(3) does 
not follow this same linguistic structure. Unlike paragraphs 1 and 2, it is not clearly setting 
out a statement of the sources of law to be applied. It does not present the Court as 
subject, but uses the passive voice in a manner which, on plain reading, could be 
understood as overarching. This different format of article 21(3) could indicate that, 
unlike paragraphs 1 and 2, article 21(3) is not setting out an independent source of 
substantive applicable law for the Court, but establishing a more general rule which must 
govern both the interpretation and application of the sources of law expressly identified 
in paragraphs 1 and 2. In this manner, article 21(3) constitutes an overriding general rule 
of interpretation, rather than a source of substantive applicable law.83 
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Nonetheless, qualifying Article 21(3) as a rule of interpretation raises the issue of the 
nature of the ICC Statute because this nature would affect the way this rule should be 
interpreted. Indeed, if the general rule of interpretation, as stated by Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 84  is that Ôa treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purposeÕ, two principles of interpretation are used to interpret 
human rights treaties 85 : the principle of effectiveness, Ôwhich implies that rights interpreted 
should be practical and effective and not theoretical and illusoryÕ, and the principle of evolutive 
interpretation, Ôwhich implies the dynamic character of human rights and thus accords only 
limited value to preparatory workÕ.86 These principles have been expressly recognized by the 
ECtHR87 and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACtHR).88  
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Consequently, should Article 21(3) be interpreted in light of the principle of effectiveness 
and the principle of evolutive interpretation? Or should Article 21(3) be interpreted restrictively 
since these techniques could conflict with the principle of strict interpretation applicable to 
criminal law? This distinction is important because, as seen infra, the words ÔinternationallyÕ and 
ÔrecognizedÕ could lead to several interpretations. Robinson convincingly demonstrated that when 
Ôhuman rights and humanitarian interpretive techniques are replicated in ICL [international 
criminal law], fostering broad, victim-focused, dynamic interpretationsÕ, it Ônot only conflicts with 
the principle of legality but also encourages exuberant interpretations that contravene culpability 
and fair labellingÕ.89 Nonetheless, regarding the right to liberty, this issue is not a real one. In fact, 
RobinsonÕs remarks are only pertinent for substantive rights and not for procedural ones since 
Ôensuring fair trials (É) appertains to the domain par excellence of human rights lawÕ. 90 
Therefore, interpretating the right to liberty in light of the principle of effectiveness would not 
put the principle of legality at risk. As held by Gillich,  
 
if the parties use the term "human rights" in a treaty without further defining or clarifying 
it, this term has to be understood according to its meaning in general international law 
and, unless otherwise indicated, taking into account subsequent changes in the nature and 
content of the concept of human rights that have taken place after the conclusion of the 
treaty. 91  
 
It stems from the lack of reservation expressed about Article 21(3) and its use of the expression 
Ôhuman rightsÕ that the drafters intended this body of law to be applied as such with its own tools 
of interpretation so that the principle of effectiveness, besides being recognized by the ICC,92 
should play a role in this analysis.  
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If the recognition of Article 21(3) as a rule of interpretation is not really contested, the 
question whether human rights, thanks to Article 21(3), would trump the ICC provisions is not 
settled. For Vasiliev, qualifying Article 21(3) as an interpretive principle amounts to 
Ôunequivocally elevat[ing] internationally recognized human rights to the status of superior norms 
and makes their function as the obligatory and prime interpretive devices formalÕ.93 This vision is 
recognized by other scholars 94  and is the right conclusion according to the principle of 
effectiveness. This conclusion is also bolstered by the argument that, had the drafters intended to 
make the ICC provisions prevail, they would have expressly recognized human rights law as a 
subsidiary source. Other authors, such as Hafner and Binder95 or Gallant96, agree on the fact that 
human rights prevail on the RPE but reach the opposite conclusion for the ICC Statute. For 
example, Gallant states that: 
 
Internationally recognized human rights are adopted as part of the ICC Statute, and are 
superior to RPE adopted under the Statute. They are not stated as being superior to the 
ICC Statute itself. That is, they are not stated as ius cogens (É). Thus should there be an 
explicit inconsistency between a provision of the ICC Statute and an internationally 
recognized human right, there is no automatic preference for the right.97  
 
Since the ICC Statute refers explicitly to human rights in a different paragraph, a Ôtextual 
and intent-based approachÕ,98 the first approach is favoured. Be that as it may, as seen infra, issue 
of conflict between the ICC Statute and IHRL does not arise for this study. 
 
Article 21(3) requires both a consistent ÔinterpretationÕ and a consistent ÔapplicationÕ of 
law with internationally recognized human rights. As noted by Bitti, Ôit appears therefore that 
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ÒapplicationÓ is something different from ÒinterpretationÓÕ. According to him, Ôit implies that a 
certain result must be reached (É) and that such a result must be in conformity with 
internationally recognized human rightsÕ.99 The distinction between interpretation and application 
is very subtle though and without real practical impact since a correct interpretation should lead 
to the correct application. 
It stems from these considerations that all the ICC provisions need to be interpreted and 
applied consistently with internationally recognized human rights. In case of conflict, the former 
should be put aside in favour of the latter. In case of lacunae in the ICC provisions, the other 
sources stated by Article 21 should also be interpreted in conformity with Ôinternationally 
recognized human rightsÕ. Nevertheless, the issue of identification of such rights remains and is 
the question to which this investigation now turns. 
 
1.2.2! The scope of ÔinternationallyÕ 
 
As noted by Young, the scope of the expression Ôinternationally recognized human rightsÕ 
is not straightforward because IHRL is derived from many sources which do not have the same 
normative status: these sources are so-called universal treaties, regional treaties, soft law and the 
case law of human rights institutions. The preparatory works do not provide any indication 
regarding the sources to use100 as if Ôthe drafters of the Statute considered that Òinternationally 
recognized human rightsÓ are readily capable of identificationÕ.101 As held by Bailey, Ôbeyond 
express reference to treaty standards, implicit acknowledgement of the role of international 
custom, and reference to fair trial rights, there was no discussion as to the content of this 
phraseÕ.102 In addition, the ad hoc tribunals do not use this expression so that their practice is not 
helpful in understanding the intention of the drafters of the ICC Statute.103 Hafner and Binder 
demonstrate that, notwithstanding being Ôextensively used in international relationsÕ as a generally 
                                                
99 Bitti (n57) 285-304. 
100 The ILC draft did not mention human rights as law applicable to the ICC. It stipulated that Ôthe Court shall apply 
this Statute, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of general international law and to the extent applicable, 
any rule of national lawÕ. 
See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, Rome 15 June-17 July 1998, Official Records, Volume II, Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the 
meetings of the Committee of the Whole, UN Doc A/CONF.183/13 (Vol II), various plenary meetings, 222-224. 
101 Young (n78) 194. 
102 Bailey (n69) 530. 
103 Young (n78) 195-196. 
32 
accepted standard of reference, the expression Ôinternationally recognizedÕ Ôis neither precisely 
defined nor consistently detailedÕ.104 
 
The scope of the expression ÔinternationallyÕ is debated in the literature. Sheppard 
distinguishes two potential interpretations regarding this scope. The first one is a minimalist one: 
Ôany norm that was recognised as a human right would be sufficient to bind the court pursuant to 
Article 21(3)Õ since this article Ôdoes not incorporate any requisite level of international 
recognition, but sets the international nature of the recognition itself as the relevant criterionÕ. 105 
This approach is tantamount to adopting Ôall human rights norms existing in the corpus of 
international lawÕ.106 Other authors recognize this possibility.107  
 
Sheppard also suggests a second potential approach, a contextual one according to which 
the pertinent regional conventions would be identified depending on which state would have 
been supposed to prosecute the case.108 This approach is illustrated by the practice of the ICTY 
which, in some instances, applied the standards of the ECHR as binding law on the ground that 
the accused must be granted at least the same level of protection as he would have enjoyed if he 
had been charged in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in the interest of equal treatment.109 
For Ohlin, the application of the human rights standards of the states concerned is preferable 
because it helps to strengthen the rule of law and because the procedure will be more accepted by 
the victims and the defendant as these are the standards to which they are accustomed. 110 
Nonetheless, this second approach is rather isolated and seems to contravene the anti-
discrimination clause contained in Article 21(3) since it would lead to a difference of treatment 
between the accused.111 In addition, if a case concerns a conflict spread among several states, the 
identification of the state that would have had jurisdiction is not necessarily straightforward.  
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Besides these two approaches suggested by Sheppard, Hafner and Binder argue that the 
expression ÔinternationallyÕ necessarily excludes the regional conventions from the equation.112 To 
my knowledge, they are the only ones to suggest this approach. 
 
All these approaches seem to be cogent and one is not legally prevalent over the others. 
In this thesis, I adopt the first one since, as seen in the following sub-section, it respects the 
consent of the states thanks to the requirement that rights be recognized implies that the right 
stated in a regional convention should be corroborated by other regional conventions or a 
universal one. 
 
1.2.3! The definition of ÔrecognizedÕ 
 
Regardless of the issue of the geographical scope, the issue of the definition of 
ÔrecognizedÕ arises. What does it entail? Does the absence of reference to ÔbindingÕ mean that the 
ICC judges have also to pay attention to soft law, like the Universal Declaration of human rights 
(UDHR), the general comments of the ICCPR or the resolutions of the UN General Assembly? 
And what about the case law of human rights institutions? The travaux prparatoires do not address 
this issue either.  
 
Since the founding states explicitly chose to refer to ÔrecognizedÕ human rights and not to 
ÔbindingÕ human rights, it is argued that the scope is thus larger. Therefore, when the soft law or 
the case law of human rights institutions is necessary to define a human right, this soft law and 
this case law should be understood as ÔrecognizedÕ if they are internationally uncontested. 
Consequently, with most scholars,113 in this thesis I argue that, if the ICC is not bound as such by 
this soft law or that case law, it is still obliged to take them into consideration and to interpret 
and apply its law in conformity with them as long as they are internationally uncontested. I adopt 
the conclusion of the study conducted by Cassese regarding the ad hoc tribunals and the use of the 
ECtHRÕs case law since it could be transposed to the ICC: 
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Recourse to such case law should only serve to establish the existence of rules of 
customary international law, or to elucidate general principles of international procedure 
and principles of criminal law common to the major legal systems of the world. Lastly, 
such recourse may contribute to establishing the precise interpretation of international 
conventional or customary norms that are obscure, incomplete or ambiguous. In other 
words, the case law of the European Court should never be applied as such, but only as a 
supplementary means of elucidating rules or principles of international law.114  
 
In order to define an internationally recognized human right, the principle is thus to start 
with the relevant treaty, customary international law or general principle of law and then to use 
the existing soft law or case law when these norms are not sufficient to understand the scope of a 





Using the formalist method, it has been demonstrated that the law applicable to the ICC 
is determined by Article 21 of its Statute, which is lex specialis to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. In 
this case, since, as seen in section 4, the regime of interim release provided by the ICC provisions 
does not suffer from any lacunae, only the ICC provisions will be examined and the other 
subsidiary sources are left aside. In addition, Article 21(3) requires that the law applicable to the 
ICC to be interpreted and applied in conformity with internationally recognized human rights. 
Consequently, the regime of interim release provided by the ICC rules should be interpreted and 
applied in conformity with the right to liberty as it is internationally recognized. Nonetheless, 
before defining this right, it is interesting to understand whether the ICC judges share the same 
opinion regarding the application of IHRL to them. 
 
2.! The ICC judges and international human rights law 
 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the ICC provisions regarding interim release 
have to be interpreted and applied in conformity with the right to liberty as internationally 
recognized. But are the ICC judges of the same opinion? These theoretical arguments from the 
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previous section put aside, what is the ICC judgesÕ attitude regarding their applicable law, and 
more specifically regarding the application of human rights to their rulings? First, it must be 
noted that the ICC has always referred to Article 21 of its Statute to determine its applicable law. 
Secondly, the Appeals Chamber (AC) stressed the importance of human rights for the ICC 
proceedings but failed to clarify the meaning of Article 21(3):  
 
Article 21(3) of the Statute makes the interpretation as well as the application of the law 
applicable under the Statute subject to internationally recognised human rights. (É) 
Human rights underpin the Statute; every aspect of it, including the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the Court. Its provisions must be interpreted and more importantly applied 
in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.115 
 
No further clarification has been provided by another chamber. Thirdly, the ICC judges have not 
yet adopted a uniform and constant position towards IHRL, probably considering that this 
position should vary depending on the case. In fact, their decisions can be classified in several 
categories: those refusing to apply IHRL in a specific case; those using IHRL ad abundantiam, 
namely when the clarity of the ICC provisions would not require such use; those using IHRL to 
give content to the ICC provisions and those using IHRL to reject the application of the ICC 
rules. It must be noted that this lack of constant position was also noted by Cassese regarding the 
ad hoc tribunalsÕ attitude towards the ECtHRÕs case law. Cassese even qualified this approach as 
being wild because if Ôthey have often referred to this case law in support of an interpretation 
they had already adopted (a sort of a posteriori legitimisation), or to find a legal solution to specific 
unresolved problems, which is perfectly legitimateÕ, they Ôhave not always sought to determine 
whether the transposition of European Court case law was appropriate, nor the correct means of 
doing soÕ.116 The same characterization as ÔwildÕ is used by Deprez regarding the appropriation by 
the ICC of ECtHRÕs case law.117 
                                                
115 Judgment on the ProsecutorÕs Application of Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber IÕs 31 March 2006 
Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, Situation in the DRC, ICC-01/04, AC, ICC, 13 July 2006 ¤11; Judgment on the 
Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the jurisdiction of the 
Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, AC, ICC, 14 December 2006 ¤¤36-37.   
116 Cassese (n53) 50; 
In the same sense, see S. Vasiliev, ÔInternational Criminal Tribunals in the Shadow of Strasbourg and Politics of 
Cross-fertilisationÕ (2015)84 Nordic Journal of International Law 387. 
117 Deprez (n52) 294. 
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These different attitudes of the ICC judges will be examined in more detail in the 
following subsection. 
 
2.1.! The impact of Article 21(3) 
 
2.1.1.! The refusal of application of human rights 
 
The refusal to apply IHRL has arisen, to my knowledge, only in two decisions. In its 
witness proofing decision, Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) I refused to apply Article 21(3) because Ôprior 
to undertaking the analysis required by article 21 (3) of the Statute, the Chamber must find a 
provision, rule or principle that, under article 21 (1) (a) to (c) of the Statute, could be applicable 
to the issue at handÕ.118 This decision was criticized by Young because Ôthis fails to recognize that 
the process of determining that there is no applicable law under article 21(1) is itself a process of 
interpretation of the law, which therefore must be informed by article 21(3)Õ.119 Later on, PTCI 
rectified its position and rightly held that:  
 
The consistent case law of the Chamber on the applicable law before the Court has held 
that, according to article 21 of the Statute, those other sources of law provided for in 
paragraphs (l)(b) and (l)(c) of article 21 of the Statute, can only be resorted to when the 
following two conditions are met: (i) there is a lacuna in the written law contained in the 
Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules; and (ii) such lacuna cannot be filled by the 
application of the criteria of interpretation provided in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties and article 21(3) of the Statute.120 (emphasis added) 
 
In another decision, without referring to Article 21(3), PTCII rejected the pertinence of 
applying to the ICC the non-refoulement principle since Ôonly a State which possesses territory is 
                                                
118 Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 8 November 2006 ¤10. 
119 Young (n78) 201. 
120 Al Bashir arrest warrant (n57) ¤44. 
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actually able to applyÕ this rule.121 Nonetheless, as seen in sub-section 2.1.4., in the same decision, 
the judge referred to Article 21(3) to disregard Article 93(7) of the ICC Statute.  
 
These two positions are isolated and were used in specific cases. Besides, PTCI seems to 
have changed its position and PTCII establishes in the same decision the importance of human 
rights. 
 
2.1.2.! The use of international human rights law ad abundantiam 
 
In some cases, the ICC judges refer to IHRL to confirm that the way they apply and 
interpret the ICC provisions is in conformity with this law. In these cases, they content to state 
the theoretical content of the relevant human right without learning concrete lessons from it. 
This use is different from the third approach since IHRL is not used to give further content to an 
ICC provision. This second approach is usually illustrated in the ICC decisions by the reference 
to Article 21(3), which PTCI expressly qualified as Ôa general principle of interpretationÕ,122 and by 
the interchangeable reference to different human rights conventions, to their case law and to soft 
law, in order to demonstrate the rightness of the chosen reasoning. Since these references do not 
appear, at least according to the motivation of their decisions, to have any effects on the way the 
judges apply the ICC provisions, they are said to be ad abundantiam. It is interesting to note that, if 
most of these decisions refer to Article 21(3), they do not give any explanation regarding the 
choice of instruments of IHRL. 
 
The case law regarding detention issues is revealing of this practice. For example, 
referring to Article 21(3), PTCI held that the expression Ôreasonable grounds to believeÕ found in 
Article 58 of the ICC Statute had to be Ôconsistent with the Ôreasonable suspicionÕ standard 
provided for in article 5(1)(c) of the [ECHR] and the interpretation of the [IACtHR] in respect of 
                                                
121  Decision on an Amicus Curiae application and on the ÒRequte tendant  obtenir prsentations des tmoins DRC 
D02P0350, DRC D02P0236, DRC D02P0228 aux autorits nerlandaises aux fins dÕasileÓ (articles 68 and 93(7) of the 
Statute), Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-
01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 9 June 2011 ¤64 (ÔKatanga and Ngudjolo Amicus Curiae decisionÕ). 
122 Decision on the Joinder of the Cases against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 10 
March 2008 ¤7; Decision on the powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber to review proprio motu the pretrial detention of 
Germain Katanga, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 
and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 18 March 2008 ¤6 (ÔKatanga interim release decision of 18 March 2008Õ). 
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the fundamental right of any person to liberty under article 7 of the American Convention on 
Human RightsÕ.123 It did not give any more explanation regarding this standard and its impact on 
the expression Ôreasonable grounds to believeÕ. Similarly, PTCII124 and PTCIII125 enunciated the 
definition of the right to liberty by referring to the ICCPR, the American Convention on Human 
Rights (AmCHR)126, the African Charter on Human and PeoplesÕ Rights (AfCHPR)127 and to the 
ECHR and their case law without learning anything from it. The AC confirmed this reasoning 
and referred to the case law of the ECtHR and IACtHR to confirm the conformity of the ICC 
provisions with the right to liberty128 and the right to be tried without undue delay129.130 
                                                
123 Decision on the ProsecutorÕs Application for a warrant of arrest, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, PTCI, ICC, 10 February 2006 ¤12 (ÔLubanga arrest warrantÕ).  
Same sense: Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Ahmad 
Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 27 April 2007 
¤28; Review of detention and decision on the Òthird defence request for interim releaseÓ, Prosecutor v. Callixte 
Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, PTCI, ICC, 16 September 2011 (ÔMbarushimana interim release decision 
of 16 September 2011Õ); 
Same sense with an additional reference to the case law of the HRC: Katanga interim release decision of 18 March 
2008 (n122). 
124 Decision on the interim release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and convening hearings with the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, 
and the Republic of South Africa, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, PTCII, ICC, 14 
August 2009 ¤35, ¤38, ¤57, ¤59 (ÔBemba interim release decision of 14 August 2009Õ); Decision on the ProsecutorÕs 
Application under Article 58, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, PTCII, ICC, 13 July 2012 ¤13. 
125 Decision on application for interim release, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 
PTCIII, ICC, 21 August 2008 ¤36, ¤43, ¤46, ¤55 (ÔBemba interim release decision of 21 August 2008Õ); Decision on 
the ProsecutorÕs Application Pursuant to Article 58 for a warrant of arrest against Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, 
Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, PTCIII, ICC, 30 November 2011 ¤27 (ÔLaurent Gbagbo 
Article 58 decisionÕ). 
126 American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 
UNTS 123 
127 African Charter on Human and PeoplesÕ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 
(1982) 21 ILM 58 
128 Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber III entitled 
ÒDecision on application for interim releaseÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, AC, 
ICC, 16 December 2008 ¤¤28-32; Decision on the application for the interim release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 18 October 2006 (ÔLubanga interim release 
decision of 18 October 2006Õ).  
See also: Second review of the ÒDecision on the application for the interim release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 




This trend to use Article 21(3) as a general rule of interpretation and to refer to diverse 
human rights instruments without demonstrating the necessity to do so or without inferring 
anything from it does not only exist in the case law regarding detention. For example, to 
corroborate its interpretation of Article 67(2) of the ICC Statute which deals with issues of 
disclosure, the AC referred to the ECtHRÕs case law despite its lack of utility for the adopted 
reasoning.131 
 
The risk of this practice is that these references to IHRL would only be perceived as a 
formality by the participants and therefore ultimately lead to some disillusion. In addition, by 
qualifying Article 21(3) only as Ôa general principle of interpretationÕ and by enumerating only in 
theory the principles of IHRL, the fact that Article 21(3) also requires the application of the ICC 
provisions in conformity with IHRL is not taken into account. Consequently, such use of Article 
                                                                                                                                                   
interim release of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases 
No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 27 March 2008; Dcision relative  la Requte du 
Procureur aux fins de dlivrance dÕun mandat dÕarrt  lÕencontre de Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, PTCIII, ICC, 10 June 2008 ¤24, ¤90 (ÔBemba Article 58 decisionÕ); 
Review of the Òdecision on the conditions of the pre-trial detention of Germain KatangaÓ, Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 18 
August 2008; Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Ahmad 
Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 27 September 
2008 ¤28 (ÔHarun Article 58 decisionÕ); Second review of the decision on the application for interim release of 
Mathieu Ngudjolo (rule 118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 19 November 2008 ¤19 
(ÔNgudjolo interim release decision of 19 November 2008Õ); Decision on application for interim release, Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, PTCIII, ICC, 16 December 2008 ¤31, ¤46. 
129 Judgment on the appeal of Mr Katanga against the decision of Trial Chamber II of 20 November 2009 entitled 
ÒDecision on the motion of the defence for Germain Katanga for a declaration on unlawful detention and stay of 
proceedingsÓ, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and 
ICC-01/04-01/07, AC, ICC, 19 July 2010 ¤45. 
130 Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the "Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant 
of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir", Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-
01/09, AC, ICC, 3 February 2010 ¤31. 
131 Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the 
consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application 
to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 
2008", Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, AC, ICC, 21 October 2008 ¤¤46-47. 
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21(3) does conform to its letter as long as it does not remain only a formal reference to IHRL 





2.1.3.! The content determination function of human rights 
 
Another function assigned to human rights by the ICC judges is to give content to ICC 
rules that are not sufficiently detailed. In this case, the judges not only interpret but also apply the 
ICC provisions in conformity with IHRL. 
 
The scarcity of provisions in the ICC Statute regarding the rights of victims has led to an 
expansive use of this function. For example, PTCI deduced the victimsÕ right to participate in the 
proceedings at the investigation stage from the case law of the ECtHR and the IACtHR.132 
Likewise, the way to evaluate the prejudice mentioned by Regulation 85133 was determined by 
PTCI thanks to the case law of the ECtHR and the IACtHR and to some soft law, such as the 
ÔDeclaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of PowerÕ134 and the 
Ôthe Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian LawÕ135.136 Trial Chamber (TC) I referred to the same soft law when determining 
victimsÕ applications for participation.137 Similarly, to reach the conclusion that a deceased person 
may be represented by his or her successors in the proceedings, PTCIII applied both human 
                                                
132 Dcision sur les demandes de participation  la procdure de VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5et 
VPRS 6, Situation in the DRC, ICC-01/04, PTCI, ICC, 17 January 2006 ¤52-53 (DRC decision of 17 January 2006). 
133 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3, 3-10 September 2002 (ICC RPE). 
134 UN General Assembly Res 40/34 (29 November 1985) UN Doc A/RES/40/34 Declaration of Basic Principles 
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. 
135  UN General Assembly Res 60/147 (16 December 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/147 Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law. 
136 DRC decision of 17 January 2006 (n132) ¤¤115-116. 
137 Decision on victims' participation, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 18 January 
2008 ¤35; Decision on the applications by victims to participate in the proceedings, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 15 December 2008 ¤48. 
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rights treaties and soft law documents.138 In another case, to determine which procedural rights 
of the victims were included in the expression Ôpersonal interests of the victimsÕ, PTCI invoked 
the victimsÕ right to the truth as developed in the doctrine and in the case law of the IACtHR, the 
ECtHR and the Columbian and the Peruvian Constitutional Courts.139 Another example is the 
conclusion inferred from the ECtHRÕs case law that the right to fair trial applies Ôas soon as the 
Chamber has issued the summonses to appear in accordance with article 58(7) of the StatuteÕ.140 
 
This approach is also illustrated by the insistence of the presidency on the need to 
interpret human rights in such a way as to make them effective. After noting Regulation 179(1) of 
the Regulations of the Registry regulating the right of the accused to receive family visits and the 
terms of Article 21(3), the presidency stressed the fact that the ECtHR has frequently 
emphasized that the nature of human rights is such that they must be interpreted in a practical 
and effective, rather than theoretical and illusory, manner. It then deduced that this right of 
family visits necessitated these visits to be funded by the Court even if it was not foreseen in its 
legal provisions.141 It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that the right to receive family 
visits was stipulated in Regulation 179, the presidency recalled that this right was guaranteed, 
among others, by the case law of the ECtHR142 and by soft law regarding detention, such as the 
Standard Minimum Rules, the Body of Principles,143 the European Prison Rules,144 the concluding 
observations of the UN Committee Against Torture 145  and the Standards of the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture146.  It is thus also an example of the use of IHRL ad 
                                                
138  Fourth Decision on Victims' Participation, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 
PTCIII, ICC, 12 December 2008 ¤¤16-17, ¤44. 
139 Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the 
Case, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-
01/07, PTCI, ICC, 13 May 2008 ¤32 (ÔKatanga and Ngudjolo decision of 13 May 2008Õ). 
140  Decision on variation of summons conditions, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta & 
Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11, PTCII, ICC, 4 April 2011 ¤11. 
141 Ngudjolo Presidency decision (n92) ¤31. 
142 Ngudjolo Presidency decision (n92) ¤¤27-29. 
143 UN General Assembly Res 43/173 (9 December 1988) UN Doc A/RES/43/173 Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. 
144 Council of Europe Recommendation (CoE) Rec (2006)2 on the European Prison Rules (11 January 2006). 
145 CAT, Consideration of Reports submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and 
recommendations of the Committee against Torture to Tajikistan, CAT/C/TJK/CO/1 (7 December 2006) ¤7.  
146 European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CoE) 
on The CPT standards CPT/IntTE (2002) 1- Rev 2006, ¤51. 
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abundantiam since there was no reason for the presidency to justify the existence of a right already 
stipulated in the ICC rules. 
In its two judgments regarding the applications of a stay of proceedings in the Lubanga 
case, the AC went even further. Indeed, it held that Article 64(2) of the Statute implied a 
responsibility to ensure the fairness of the proceedings and that, according to Article 21(3), this 
responsibility should be understood as recognizing the power to organize such stay of 
proceedings even if this power had not been conferred by any ICC rules.147 IHRL was thus really 
used as a way to compensate for a lacuna in these rules. 
 
This application of Article 21(3) is clearly in conformity with the terms of this article and 
therefore with the conclusion reached in the first section of this thesis.  
 
2.1.4.! The prevalence of human rights on the Statute 
 
In the specific case of detained witnesses who had already testified before the ICC and 
who wanted to apply for asylum, PTCII concluded that, according to Article 21(3), it had to 
Ôensure full exercise of the right to effective remedy which is clearly derived from internationally 
recognized human rightsÕ, namely in the UDHR, the ICCPR, the ECHR, the AfCHPR and the 
AmCHR.148 It decided consequently that it was unable to apply Article 93(7) of the Statute, the 
provision regulating the return of detained witnesses, since its application would deprive the 
detained witnesses of their right to apply for asylum and of their fundamental right to effective 
remedy.149 On appeal, TCII explicitly held, witout further explaining its reasoning, that Article 
21(3) made human rights prevail on the Statute.150 
 
                                                
147 Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the 
jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-
01/04-01/06, AC, ICC, 14 December 2006 ¤37; Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of 
Trial Chamber I entitled ÒDecision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by 
Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application of stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other 
issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008Ó, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, AC, ICC, 21 
October 2008 ¤77. 
148 Katanga and Ngudjolo Amicus Curiae decision (n121) ¤¤69-70. 
149 Katanga and Ngudjolo Amicus Curiae decision (n121) ¤73. 
150 Dcision relative  la demande de mise en libert des tmoins dtenus DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 et 
DRC-D02-P-0350, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/, TCII, ICC, 1 October 2013 ¤29. 
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To my knowledge, it is the only example where a Chamber took a clear stance regarding 
the superiority of IHRL over the ICC Statute. As seen in sub-section 1.2.1., this position 
corresponds to the view of most scholars. 
 
2.2.!  The scope of Ôinternationally recognized human rightsÕ 
 
If this analysis of the case law demonstrates that the ICC judges merely agree with the 
status that most scholars, myself included, grant to Article 21(3), namely that it is a general 
principle of interpretation that trumps the ICC rules in case of lacuna or contradiction, this 
analysis does not provide a real understanding of the meaning of the expression Ôinternationally 
recognized human rightsÕ. On the contrary, it reveals that universal and regional conventions, the 
case law of these instruments and soft law are cited, rather incoherently, without explanation 
regarding this seemingly random choice. The judges do not elaborate on their choice to refer to 
specific conventions in one case and not in another one and on the pertinence of referring to the 
case law of human rights institutions or to soft law instruments. In other words, rather than 
explaining the expression Ôinternationally recognized human rightsÕ, the ICC judges content 
themselves identifying as many concurrent sources as possible to justify the reference to a human 
right without any explanations as to the relations between these sources and to their binding 
character.151!This confusion is aggravated by the fact that, in some cases, while referring to these 
instruments, the judges do not even cite Article 21(3).152 As noted by Deprez regarding the case 
law of the ECtHR, Ôthe ICCÕs stance on the matter lies in a vague and indeterminate zone, 
somewhere between pure obligation and mere informationÕ.153!
 
Sheppard154 contends that the only attempt at explanation of this expression is provided 
by Judge Pikis in one dissenting opinion:  
  
Article 21(3) of the Statute ordains the application and interpretation of every provision 
of the Statute in a manner consistent with internationally recognized human rights. 
Internationally recognized human rights in this area, as may be distilled from the UDHR 
                                                
151 Croquet (n47) 109; Vasiliev (n36) 30-31; Gradoni, Lewis, Mgret, Nouwen, David Ohlin, Reisinger-Coracini and 
Zappal (n12) 88. 
152 DRC decision of 17 January 2006 (n132) ¤¤52-53; Katanga and Ngudjolo decision of 13 May 2008 (n139) ¤32. 
153 Deprez (n52) 293. 
154 Sheppard (n79) 48. 
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and international and regional treaties and conventions on human rights, acknowledge a 
right to an arrested person to have access to a court of law vested with jurisdiction to 
adjudicate upon the lawfulness and justification of his/her detention.155 
 
Nonetheless, this statement does not equate to a real explanation.156 Indeed, for example, 





It stems from these considerations that the ICC judges do seem to consider human rights 
as applicable to their proceedings. Nonetheless, the ICC case law not being consistent in its 
reference to and use of IHRL, this case law does not really shed light on the legal basis for such 
application. In fact, even if Article 21(3) seems to be the door by which human rights enter into 
the ICC proceedings, the judges do not explain how this article has to be applied. The only lesson 
learnt by this study is that the ICC judges seem to adopt an eclectic approach, namely that they 
refer interchangeably to any human rights instruments regardless of their degree of recognition. !
!
The ICC judges are even less clear than their counterparts at the ICTY and the ICTR 
which have already been qualified by Cassese as adopting a ÔwildÕ approach. In fact, even if they 
do not explain how they reach the conclusion that some rights are customary international law or 
general principles of law, the ad hoc tribunals at least give some explanations regarding the status 
of the conventions used and of the case law interpreting these conventions. They usually consider 
that the ICCPR reflects customary international law and that the regional conventions and the 
case law of the human rights institutions Ôare persuasive authority which may be of assistance in 
applying and interpreting the TribunalÕs applicable lawÕ but that Ôthey are not binding of their 
own accordÕ.157 
 
                                                
155 Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled 
ÒDcision sur la demande de mise en libert provisoire de Thomas Lubanga DyiloÓ, dissenting opinion of Judge 
Pikis, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, AC, ICC, 13 February 2007 ¤16 (ÔLubanga interim 
release judgment of 13 February 2007Õ). 
156 Bailey (n69) 523. 
157 Cassese (n53) 17; Gradoni (n47) 854. 
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This lack of explanation is even more to be regretted since Article 21(3) is not clear and 
leaves the door open to many interpretations. This lack of explanation is also problematic 
because, as argued by Cassese regarding the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, such explanation 
would be: 
!
necessary not only for reasons of legal rigour, but also to satisfy the fundamental 
requirements of the principle of fair trial, especially the obligation, derived from this 
principle, to respect the rights of the accused. Indeed, the adoption of a legally rigorous 
approach reduces the margin for arbitrary decisions by the international judge (arbitrium 
judicis): if the defence knows in advance the legal logic that can and will be followed by the 
judges, their conclusions may reasonably be anticipated. If, on the contrary, the judges 
proceed a little Ôtoo rapidlyÕ, their reasoning is less foreseeable, and the defence is 
deprived of the means to reasonably anticipate the judgesÕ conclusions.158 
!
My aim in this thesis is to compensate for this lack of explanation by determining the 
content of the right to liberty as Ôan internationally recognized human rightÕ and by examining 
whether the Ôinterpretation and the applicationÕ of the ICC provisions by the ICC judges is 
consistent with this right. Indeed, stemming from the previous considerations, the ICC judges are 
supposed to apply and interpret the ICC provisions regarding interim release in conformity with 
the right to liberty as internationally recognized. The first step is thus to define this right in order 
to be able to assess the conformity of the ICC provisions with it and then to assess the respect of 
this right by the ICC.  
!
3.! Pre-trial detention and detention pending trial in international human rights law 
 
3.1.!  Identification of human rights relevant to pre-trial detention and detention 
pending trial 
 
The main human right relevant to pre-trial detention and detention pending trial is the 
right to liberty. The presumption of innocence could also be considered as relevant. Nonetheless, 
                                                
158 Cassese (n53) 20. 
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if it is settled that this presumption is a guarantee of fair trial,159 the link between the presumption 
of innocence and the right to liberty is not accepted without any controversy. From a human 
rights perspective, this link is certainly obvious. In Cagas v. Philippines, the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) expressly stated that excessive pre-trial detention affects the right to be 
presumed innocent.160 Furthermore, the IACtHR highlighted the exceptional character of such 
detention by reference to the presumption of innocence. 161  According to the ECtHR, the 
necessity of the detention on remand must be assessed in light of the presumption of 
innocence162  and the pre-trial procedures should Ôbe conducted, so far as possible, as if the 
defendant were innocentÕ.163 The idea is, as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IAmCHR) noted, that Ôthe guarantee of the presumption of innocence becomes increasingly 
empty and ultimately a mockery when pre-trial imprisonment is prolonged unreasonablyÕ.164  
 
Nonetheless, others share the view that, as once argued by the ICTY, if the presumption 
of innocence were decisive on the issue of provisional release, Ôno accused would ever be 
detained, as all are presumed innocentÕ.165 The Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) also ruled 
that Ôthe Òpresumption of innocenceÓ is no more (but no less) than the principle that the 
Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the defendantÕ and that Ôit has no 
                                                
159 ICCPR: Article 14¤2: Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty according to law. 
ECHR: Article 6¤2: 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law. 
AmCHR: Article 8¤2: 2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as 
his guilt has not been proven according to law. 
AfCHPR: Article 7¤1 (b) Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: (b) the right 
to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or tribunal. 
160 HRC, Cagas v. Philippines (Comm. No. 788/1997), CCPR/C/73/D/788/1997, 31 January 2002; 
Fairlie (n9) 1113. 
161 IACtHR, Judgment, Bayarri v. Argentina, 30 October 2008 ¤110. 
162 ECtHR, Judgment, Bykov v. Russia (App. No. 4378/02), 10 March 2009 ¤63. 
163 A. Ashworth, ÔFour threats to the presumption of innocenceÕ (2006)10 The International Journal of Evidence and Proof 
248. 
164 IACmHR, Gimnez v. Argentina (Case No. 11.245), 1 March 1996. 
165  Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of Denial of Provisional Release During the Winter Recess, Prosecutor v. 
Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87, AC, ICTY, 14 December 2006 ¤12 (ÔMilutinovic provisional release decision of 14 
December 2006Õ). 
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application or relevance to the preconditions for bailÕ. 166  Its justification is that Ôinnocent 
defendants may nevertheless try to avoid a lengthy trial or to threaten those who have made 
statements against themÕ. 167  The proponents of this vision, among others, the US Supreme 
Court,168 argue that the presumption of innocence has no impact on reviewing the necessity of 
detention on remand and is only an evidentiary principle which, as such, should be limited to the 
trial phase.169 In their view, this presumption would only mean that, when a person is charged 
with a criminal offence, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt 
guilt of that offence.  
 
In other words, the first position sees the presumption of innocence Ôas a safeguard 
against violation of human rights at all stages of the criminal processÕ whereas the second one 
sees it Ôas a safeguard against mistaken convictionÕ.170 This debate is rather theoretical without 
significant consequences, since, while recognizing the impact of presumption of innocence on 
detention on remand, human rights instruments recognize the possibility of such detention. The 
principle is thus rather that, as noted by the ICC: 
 
There is no inconsistency between the accusedÕs right to a fair trial and the presumption 
of innocence on the one hand and a judicial process in which the accused is detained to 
ensure his appearance at trial and to prevent his interference with the CourtÕs processes 
on the other.171 
 
Due to the controversy on the application of presumption of innocence in pre-trial 
detention and detention pending trial and the lack of real impact of this issue, this thesis only 
focuses on the right to liberty. Nonetheless, as urged by Stevens, the presumption of innocence is 
kept in mind as Ôan important but abstract principle operating in the backgroundÕ so that Ôit 
                                                
166 Appeal against decision refusing bail, Prosecutor against Samuel Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, Case 
No. SCSL-04-14, AC, SCSL, 11 March 2005 ¤37 (ÔNorman bail decisionÕ). 
167 Norman bail decision (n166) ¤37. 
168 R. Kitai, ÔPresuming innocenceÕ (2002)55 Oklahoma Law Review 258. 
169 Kitai (n168) 275-276; A. Ashworth (n163) 243; Fairlie (n9) 1109. 
170 Kitai (n168) 275-276. 
171 Decision on applications for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 
TCIII, ICC, 16 August 2011 (ÔBemba interim release decision of 16 August 2011Õ). 
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constantly reminds us that we are dealing with a possible innocent individual and that a 
possibility of error in accusing this person existsÕ.172 
 
3.2.!  Adopted definition of Article 21(3)   
 
It was demonstrated that, when an issue such as the interim release regime is covered by 
ICC provisions, Article 21(3) requires the ICC judges to interpret and to apply them in 
conformity with Ôinternationally recognized human rightsÕ. Nonetheless, this notion is very vague 
and the ICCÕs case law unhelpful to understand it better. It is thus important to recall the 
approach adopted in this thesis.  
 
Article 21(3) is considered as a general rule of interpretation applicable to the provisions 
regulating the interim release regime. To be qualified as Ôinternationally recognizedÕ, a binding 
character is not required because the choice of the word ÔrecognizedÕ cannot be seen as 
synonymous with ÔbindingÕ. This is accepted by the ICC judges since they do not hesitate to refer 
to soft law. However, albeit not binding, the components of the right to liberty regarding 
provisional release cannot be contested and, given the ÔinternationalÕ requirement, they must be 
accepted in most of the countries of the world. The goal is thus to establish the minimum human 
rights standards that govern provisional release and that are accepted as ius commune.  
 
It has to be kept in mind that Article 21(3) is open to several interpretations so that the 
ICC judges could legally choose to adopt a more extensive interpretation and to apply higher 
standards. Such an attitude would be more in harmony with the human rights vision. Indeed, as 
argued by Judge Pocar in the Mrksic and Sljivancanin case, the highest-standard solution is 
something that IHRL itself dictates: Ôone of the key principles in the international protection of 
human rights is that when there are diverging international standards, the highest should 
prevailÕ.173  
 
                                                
172 L. Stevens, ÔPre-Trial Detention: The Presumption of Innocence and Article 5 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights Cannot and Does Not Limit its Increasing UseÕ (2009)17 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 170. 
173 In Gradoni, Lewis, Mgret, Nouwen, David Ohlin, Reisinger-Coracini and Zappal (n12) 86. 
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Nevertheless, in order to respect the consent of member states, for the purpose of this 
analysis, I adopt a definition of the right to liberty that is recognized, and therefore not contested, 
in most parts of the world.  
 
3.3.!  Identification of the sources of the right to liberty 
 
Since the right to liberty is not defined in the ICC Statute, external sources implied by 
Article 21(3) have to be identified. Indeed, if Article 21 establishes the law applicable to the ICC 
and should thus be considered as lex specialis with respect to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, then 
Article 21(3) leads to an indirect application of external sources to identify Ôinternationally 
recognized human rightsÕ. As seen before, Article 38 of the ICJ Statute lists the applicable law for 
the ICJ and is used to determine the existence of an obligation of international law and its 
content.174 According to this article, these sources are: 
 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
 
For some authors, this article is not complete since there exist other sources of 
international law, such as the principles of international law or the unilateral acts of states or of 
organizations.175 This debate is beyond the scope of this thesis and only the traditional sources 
will be used since they are the ones commonly used to define IHRL and since they are sufficient 
to reach a common definition of the right to liberty.   
 
Before examining the substantive definition of this right, some particularities linked to the 
use of the traditional sources of international law to determine the content of IHRL need to be 
                                                
174 Bassiouni (n28) 782; Brownlie (n44) 5; Shaw (n44) 5. 
175 See H. G. Cohen, ÔFinding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of SourcesÕ (2007)93 Iowa Law Review 65-
129; Brownlie (n44) 5; Shaw (n44) 19, 121; N. Arajrvi, ÔIs There a Need for a New Sources Theory in International 
Law? A Proposal for an Inclusive Positivist ModelÕ (2012)106 American Society International Law Proceedings 370-373. 
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stressed. In fact, IHRL is a specific branch of international law in the sense that it does not 
regulate relations among states but relations between a state and its population and in the sense 
that it is very fragmented due to the multiplicity of instruments and institutions interpreting it.  
 
Even if Article 38 of the ICJ Statute does not establish a hierarchy,176 its order will be 
followed to present the sources of IHRL since Ôthe order mentioned simply represented the 
logical order in which these sources would occur to the mind of the judgeÕ.177 
 
3.3.1.! IHRL treaties 
 
The main human rights treaties are the ICCPR, the International Covenant for 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the other UN Conventions elaborating on certain 
rights, dealing with certain categories of persons who may need special protection or seeking to 
eliminate discrimination. Next to these so-called universal treaties, there are also regional 
conventions such as the ECHR,178 the AmCHR and the AfCHPR.  
 
Four binding instruments are relevant to the right to liberty: the ICCPR, the ECHR, the 
AmCHR and the AfCHPR. The pertinence of this type of source to establish a ius commune can be 
questioned since treaties are just binding on their signatories and since the states parties of these 
conventions differ. In addition, their members may have expressed reservations179 and the rights 
they contain are not phrased in exactly the same way. 
 
Nevertheless, on the one hand, there are many similarities between the provisions of 
these treaties because they are all derived from the UDHR.180 As held by De Schutter, Ôwhether 
they are adopted at the universal or regional levels, all human rights treaties are derived from the 
UDHR, from which they borrow, sometimes quite literally, much of their language. It is 
therefore quite natural for international courts or quasi-judicial bodies, whether they belong to 
                                                
176 Bassiouni (n28) 782; Degan (n44) 50; Shelton (n38) 295; Brownlie (n44) 5; Shaw (n44) 5.  
177 G. Gaja, ÔGeneral Principles of LawÕ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law; Bassiouni (n28) 782. 
178 It must be noted that the EU Charter will not be examined since, according Article 52 ¤3 of the Charter, when the 
Charter contains rights that stems from the ECHR, their meaning and scope are the same, which is the case for the 
studied framework. 
179 See Stapleton (n38) 580-583; Shelton (n38) 313-318; Fedorova and Sluiter (n81) 55; De Schutter (n38) 96. 
180 De Schutter (n38) 31. 
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regional or to universal systems, to cite one anotherÕ.181 Brownlie can thus be contested when he 
contends that, Ôin the real world of practice and procedure, there is no such entity as 
ÒInternational Human Rights LawÓÕ.182 On the contrary, this thesis is intended to demonstrate 
that a common denominator can be found regarding the right to liberty and its vision of pre-
conviction detention. These four conventions will thus be examined in order to determine the 
minimum content of the right to liberty recognized by each of them. It must be mentioned that 
the issue of the reservations is not relevant in this case because they do not contain any 
reservations about the issue of provisional release as such.183  
 
On the other hand, despite this fragmentation of IHRL among the different conventions, 
it is important to examine these conventions due to the ways in which treaties may interplay with 
unwritten law: the treaty may reflect customary law, it may crystallize a customary rule and a 
treaty provision may subsequently become accepted as reflecting custom.184 This reasoning can 
be transposed to general principles of law,185 which as seen in sub-section 3.3.3., is the source 
used in this thesis. The objective is thus to identify a common regime through the treaties by 
which states are bound and then to control whether this regime has reached the status of 
customary international law or, as favoured in this case, of general principles of law.  
                                                
181 De Schutter (n38) 31-32. 
182 Brownlie (n44) 554 
Nonetheless, in his comments of BrownlieÕs Principles of Public International Law, Crawford did not reiterate this 
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human rights at the universal and regional levelsÕ but Ôthat any such common core is partial and imperfect Ð and it 
hides altogether the many differences in the articulations of the various rights in the various treatiesÕ (J. Crawford, 
BrownlieÕs Principles of Public International Law (OUP, 2012, 8th edition) 643). 
183 https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-4&chapter=4&lang=en; 
See Stapleton (n38) 580. 
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3.3.2.! Customary international law 
 
The second source of law recognized by Article 38 of the ICJ Statute is customary 
international law, or Ôevidence of a general practice accepted as lawÕ. The traditional elements of 
customs are duration, uniformity and consistency of the practice by states, generality of this 
practice and opinio juris sive necessitatis.186 These elements raise some issues regarding the pertinence 
of customary international law for establishing IHRL.187 The main problem is that, in practice, no 
single state truly respects all human rights. There is thus a discrepancy between the practice and 
opinio iuris so that one element of customary international law, at least in its traditional 
conception, is missing. 
 
This problem is the reason why some scholars plea in favour of the adoption of a new 
definition of customary international law that would give prevalence to opinio iuris and blur the 
distinction between physical practice and verbal practice.188 For example, the International Law 
Association recognizes that practice can be constituted of Ôverbal actsÕ like 
  
diplomatic statements (É), policy statements, press releases, official manuals (É), 
instructions to armed forces, comments by governments on draft treaties, legislation, 
                                                
186 T. Treves, Customary International Law Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law; Brownlie (n44) 5; Shaw 
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187 See O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Springer, 1991) Ch. XV;  H. Thirlway, ÔHuman rights in 
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decisions of national courts and executive authorities, pleadings before international 
tribunals, statements in international organizations and the resolutions these bodies 
adopt.189  
 
If it is not contested that such acts can suggest the existence of a practice, proponents of 
this new definition of custom stretch this concept very far by suggesting that the existence of a 
custom could only be demonstrated by these verbal acts.190  
 
This conception finds some grounds in the ICJÕs practice since, as argued by Treves, it 
distinguishes Ôfrom the normal customary law rules, a category of such rules for which the search 
for the objective and the subjective elements is not requiredÕ.191 For example, the ICJ accepted in 
the Nicaragua case that Ôinconsistencies between what a State says is the law and what it does are 
not fatal, so long as it does not try to excuse its non-conforming conduct by asserting that it is 
legally justifiedÕ.192 Nonetheless, the statements of the ICJ concern international humanitarian law 
and the right of self-determination rather than IHRL. In addition, it must be noted that the 
International Law Commission seems to recognize that Ôthere may (É) be a difference in 
application of the two-element approach in different fields (of international law)Õ but concludes 
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that Ôthe essential nature of customary international law as a general practice accepted as law must 
not be distortedÕ.193 
 
This relaxed approach to custom was also adopted by the ad hoc tribunals. They grant less 
importance to state practice and focus rather on the opinio iuris which can be found in primary 
sources (treaties) or in other instruments of international law (e.g., UN documents) or judicial 
decisions.194  It is the idea, as suggested by Clapham, that Ôour changing notions of what is 
considered humane can generate new binding rules in the field of international human rights and 
humanitarian law without recourse to mysteries of evaluating state practice and opinio jurisÕ.195 
 
Admittedly, not only does this new conception help avoid the problem of the 
inconsistency of the practice, but it also circumvents the question of identifying the relevant 
practice. This second issue should not be disregarded. Indeed, such establishment would require 
the examination of the practice of each state regarding this right and of its position vis--vis this 
right and the determination that this practice is due to a feeling that the state has to act in a 
certain way because of an international obligation. 196  In other words, as held by Vasiliev, 
Ôconclusive determination of the scope of customary human rights is methodologically an 
arduous task and, arguably, a Òmission impossibleÓÕ.197 This Ômodern vision of customÕ, according 
to which the establishment of verbal practice would be sufficient,198 could prove this statement to 
be irrelevant.  
 
Nonetheless, De Schutter rightly argued that Ôthis ÒmodernÓ view results in distorting the 
classical notion of custom in such a way that the notion is barely even recognizable under its new 
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disguiseÕ.199 Indeed, its potential result is, for example, that general resolutions or declarations 
would become binding even though the binding effect of the UN General Resolutions was 
expressly rejected by the founders of the UN.200 This Ômodern viewÕ does not thus always rest on 
statesÕ consent. Criticizing this modern view of custom, Simma and Alston underlined the risks 
of the vagueness of such new definition:  
 
The mainstream position, particularly in the United States, satisfies its appetite by 
resorting to a progressive, streamlined theory of customary law, more or less stripped of 
the traditional practice requirement, and through this dubious operation is able to find a 
customary law of human rights wherever it is needed.201 
 
In the same vein, Kadens and Young rightly stressed the incongruity of reference to 
custom as a source of IHRL: 
 
The role of [IHRL] is frequently to challenge existing arrangements and practices. It is an 
odd thing, to say the least, to invoke custom to challenge conditions in oppressive societies 
or the abuses of long-entrenched despotic regimes. That is no doubt why human rights 
advocates so frequently seek to define the content of customary law by reference to 
aspirational documents like General Assembly resolutions or the open-ended provisions 
of treaties like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.202 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine this debate in further detail.203 In any case, 
it is posited that this new definition of custom is not needed because the potential flaws of the 
traditional definition for becoming a source for IHRL can be compensated by using general 
principles of law as a source.204 As Maki noted, Ôa general practice among states, as well as the 
recognition of the legal character of such practice, is required for customary law to be applicable. 
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In contrast, application of general principles of law does not require any such general practice 
among states.Õ205 This could be illustrated by the assertion of the ICC Judge Steiner regarding the 
status of the right to truth, which he qualified as Ôan emerging customary norm, as well as a 
general principle of lawÕ.206 Indeed, it implies that the general principle already exists whereas it is 
not yet fully formed as customary international law, probably because of a lack of practice due to 
its novel character. Upon the suggestion of Simma and Alston, 207  of De Schutter, 208  and of 
Meron,209 this thesis will thus have recourse to the third source mentioned by Article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute, namely the general principles of law, in order to define the right to liberty. 
 
3.3.3.! General principles of law 
 
It is thus contended that general principles of law are more adequate to define the 
content of IHRL. It is usually accepted that the principles aimed at by Article 38 are principles 
existing in domestic legal systems that can be transposed to the international legal order.210 This 
source is thus interesting for establishing human rights since they are recognized both in 
domestic legal systems and at the international level.  
 
The first caveat for human rights as a general principle is that human rights seem to be 
rights and not principles. Nevertheless, general principles of law identified so far in the case law 
of international courts and arbitral tribunals Ôinclude, inter alia, the principle of good faith, the 
obligation to make reparation for international wrongs, the principle of res judicata, the principle 
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of estoppel, the principle of jus novit curia, equality of the parties to a dispute, the rights of the 
defence, and respect for fundamental human rightsÕ.211 The fact that Ôthe general principles mentioned 
in Article 38 ¤1 (c) included the concept of human rights and their protectionÕ was also argued by 
Judge Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the South-West Africa case. 212  Besides, after having 
analysed the case law of the ICJ regarding general principles of law, De Schutter concludes that 
these principles Ôhave been interpreted as implying that human rights should qualify among the 
latter principles, and thus as forming part of general international lawÕ.213 Likewise, referring to 
Green who, in 1955, denied the possibility for human rights to qualify as general principle, 
OÕBoyle and Lafferty concluded that Ôthe practice of the International Court of Justice, the 
European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, suggests the contrary is true todayÕ.214 It has thus been accepted that human 
rights could qualify for being such principles.  
 
Stemming from the use of ÔrecognizedÕ, the second condition for being a general principle 
is that these principles need to be recognized by the major legal systems of the world.215 As noted 
by Bassiouni, Ôthe rule must exist in a number of States, but the rule does not have to meet the 
test of Òuniversal acceptance,Ó and no quantitative or numerical test for States having such a 
ÒprincipleÓ has ever been establishedÕ.216 Admittedly, there is the obsolete reference in Article 38 
to the controversial expression Ôcivilized peopleÕ but it is now commonly agreed that this 
reference is not actual anymore.217 This condition of ÔrecognizedÕ thus only requires a recognition 
                                                
211 OÕBoyle and Lafferty (n191) 196 (emphasis added). 
212  ICJ, Cases on South-West Africa, Second Phase (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa) (Merits, dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Tanaka) (1996) ICJ Rep 6 250; 
OÕBoyle and Lafferty (n191) 207-208. 
213 De Schutter (n38) 54;  
See also OÕBoyle and Lafferty (n191) 221. 
It must be noted that others authors who did the same analysis reached the conclusion that the ICJ refers to 
customary international law: Treves (n186). 
214 OÕBoyle and Lafferty (n191) 221. 
215 Gaja (n177). 
216 Bassiouni (n28) 788; 
See also Kaufman Hevener and Steven Mosher (n185) 602; Maki (n205) 277; M. Panezi, ÔSources of Law in 
Transition. Re-visiting General Principles of International LawÕ (2007) Ancilla Iuris 74; Gaja (n177). 
217 B. Vitanyi, ÔLes positions doctrinales concernant le sens de la notion de Òprincipes gnraux du droit reconnu par 
les nations civilisesÓÕ (1982) Revue gnrale de droit international public 54; Bassiouni (n28) 789; Panezi (n216) 74. 
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in a high number of states,218 which, as shown in the previous section, corresponds to the scope 
that this current analysis gives to the expression Ôinternationally recognizedÕ contained in Article 
21(3) of the ICC Statute. Consequently, if a human right can qualify as a general principle of law, 
Article 21(3) obliges the ICC judges to take this right into account. 
 
Since this source does not require any practice, the recourse to general principles of law 
avoids the question of the identification of the practice and that of the discrepancy between opinio 
iuris and this practice. Admittedly, the identification of general principles of law is supposed to 
require Ôa comparison between national systems, the search for common ÒprinciplesÓ, and their 
transposition to the international sphereÕ.219 Nonetheless, if a human right is stipulated in a treaty, 
the ratification of this treaty implies that somehow this right becomes part of the municipal 
law.220 It is thus sufficient to examine in how many and in which conventions a human right is 
recognized in order to gauge its Ôinternationally recognizedÕ character. This approach makes it 
possible to bypass the fact that the ICC member states are not party to the same treaties while 
respecting statesÕ consent at the same time since these principles need to be recognised by them. 
Needless to say that the treaty or the different treaties that recognize a human right need to have 
enough members for this right to be considered as a general principle.   
 
Despite these advantages, there are not many references to this source in the literature.221 
The legislation of states is easier to identify than the practice of states as required by customary 
international law, however. It must be noted that the legislation of states equates to opinion iuris 
and the way the legislation is applied and respected equates to practice so that, contrary to the 
general principles of law, both are required to establish the existence of customary international 
law. Furthermore, the possible translation of human rights as international law is assumed given 
the existence of international human rights conventions. As held by Meron,  
 
It is surprising that Ôthe general principles of law recognized by civilized nationsÕ (É) 
have not received greater attention as a method for obtaining greater legal recognition for 
the principles of the Universal Declaration and other human rights instruments. As 
                                                
218 Elewa Badar and Higgins (n58) 268. 
219 Pellet (n53) 1073-1074. 
220 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention. 
221 For example, in his article regarding finding a source for human rights, DÕAmato does not mention general 
principles once: DÕAmato (n190) 47-98. 
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human rights norms stated in international instruments come to be reflected in national 
laws, (...) Article 38(1)(c) will [or might] increasingly become one of the principal methods 
for the maturation of such standards into the mainstream of international law.222 
 
For all these reasons, in order to determine the content of the right to liberty, this thesis 
will examine whether the provisions of human rights conventions regarding provisional release 
can also be considered as general principles of law. If so, the right to liberty would indubitably 
meet the conditions provided by Article 21(3) since a general principle is in any case international 
and binding whereas Article 21(3) only requires the right to be international and recognized.  
 
3.3.4.! Role of the subsidiary means for the identification 
 
The problem with the recourse to human rights conventions to define a human right is 
that they are usually not sufficiently detailed to determine the content and the scope of a right. 
They only contain general standards and therefore, as noted by Warbrick, only provide for Ôa 
mere skeleton of what is requiredÕ. 223  Nonetheless, each of the treaties has at least one 
institutional body whose mandate is to interpret its provisions. These bodies are the following: 
the HRC for the ICCPR; the ECtHR for the ECHR; the IAmCHR and the IACtHR for the 
AmCHR; and the African Commission on Human and PeoplesÕ Rights (AfCmHPR) and the 
African Court on Human and PeoplesÕ Rights (AfCtHPR) for the AfCHPR.   
 
All these bodies have to some extent the power to interpret the convention they are 
linked to. Their decisions are never binding as such for all the states parties to the convention.224 
                                                
222 Hannum (n209) 351. 
223 C. Warbrick, ÔInternational Criminal Rights and Fair TrialÕ (1998)3 Journal of Armed Conflict 50. 
224 Articles 32¤1, 33, 34, 46, 47 of the ECHR; Article 33 of the ECHR; Articles 41, 62¤3, 63 and 68 of the AmCHR; 
Articles 45, 47 and 56 of the AfCHPR and Article 3¤1 and 30 of the Optional Protocol to the AfCHPR;  
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the United Nations Human Rights Treaty BodiesÕ in International Law Association Report of the Seventy-First 
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2011 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1817532 (last accessed 21 March 2015) 73; H. J. Steiner, P. Alston and 
R. Goodman, International Human Rights in Context. Law Politics Moral, (OUP, 2007 (third edition)) 913-916; Shaw (n44) 
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Hestermeyer and others (eds.) Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity (Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) 559. 
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Nonetheless, this lack of binding character only concerns the actions required by these decisions. 
Could a different conclusion be reached regarding the in abstracto interpretation, or res interpretata, 
of the rights provided by these bodies? It has to be kept in mind that Article 21(3) does not 
require a binding definition of a human right but well a recognized one. Besides, the ICC does 
not seem to have any problem referring to this res interpretata, even if the ICC fails to explain its 
reasoning regarding their potential binding character.225 
 
Several explanations adduce that this res interpretata should be considered as being an 
integral part of the right contained in the convention. Legally, the most convincing one is to 
consider this case law as a subsidiary source to which Article 38 of the ICJ Statute refers, namely 
Ôthe judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nationsÕ. The judicial character of the ECtHR, of the IACtHR and of the AfCtHPR cannot be 
contested. Some scholars,226 and the HRC itself,227 propose the quasi-jurisdictional character of 
the HRC, of the IAmCHR and of the AfCmHR. Their decisions could also be considered as the 
teachings referred to by Article 38. Arai convincingly held that: 
 
It is also possible to contend that general comments being the fruits of elaborate doctrinal 
discourse of the leading experts on [IHRL], their status and weight as a material source of 
international law are comparable to, but more authoritative than the writing of leading 
publicists within the meaning of Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ.228  
 
The qualification of the res interpretata of the decisions of the human rights bodies as 
subsidiary sources of international law demonstrates the need to take them into account to define 
an internationally recognized human right in the sense of Article 21(3). As held by Cassese, these 
                                                
225 For a study of the attitude of the ICC towards the ECtHRÕs case law, see Deprez (n52) 278-296. 
226 Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation (Brill, 2009) 517-518. 
See also: Sluiter (n113) 940; Y. Arai-Takahashi, ÔFair Trial Guarantees in Occupied Territory Ð The Interplay between 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights LawÕ in R. Arnold and N. Qunivet, International Humanitarian 
Law and Human Rights Law. Towards a New Merger in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 460; Nollkaemper and 
van Alebeek (n224) 41; Shelton (n224) 568. 
227 UNHRC, ÔGeneral Comment 33Õ (5 November 2008) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/33 ¤11. 
228 Arai-Takahashi (2008) (n226) 461; Arai-Takahashi (2009) (n226) 468. 
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decisions should be used to demonstrate, among others, Ôwhether a general principle of 
international law existsÕ.229  
 
Another convincing explanation is, as suggested by Arai, Ôto argue that the states parties 
to the ICCPR have agreed to ÒdelegateÓ to the monitoring body (HRC) the power of clarifying 
the meaning of this treatyÕ.230 In fact, most of the treaties confer expressly this power to their 
bodies. In any case, this power is implicit since it is essential for them to carry out their 
functions.231 A consequence of this delegation is that it would counter the principle of good faith 
to deny any effect to this res interpretata. This explanation seems to be adopted by the IAmCHR 
which, in its Loayza Tamayo v. Peru judgment, while continuing to state that the ordinary meaning 
of the term ÔrecommendationsÕ means that they are not legally binding, held that:  
 
However, in accordance with the principle of good faith (É) if a State signs and ratifies 
an international treaty, especially one concerning human rights, (É) it has the obligation 
to make every effort to comply with the recommendations of a protection organ (É).232  
 
In this vein, Judge Pocar (former HRC member) rightly argued in his partially dissenting 
opinion to the Mrk!ic and "livancanin appeal judgment that Ôno reasons exist to permit the 
International Tribunal to subtract itself from applying the principles enshrined in the ICCPR, in 
accordance with the meaning given to them by the [HRC], that is, the very body entrusted to 
interpret the ICCPR for the overall purpose of monitoring its application and implementationÕ.233   
 
Nonetheless, this explanation has less legal basis than the previous one and does not 
really rest on statesÕ consence since it could be argued that the states delegated their power only 
partially to interpret the conventions and that they did not delegate to these bodies a power to 
deliver a binding interpretation.  
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A third justification for taking into account at least the judgments of the regional courts is 
a practical one. Their judgments being binding on the states concerned and these courts being 
likely to follow their previous reasoning,234 the res interpretata would have, as argued by Trechsel 
regarding the ECtHR, Ôa de facto binding effect in all member statesÕ.235 The same reasoning can 
be applied to the other bodies. The idea is that, to avoid future condemnation, the states have to 
conform to the interpretation provided by the institutional body even if this interpretation is not 
binding as such upon them.236 However, the ICC not being members of any of these courts or 
commissions, it would not fear any condemnation for its violation of their case law. Nonetheless, 
as seen in part II, this lack of respect could have an impact on the responsibility of its own 
member states. 
 
It has also been argued that the decisions of the human rights bodies have to be taken 
into account because they would amount to the subsequent practice referred to by Article 
31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This article stipulates that the 
interpretation of a provision of a treaty shall take Ôinto account, together with the context, any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretationÕ. The problem is that this explanation grants the human rights bodies 
the power to give an authentic interpretation of the treaty whereas, as pointed out by a judge of 
the former Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), Ôthe right of giving an authoritative 
interpretation of a legal rule belongs solely to the person or body who has power to modify or 
suppress itÕ. 237  Therefore, for the International Law Commission, the so-called subsequent 
practice has to emanate from the states parties and cannot emanate as such from the bodies 
entrusted with the interpretation of the treaty.238 In a recent case, the ICJ also seems to require 
the participation of all states parties in order for a non-binding decision of a treaty body to 
amount to subsequent practice as meant by Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention.239 This 
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reasoning is thus debated. Be that as it may, as seen before, this explanation is not needed to 
demonstrate that the ICC judges have to take into account the res interpretata of the decisions of 
the human rights bodies. 
 
In summary, regardless of the binding status of the decisions of human rights bodies, 
their interpretation of a right has to be taken into account to define an internationally recognized 
human right, with the condition that this interpretation be internationally uncontested in the 
sense developed earlier. The main reason is that they can qualify as subsidiary means of 
interpretation within the meaning of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. In addition, the principle of 
good faith requires them to be taken into account. It is also a matter of fact that the 
interpretation given by these institutions has become part of the treaties, these institutions 
referring to their previous decisions. Since this legal analysis will use this interpretation only if it is 
uncontested by states, it respects  statesÕ consent. 
 
The specific status of the ECtHRÕs case law needs to be stressed. Indeed, the ECtHR is 
the body most often cited by the other supervisory bodies themselves or by the international 
criminal tribunals, probably because it is Ôone of the most advanced forms of any kind of 
international legal processÕ.240 It has a lot of state parties Ð more than the IAmCHR Ð, a strong 
institutional framework Ð contrary to the HRC Ð, and a plethora of cases.241 In addition, the 
ECtHRÕs case law is a good reference for the international tribunals since the ECtHR exercises 
jurisdiction over states with both civil law and common law systems.242 Besides, the ECHR also 
served as a blueprint for the other conventions.243 The case law of the ECtHR will be thus cited 
more than that of the other bodies. Nonetheless, this analysis still requires the reasoning of the 
ECtHR to be confirmed by other bodies in order to qualify as Ôinternationally recognizedÕ. 
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3.3.5.! Soft law? 
 
As seen before, some ICC judges do not hesitate to refer to soft law issued by 
international organizations, such as the UN, which is not linked to a specific human rights treaty. 
Admittedly, if not internationally contested, it could be argued that the principles emanating from 
this soft law should be taken into account. Nonetheless, the use of this source is not recognized 
by Article 38 of the ICJ Statute since it does not amount to international ÔlawÕ so that it will not 
be taken into account for this analysis. Be that as it may, this use is not justified for the right to 




It stems from these considerations that, in order to define the right to liberty which the 
ICC interim release regime should respect, inquiries will need to be made into the human rights 
conventions and the decisions of their institutional bodies related to the provisional release issue. 
The focus is on these sources because customary international law is not appropriate to define 
the content of human rights and because general principles of law may be identified by the 
human rights conventions Ð since the national order is supposed to reflect these principles Ð and 
by the decisions of their institutional bodies as subsidiary means of interpretation. The fact that 
this analysis keeps only the components of the right to liberty revealed by the treaties and the 
bodies interpreting them when they corroborate each other guarantees these components are 
sufficiently internationally accepted to demonstrate the existence of a general principle of law.  
 
3.4.! Definition of the right to liberty 
 
For the purpose of this study, only the aspects of the right to liberty pertinent to a person 
detained pending a future trial are examined. The objective is to establish a ius commune with the 
aspects that are uncontested in most parts of the world in order to be sure it fits the requirements 
of Article 21(3). As stated before, despite BrownlieÕs previous comment on the alleged non-
existence of such an entity as ÔInternational Human Rights LawÕ,244 it is argued that a common 
denominator can be found regarding the right to liberty and pre-conviction detention. 
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3.4.1.! Legal basis of the detention 
 
The right to liberty is recognized by the ICCPR,245 the ECHR,246 the AmCHR247 and the 
AfCHPR.248 The right is phrased differently depending on the convention, however.249 The only 
                                                
245 Article 9 of the ICCPR: 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with 
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(É) 
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It 
shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to 
guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution 
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 (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal 
authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to 
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; 
(É) 
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought 
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within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the 
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall 
have an enforceable right to compensation.   
247 Article 7 of the AmCHR: 1. Every person has the right to personal liberty and security. 
2. No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons and under the conditions established 
beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto. 
3. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. 
(É) 
5. Any person detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise 
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the 
continuation of the proceedings. His release may be subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for trial. 
6. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in order that the court 
may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest or detention 
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real common condition is that any detention must have a legal basis. This condition corresponds 
to the general interdiction of arbitrary detention. It stems from this condition that, as held by 
Drr, Ôthe human right to liberty does not, strictly speaking, grant freedom from detention, but 
obliges States to set up substantive preconditions and procedural requirements for detention in 
legal terms and to comply with them in practiceÕ. 250  Pre-conviction detention must thus be 
regulated by law.  
 
In addition, according to IHRL, the permissible scope of detention has to be narrowly 
construed. For example, the ICCPR expressly states that such detention should not be the 
general rule and that it should be ordered only if reasonable and necessary.251 The HRC makes 
clear that Ôpre-trial detention should be an exception as short as possibleÕ. 252  Likewise, the 
IACtHR held that Ôliberty is always the rule, and its limitation or restriction the exceptionÕ253 and 
that the use of detention on remand Ôshould be exceptional, limited by the principle of 
lawfulness, the presumption of innocence, and the need and proportionality in keeping with what 
is strictly necessary in a democratic societyÕ because Ôit is a precautionary rather than a punitive 
measureÕ.254 The ECtHR requires such detention to be exceptional by stating that it is justified 
only when Ôthere are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, 
notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual 
libertyÕ. 255  The presumption is thus in favour of release before and pending trial. 256  The 
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AfCmHPR confirmed this presumption, 257  so that it is established that this presumption is 
recognized worldwide. 
 
This presumption implies that the possibility of the implementation of alternative 
measures to detention needs to be assessed. In fact, for the HRC, preventive detention is 
arbitrary when states are unable to demonstrate Ôthat other, less intrusive, measures could not 
have achieved the same endÕ, or that Ôit is not necessary in all circumstances of the case and 
proportionate to the ends soughtÕ.258 Article 5 of the ECHR expressly provides that Ôrelease may 
be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trialÕ.259 As the ECtHR noted, Ôthe detention of an 
individual is such a serious measure that it is only justified where other, less severe measures, 
have been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the individual or public interest 
which might require that the person concerned be detained. The deprivation of liberty must be 
shown to have been necessary in the circumstances.Õ260 Likewise, the AmCHR stipulates that a 
detaineeÕs Ôrelease may be subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for trialÕ.261 According to 
the IACtHR, there should be Ôno measure that is less onerous in relation to the affected right, 
among all those that are similarly appropriate to achieve the proposed objectiveÕ.262 No explicit 
mention of the obligation to assess alternative measures has been found in the African human 
rights regime. Nonetheless, this obligation should be considered as being internationally 
recognized since it is required by the ICCPR and since it is a logical corollary of the exceptional 
character of the detention on remand, which is recognized in the African regime. In any case, as 
will be seen, Article 60 of the ICC Statute and Rule 119 of the RPE provide for the possibility of 
conditional release. 
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Examples of these alternative measures are: undertakings to appear before a judicial 
authority as and when required, undertakings not to interfere with the course of justice and not 
to engage in particular conduct, including that involved in a profession or particular employment; 
requirements to report on a daily or periodic basis to a judicial authority, the police or other 
authority; requirements to accept supervision by an agency appointed by the judicial authority; 
requirements to submit to electronic monitoring; requirements to reside at a specified address, 
with or without conditions as to the hours to be spent there; requirements not to leave or enter 
specified places or districts without authorisation; requirements not to meet specified persons 
without authorisation; requirements to surrender passports or other identification papers; and 
requirements to provide or secure financial or other forms of guarantees for appearance at the 
pending trial.263  
 
It stems from these considerations that the fact that the possibility of pre-conviction 
detention must be provided by law, that it should be the exception and that alternative measures 
should be envisaged are internationally recognized components of the right to liberty. 
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that such detention exists in every country and that prisons are 
crowded with persons awaiting trial. This situation does not contravene IHRL as long as a 
judicial control exists and as long as it is demonstrated that some conditions are fulfilled.   
 
3.4.2.! The right to be brought promptly before a judge 
 
IHRL does not recognize as such a right to bail or to release pending trial. Rather, it 
recognizes the right to have a court decide on the lawfulness of a suspectÕs detention promptly 
after arrest264 in order to verify if this detention is necessary. Except for the AfCHPR, all the 
three conventions require a judicial control. The ICCPR stipulates that Ôanyone arrested or 
detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial powerÕ.265 The AmCHR holds that Ôany person detained 
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial 
powerÕ.266 Similarly, the ECHR provides that Ôeveryone arrested or detained in accordance with 
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the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other 
officer authorised by law to exercise judicial powerÕ.267 The lack of such provision in the AfCHPR 
is compensated by the fact that the African Commission provides for it in its Resolution on Fair 
Trial.268 
 
The bodies interpreting these instruments provide more details. According to the ECtHR, 
this judicial control of the detention must be automatic, notably because arrested persons who 
have been subjected to ill-treatment or are vulnerable persons such as the mentally weak or those 
who do not speak the language of the judicial officer might be incapable of lodging an 
application.269 The necessity of the automatic character is also recognized by the HRC.270 The 
ECtHR adds that the detention Ômust be regularly reviewedÕ.271 This necessity of a regular control 
stems logically from the fact that the detention must remain necessary. Regarding the 
requirement of promptness, namely the delay in which the detainee has to appear before a judge, 
the ECtHR has always refused to fix a precise time limit and insists that Ôthe question whether or 
not the requirement of promptness has been satisfied must be assessed in each case according to 
its special featuresÕ.272 This is also the position adopted by the HRC.273 It must be noted that, for 
the ECtHR, this control would not cease to apply at the beginning of a trial.274 
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According to the ECtHR,275 the HRC,276 and the AfCmHR,277 this control has to be done 
by an authority offering guarantees of independence from the executive and the parties. In 
addition, in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the right to challenge the lawfulness of the 
detention, this authority must have the power to order the release of the detainee.278 This is one 
of the reasons why the ECtHR does not accept a system of mandatory detention for a certain 
type of offences.279 The other reason is that, according to the ECtHR, Ôthe need to continue the 
deprivation of liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract point of view, taking into 
consideration only the gravity of the offenceÕ. 280  This was clearly expressed by the former 
European Commission on Human Rights regarding the former section 25 of the United 
Kingdom Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which precluded the possibility of pre-trial 
release for those charged with one among a list of enumerated crimes if previously convicted of 
one of those crimes.281 Similarly, the ECtHR condemned Malta because the magistrate before 
whom the applicant had appeared had no power to order his release.282 The HRC followed a 
similar reasoning.283 The same principle can be inferred from the Principles and Guidelines on 
the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa. It prescribes that the purpose of the 
judicial review includes giving Ôthe detainee the opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of his or 
her detention and [to secure] release if the arrest or detention violates his or her rightsÕ.284 If this 
power to order release is not expressly prescribed in the American human rights system, this 
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prescription stems from the need to interpret the convention in order to make its rights 
effective.285 Indeed, why provide for judicial control if this control could not lead to the release of 
the accused? 
 
It can therefore be concluded that it is internationally recognized that an independent 
officer with the power to order the release of the accused has to control the necessity of his or 
her detention automatically and regularly.  
 
3.4.3.! Criteria justifying detention 
 
In order to appreciate the necessity of the detention, IHRL prescribes that several 
conditions be fulfilled. The first condition is that the person is suspected of having committed an 
offence. The ICCPR refers to a person Ôarrested or detained on a criminal chargeÕ,286 and the 
AmCHR to a person detained in view of a future trial.287 The ECHR is more precise. It states that 
there must be ÔÒa reasonable suspicionÓ of a commission of a criminal offenceÕ, 288  which 
presupposes Ôthe existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that 
the person concerned may have committed the offenceÕ.289  Likewise, the IACtHR held that 
Ôsuspicion must be based on specific facts (É) not mere conjectures (É) a State should not 
detain someone to investigate himÕ,290 and that it is necessary that Ôthe findings of the national 
judicial authorities are adequately Òrelevant and sufficientÓ to justify continued detentionÕ.291 The 
AfCmHPR also states that a person may only be arrested on Ôreasonable suspicion or for 
probable causeÕ.292 The suspicion of commission of a criminal offence must persist during the 
whole detention.293  
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Only the ECHR specifies the other conditions related to the assessment of the necessity 
of pre-conviction detention, namely the fact that Ôit is reasonably considered necessary to prevent 
him committing an offence or fleeing after having done soÕ.294  The ECtHR added as other 
conditions the risk of prejudicing the administration of justice, disturbing the public order and 
posing a danger to the accused himself.295 Likewise, the HRC recognizes the risk of committing a 
new offence as an acceptable ground for detention and admits detention Ôwhere the likelihood 
exists that the accused would abscond or destroy evidence, influence witnesses or flee from the 
jurisdiction of the state partyÕ.296 Similarly, for the AfCmHPR, Ôunless there is sufficient evidence 
that deems it necessary to prevent a person arrested on a criminal charge from fleeing, interfering 
with witnesses or posing a clear and serious risk to others, States must ensure that they are not 
kept in custody pending their trialÕ.297 The IAmCHR requires pre-conviction detention only to Ôbe 
applied within the strictly necessary limits to ensure that the person will not impede the efficient 
development of the investigations nor will evade justiceÕ,298 because Ôfailure to comply with these 
requirements is tantamount to a sentence without conviction, which is contrary to universally 
recognized general principles of lawÕ.299 It stems from these considerations that it can be assumed 
that the suspicion of having committed an offence, the risk of flight and the risk of prejudice to 
the administration of justice are recognized internationally as being part of the human rights 
regime regarding provisional release. If the risk of committing further offences is only stated by 
the ECtHR and the HRC, it can still be considered as internationally sufficient given the universal 
character of the ICCPR. On the contrary, the risk of disturbing the public order and of the 
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danger to the accused do not seem to be internationally recognized since they were only stated by 
the ECtHR. 
 
These conditions were further elaborated by the ECtHR and the IACtHR. Regarding the 
risk of flight, it is admitted that it necessarily diminishes as the detention continues because the 
balance of the sentence that the person concerned may expect to serve is reduced. 300  The 
character of the person involved, his morals, his home, his occupation, his assets, his family ties 
and all kinds of links with the country in which he is being prosecuted are relevant to assess this 
risk.301 A previous history of flight after being charged with an offence or the previous necessity 
of an extradition may also be relevant.302 The ECtHR also held that Ôthe severity of the sentence 
faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of absconding (É) but it is not sufficient 
after a certain lapse of time to justify the length of detentionÕ,303 or that Ôthe danger of an accused 
absconding does not result just because it is possible or easy for him to cross the frontierÕ.304 The 
risk that the accused, if released, would take action to prejudice the administration of justice, such 
as interacting with witnesses or destroying evidence, can also justify detention on remand.305 The 
ECtHR considers that this risk continues to exist only as long as the evidence has not been 
collected or the witnesses heard.306 The IACtHR reached the same conclusion.307 
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3.4.4.! Permanent justification of these conditions and length of detention 
 
States have to demonstrate that detention is justified to counter the dangers that the 
accused would present if released and that these risks could not be suppressed by alternative 
measures. Therefore, to justify the necessity of the detention, states need to explain their 
decisions.308 They have to Ôshow that there are Òrelevant and sufficientÓ reasons to justify his or 
her continued detentionÕ.309 According to the HRC, the lack of motivation would amount to an 
arbitrary detention.310 It stems from this obligation of motivation that the burden of proof of the 
fulfilment of the conditions for detention rests on the prosecuting authorities. Indeed, according 
to the ECtHR, the burden of proof in these matters should not be reversed by making it 
incumbent on the detained person to demonstrate the existence of reasons warranting his 
release.311 It noted that Ôshifting the burden of proof to the detained person in such matters is 
tantamount to overturning the rule of Article 5 of the Convention, a provision which makes 
detention an exceptional departure from the right to liberty and one that is only permissible in 
exhaustively enumerated and strictly defined casesÕ.312  
 
After a certain lapse of time, states do not only have to demonstrate relevant and 
sufficient grounds to maintain the detention but also Ôto display Òspecial diligenceÓ in the conduct 
of the proceedingsÕ to avoid undue delay.313 There is no indication in the conventions about what 
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would constitute Ôa reasonable timeÕ or Ôundue delayÕ.314 Nonetheless, the HRC, the ECtHR and 
the IACtHR link the reasonable duration with this criterion of Ôspecial diligenceÕ.315 According to 
the ECtHR, a detention is prolonged beyond a reasonable time Ôwhen (and to the extent that) the 
investigation and trial are conducted less expeditiously than is possible consistently with the 
proper administration of justice or when, alternatively, there is no good reason in the public 
interest (e.g. that the accused might escape) to continue it any further pending trialÕ.316 The HRC, 
the ECtHR, the IACtHR and the IACmHR recognize three factors to assess the special diligence: 
the complexity of the proceedings, the behaviour of the accused and the behaviour of the 
national authorities.317 For all human rights instruments, the sanction of the violation of this 
requirement of due diligence is the release of the accused.318 This requirement of special diligence 
is built on the assumption that detention on remand should be exceptional and therefore of the 
shortest possible duration.  
 
It stems from these considerations that the right to liberty, as internationally recognized, 
requires the decisions of detention to be motivated on the basis of the elements brought by the 
prosecuting authorities and the procedures to be conducted with special diligence and to provide 
for the release of the accused in case of lack of respect of these requirements. 
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3.4.5.! Conclusion: a ius commune? 
 
It can be concluded from this analysis that the right to liberty, as internationally 
recognized, admits the possibility to detain someone who has allegedly committed an offence but 
requires it to be provided for by law and to be strictly necessary since the presumption is in 
favour of release. The necessity of the detention is assessed in light of potential alternative 
measures and in light of a potential risk of flight, of prejudicing the administration of justice and 
of committing new offences. These grounds need to be expressly demonstrated by the detaining 
authorities. In addition, these authorities must ensure a procedure to control automatically and 
regularly the necessity of the detention. This control has to be exercised promptly by an 
independent authority with the power to order the release of the detainee. Finally, the procedure 
has to be conducted with special diligence or the accused would have to be released. 
 
4.! Compliance of the ICC regime with this right to liberty  
 
As explained above, Article 21(1)(a) of the ICC Statute, in combination with its third 
paragraph, requires that, first, the judges should determine the ICC provisions relevant to the 
detention on remand and then they should interpret and apply them in conformity with the right 
to liberty. This analysis starts thus by examining whether the Statute is itself in conformity with 
this right before assessing whether the judges interpret and apply these provisions correctly. This 
analysis is also important in order to determine whether the interim release regime has lacunae in 
order to see if recourses have to be made to the other sources listed in Article 21(1). 
 
4.1.!  Examination of the Statute  
 
4.1.1.! Human rights listed in the Statute 
 
The first thing to note is that no reference to the right to liberty is made in the ICC 
instruments. There is no provision equivalent to Article 9 of the ICCPR or Article 5 of the 
ECHR whereas both the fair trial guarantees and the presumption of innocence benefit from a 
specific recognition in the Statute.319 It must be noted that the presumption of innocence is 
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presented as a guarantee relevant for the trial only regarding burden of proof issues. Therefore, 
the ICC regime seems to consider the presumption of innocence rather Ôas a safeguard against 
mistaken convictionÕ than Ôas a safeguard against violation of human rights at all stages of the 
criminal processÕ.320 It is thus doubtful that this article could be seen as an indirect recognition of 
the right to liberty.321 
 
No explanation was provided regarding the absence of the recognition of this right in the 
ICC provisions and its potential insertion was not debated during their drafting. A reason could 
be its absence in the legal instruments of the other international(ized) criminal tribunals. Reacting 
to this absence, the Ôinternational expert framework on international criminal procedure lawÕ 
pleads in favour of its insertion in the Statutes of the Tribunals because Ôit would serve to 
demonstrate the tribunalsÕ strong adherence to this right and also function as a safety net in case 
there are gaps in the tribunalsÕ positive lawÕ.322  
 
Be that as it may, several components of the right to liberty were inserted directly in the 
ICC provisions. In addition, the absence of an explicit right to liberty does not necessarily mean 
that the ICC does not respect it or, as it will be seen, that its regime is not in conformity with it.  
 
4.1.2.! Articles 58 and 60 of the ICC Statute 
 
Several provisions concerning detention by the ICC exist in the Rome Statute. This thesis 
focuses on those regarding the issuance of an arrest warrant by the ICC and the possibility of 
interim release before the ICC, namely Articles 58 and 60 of the ICC Statute, respectively. It does 
not examine the regime of detention by a member state while waiting for the case to be 
transferred to the ICC, which is covered by Article 59 of the ICC Statute. 323  In fact, the 
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procedure varies according to each state and it does not concern the guarantee of the right to the 
liberty by the ICC as such.  
 
The interpretation and the application of the ICC provisions for each accused will be 
examined in section 5. Nonetheless, the general interpretations of these provisions are mentioned 
in the current section.  
 
4.1.2.1.!Arrest and detention 
 
At any time after the initiation of an investigation, when the prosecutor has identified a 
person who allegedly committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the court in a place where a 
situation was open, he or she can apply to the PTC for the issuance of a warrant of arrest if the 
arrest appears necessary. The prosecutor can also decide to apply only for the issuance of a 
summons to appear if such a summons is deemed sufficient to ensure the personÕs appearance.324 
In contrast with the ad hoc tribunals, 325  the ICC rules thus require the prosecutor to seek 
authorization from a judge before the provisional arrest of a suspect.  
 
The choice between the issuance of an arrest warrant or a summons to appear is in 
conformity with the right to liberty since, contrary to the ad hoc tribunals,326 Article 58 does not 
envisage arrest as the only possibility. This choice does not exist when the accused is already 
detained by national authorities because Ôthe possibility provided for in the Statute to issue a 
summons to appear with conditions restricting liberty clearly indicates that the summons is 
intended to apply only to those individuals who are not already detainedÕ.327 A summons to 
appear is also not an option when the state of origin does not cooperate because Ôthe summons 
to appear is intended for individuals that are not only personally willing to appear on a voluntary 
basis but are also in a position to do soÕ.328 In both cases, there must be reasonable grounds to 
                                                
324 Article 58 of the ICC Statute.  
325 Article 40 bis of the ICTY RPE and of the ICTR RPE. 
326 W. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (CUP, 2006) 389. 
327 Harun Article 58 decision (n128); Laurent Gbagbo Article 58 decision (n125). 
328 Warrant of Arrest for Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, Case No. 
ICC-02/05-03/09, TCIV, ICC, 11 September 2014 ¤22 (ÔNourain arrest warrantÕ). 
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believe that the person committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. After the 
confirmation of the charges, the continuing existence of suspicion is simply assumed.329  
 
For the issuance of an arrest warrant, other conditions are required by Article 58:  
 
The arrest of the person has to appear necessary (i) To ensure the person's appearance at 
trial; (ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the 
court proceedings; or (iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with 
the commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction of the 
Court and which arises out of the same circumstances. 
 
The AC confirmed that these three conditions are Ôin the alternativeÕ, and consequently, 
that the fulfillment of one of them is sufficient to negate the need to address the remaining 
conditions.330 These criteria for assessing the necessity of the arrest correspond to those identified 
by IHRL. The AC stipulated that the appreciation of these criteria Ôought to be made based on 
the specific circumstances of the caseÕ.331 
 
                                                
329 Decision reviewing the ÒDecision on the application for the interim release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecutor 
v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, TCI, ICC, 9 October 2007 ¤9; Ngudjolo interim release decision of 19 
November 2008 (n128) ¤12; Second Review of the Decision on the conditions of Detention of Germain Katanga, 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-
01/07, TCII, ICC, 12 December 2008 ¤9. 
330 Lubanga interim release judgment of 13 February 2007 (n155) ¤139. 
331 Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 
17 March 2014 entitled ÒDecision on the ÔRequte de mise en libertÕ submitted by the Defence for Jean-Jacques 
MangendaÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala 
Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, AC, ICC, 11 July 2014 (ÔMangenda interim release judgment of 
11 July 2014Õ); Judgment on the appeal of Mr Fidele Babala Wandu against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 
14 March 2014 entitled ÒDecision on the 'Requete urgente de la Defense sollicitant la mise en liberte provisoire de 
monsieur Fidele Babala WanduÕÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda 
Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, AC, ICC, 11 July 2014 (ÔBabala interim 
release judgment of 11 July 2014Õ); Judgment on the appeal of Mr Aim Kilolo Musamba against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber II of 14 March 2014 entitled ÒDecision on the ÔDemande de mise en libert provisoire de Matre 
Aim Kilolo MusambaÕÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, 
Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, AC, ICC, 11 July 2014 (ÔKilolo interim release 
judgment of 11 July 2014Õ). 
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The use of the word ÔnecessaryÕ implies that the choice for an arrest or for a summons to 
appear is supposed to be made in light of the fact that Ôpre-trial detention is not the general rule, 
but (É) is the exception, and shall only be resorted to when the Pre-Trial Chamber is satisfied 
that the conditions set forth in article 58 (1) of the Statute are metÕ.332 The arrest needs to ÔappearÕ 
necessary. Difficulties arise with this word ÔappearsÕ since the ICC provisions offer no further 
guidance on when an arrest appears necessary. The AC interprets this term as referring to the 
mere possibility of a ground for detention being realized. For example, Ôin relation to the 
apparent necessity of arrest and, in this context, the continued detention of the suspectÕ, the AC 
noted that Ôthe question revolves around the possibility, not the inevitability, of a future 
occurrenceÕ, 333  because the risk of witness interference 334  or the risk of flight 335  necessarily 
involves an element of prediction. Contrary to the ad hoc tribunal, Ôthe burden of proof in relation 
to the continuing existence of the conditions set forth in article 58(1) of the Statute during the 
time a person is under pre-trial detention lies with the ProsecutionÕ.336 
 
This necessity should be justified during the whole proceedings or the accused should be 
provisionally released.337 Contrary to the ad hoc tribunals, Article 60 also stipulates that release can 
be granted in case of detention for an unreasonable period prior to trial due to inexcusable delay 
by the prosecutor. The detention taken into account is that which is part of Ôthe process of 
bringing [the accused] to justice for the crimes that form the subject-matter of the proceedings 
before the CourtÕ,338 so that prior detention for other offences is not taken into consideration. 
The AC expressly stated that the sanction for this inexcusable delay was the release of the 
detainee Ôeven if a detainee is appropriately detainedÕ.339  Nonetheless, Article 60(4) does not 
                                                
332 Katanga interim release decision of 18 March 2008 (n122); Second Decision on Bosco NtagandaÕs Interim Release, 
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, PTCII, ICC, 17 March 2014 ¤24 (ÔNtaganda interim release 
decision of 17 March 2014Õ). 
333 Decision on the Ôdefence request for interim releaseÕ, Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/10, PTCI, ICC, 19 May 2011 ¤39 (ÔMbarushimana interim release decision of 19 May 2011Õ). 
334 Decision on the accusedÕs application for provisional release in light of the Appeals ChamberÕs judgment of 19 
August 2011, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 27 September 2011 (ÔBemba 
interim release decision of 27 September 2011Õ). 
335 Mbarushimana interim release decision of 19 May 2011 (n333) ¤40. 
336 Katanga interim release decision of 18 March 2008 (n122). 
337 Article 60 of the ICC Statute. 
338 Lubanga interim release judgment of 13 February 2007 (n155) ¤121. 
339 Lubanga interim release judgment of 13 February 2007 (n155) ¤120. 
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require this sanction to be automatic since it only stipulates that Ôthe Court shall consider 
releasing the person, with or without conditionsÕ.  
 
The AC recognizes similar criteria as those developed by IHRL to assess the 
reasonableness of the duration of the detention: the complexity of the proceedings and distinct 
merits of the case.340 Contrary to the ICC regime, IHRL does not make the release depend on an 
inexcusable delay by the prosecution.341 Indeed, it does not change anything for the detainee who 
is responsible for the delay.342 Nonetheless, PTCII stated that  
 
the fact that the duration of the detention of the Suspects is not due to the ProsecutorÕs 
inexcusable delay does not relieve the Chamber of its Ôdistinct and independent obligation 
... to ensure that a person is not detained for an unreasonable period prior to trial under 
article 60(4) of the StatuteÕ, which obligation is a corollary of the fundamental right of an 
accused to a fair and expeditious trial.343  
 
The AC confirmed that reasoning stating that, despite the terms of Article 60(4) of the 
ICC Statute being unequivocal, Ôa Chamber may also determine that a detained person has been 
in detention for an unreasonable period, even in the absence of inexcusable delay by the 
Prosecutor, in its decision pursuant to article 60(2) of the StatuteÕ but that Ôthis determination 
requires finding that the condition under article 58(1)(a) is met and balancing the risks under 
article 58(1)(b) of the Statute that are found to be met against the duration of detention, Òtaking 
into account relevant factors that may have delayed the proceedings and the circumstances of the 
case as a wholeÓÕ.344 
 
                                                
340 Lubanga interim release judgment of 13 February 2007 (n155) ¤123. 
341 Sluiter (n323) 464. 
342 Doran (n9) 734. 
343 Decision ordering the release of Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu 
and Narcisse Arido, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle 
Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, AC, ICC, 21 October 2014 (ÔBembaÕs close aids interim 
release decision of 21 October 2014Õ). 
344 Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 23 January 2015 
entitled ÒDecision on ÔMr BembaÕs Request for Provisional ReleaseÕÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo 
Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, AC, ICC, 
29 May 2015 ¤23 (ÔBembaÕs close aids interim release judgment of 29 May 2015Õ). 
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During the appeal proceedings, Article 81 of the ICC Statute states that the detention 
should be the rule except in a case where the convicted has already been detained longer than his 
sentence.345 In case of acquittal at first instance, it provides for the release save in exceptional 
circumstances and having regard, inter alia, to the concrete risk of flight, the seriousness of the 
offence charged and the probability of success on appeal.  
 
Conditions may be added to the release. The examination of these conditions by the 
judges is discretionary and their imposition is thus subject to the will of the judges. Conditional 
release is possible in two situations:  
 
(1) where a Chamber, although satisfied that the conditions under article 58 (1) (b) are not 
met, nevertheless considers it appropriate to release the person subject to conditions; and 
(2) where risks enumerated in article 58 (1) (b) exist, but the Chamber considers that these 
can be mitigated by the imposition of certain conditions of release.346 
 
The AC held that, in granting conditional release, it was Ônecessary to specify the 
appropriate conditions that make conditional release feasible, identify the State to which [the 
accused] would be released and whether that State would be able to enforce the conditions 
imposed by the CourtÕ,347since release was only possible if specific conditions were imposed. 
                                                
345 Art. 81 of the ICC Statute : 3. (a)Unless the Trial Chamber orders otherwise, a convicted person shall remain in 
custody pending an appeal; 
(b) When a convicted person's time in custody exceeds the sentence of imprisonment imposed, that person shall be 
released, except that if the Prosecutor is also appealing, the release may be subject to the conditions under 
subparagraph (c) below; 
(c) In case of an acquittal, the accused shall be released immediately, subject to the following: 
(i) Under exceptional circumstances, and having regard, inter alia, to the concrete risk of flight, the seriousness of the 
offence charged and the probability of success on appeal, the Trial Chamber, at the request of the Prosecutor, may 
maintain the detention of the person pending appeal; 
(ii) A decision by the Trial Chamber under subparagraph (c) (i) may be appealed in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. 
346 Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber III of 27 June 
2011 entitled ÒDecision on applications for provisional releaseÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-
01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 12 September 2011 ¤55. 
347 Judgment on the appeal of the prosecutor against Pre-Trial Chamber IIÕs ÒDecision on the interim release of 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and convening hearings with the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Portugal, the 
Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, and the Republic of South Africa, 
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However, the AC specified that Ôif a Chamber is considering conditional release and a State has 
indicated its general willingness and ability to accept a detained person and enforce conditions, 
the Chamber must seek observations from that State as to its ability to enforce specific 
conditions identified by the ChamberÕ.348 It added that, Ôdepending on the circumstances, the 
Chamber may have to seek further information from the State if it finds that the StateÕs 
observations are insufficient to enable the Chamber to make an informed decisionÕ.349 The AC 
confirmed later this decision by stating that: 
 
a ChamberÕs obligations to specify conditions and, if necessary, seek additional 
information regarding conditions of release was only triggered when: (a) the Chamber is 
considering conditional release; (b) a State has indicated its general willingness and ability 
to accept a detained person into its territory; and (c) the Chamber does not have 
sufficient information before it regarding the conditions of release to enable it to make an 
informed decision.350  
 
Rule 119 lists non-exhaustively the following conditions:  
(a) The person must not travel beyond territorial limits set by the Pre-Trial Chamber without 
the explicit agreement of the Chamber; 
(b) The person must not go to certain places or associate with certain persons as specified by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber; 
(c) The person must not contact directly or indirectly victims or witnesses; 
(d) The person must not engage in certain professional activities; 
(e) The person must reside at a particular address as specified by the Pre-Trial Chamber; 
                                                                                                                                                   
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 2 December 2009 ¤2 (ÔBemba interim 
release judgment of 2 December 2009Õ). 
348 Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber III of 27 June 
2011 entitled ÒDecision on applications for provisional releaseÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-
01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 19 August 2011 ¤1 (ÔBemba interim release judgment of 19 August 2011Õ); Judgment on the 
appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber III of 26 September 2011 entitled 
ÒDecision on the accusedÕs application for provisional release in light of the Appeals ChamberÕs judgment of 19 
August 2011Ó, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 15 December 2011 (ÔBemba 
interim release judgment of 15 December 2011Õ). 
349 Bemba interim release judgment of 19 August 2011 (n348) ¤2; Bemba interim release judgment of 15 December 
2011 (n348). 
350 Bemba interim release judgment of 15 December 2011 (n348). 
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(f) The person must respond when summoned by an authority or qualified person 
designated by the Pre-Trial Chamber; 
(g) The person must post bond or provide real or personal security or surety, for which the 
amount and the schedule and mode of payment shall be determined by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber; 
(h) The person must supply the Registrar with all identity documents, particularly his or her 
passport. 
 
It stems from these considerations that, regarding arrest and detention, the regime of 
provisional release seems to be in conformity with the right to liberty as defined in section 3. On 
the one hand, the possibility of interim release is expressly stated in the Statute. On the other 
hand, the need to demonstrate the necessity of the arrest and the possibility of conditional release 
Ð with the nuance that the examination of the relevance of this possibility is amenable to the 
discretionary power of the judge Ð imply the exceptional character of the detention and an 
obligation for justification. In addition, the grounds for detention, namely the suspicion criterion, 
the risk of flight, the risk of prejudice to the administration of justice and the risk of committing 
new offences, correspond to those identified in section 3.4.3. The sanction of release in case of 
unreasonably long detention confirms that the case has to be conducted with special diligence. 
 
4.1.2.2.!Procedure of control 
 
The person subject to a warrant of arrest may apply for interim release in the custodial 
state pending surrender,351 or before the PTC.352 The controlling authorities being the PTC, the 
control is thus done by a judge who should therefore be considered as independent and thus 
meeting the conditions of IHRL. A decision on interim release may be appealed by either party 
within five days.353 The AC Ôwill not review the findings of the (...) Chamber de novo, instead it 
will intervene in the findings of the (...) Chamber only where clear errors of law, fact or 
procedure are shown to exist and vitiate the Impugned DecisionÕ.354 In determining whether the 
                                                
351 Article 59 of the Rome Statute. As explained supra, this thesis is exclusively dealing with this second possibility.  
See El Zeidy (n323) 448-465; Sluiter (n323) 467-474; Hartwig (n323) 297-298. 
352 Article 60 of the ICC Statute. 
353 Article 82 of the ICC Statute. 
354 Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber III of 23 
December 2014 entitled ÒDecision on ÔDefence Urgent Motion for Provisional ReleaseÕÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
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the TC has misappreciated facts in a decision on interim release, the AC will Ôdefer or accord a 
margin of appreciation both to the inferences [the Trial Chamber] drew from the available 
evidence and to the weight it accorded to the different factors militating for or against 
detentionÕ.355 
 
If the conditions set forth in Article 58 are met, according to Article 60 of the Rome 
Statute, Ôthe person shall continue to be detainedÕ. If it is not so satisfied, Ôthe Pre-Trial Chamber 
shall release the person, with or without conditionsÕ. The judge is thus supposed to have the 
power of release. The use of ÔshallÕ makes clear that this decision is not of a discretionary 
nature.356 It must be noted that this use of ÔshallÕ marks a huge difference as compared with the ad 
hoc tribunals where the expression ÔmayÕ was used, implying a very broad power of discretion for 
the judges.357  
 
It follows from the terms of Article 60(1) that the first review of detention will only be 
triggered by an application of the accused.358 Once the first application is made, Article 60(3) 
stipulates that Ôthe Pre-Trial Chamber shall periodically review its ruling on the release or 
detention of the person, and may do so at any time on the request of the Prosecutor or the 
personÕ. The RPE specify that ÔperiodicallyÕ means at least every 120 days.359 This automatic 
review does not preclude the defence from its Ôright to submit its application at any time, no 
matter the proximity between the date of the previous review and the date of filing a new 
applicationÕ,360 but, in that case, the Chamber may verify if it is appropriate to conduct this 
review.361 If so, the 120-day period starts running anew from the date of the issuance of this 
decision.362 This regular control is in conformity with IHRL. Nonetheless, the review becomes 
                                                                                                                                                   
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 20 May 2015 ¤17 (ÔBemba interim release judgment of 20 May 
2015Õ). 
355 Bemba interim release judgment of 20 May 2015 (n354) ¤18. 
356 Lubanga interim release judgment of 13 February 2007 (n155) ¤134. 
357Davidson (n8) 58-59; S. Starygin, ÔJudicial Discretion in ECCC Decisions on Pre-trial Detention against the 
Backdrop of the Case-law of the International Criminal TribunalsÕ (2011)11(2) International Criminal Law Review 321-
322. 
358 Lubanga interim release judgment of 13 February 2007 (n155) ¤120. 
359 Rule 118 of the RPE. 
360 Bemba interim release decision of 14 April 2009 (n57) ¤31-32. 
361 Bemba interim release decision of 14 April 2009 (n57) ¤31-32. 
362 Bemba interim release decision of 14 April 2009 (n57) ¤31-32. 
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automatic only once triggered by an application. This may seem in contradiction with IHRL but 
it may be explained by the fact that the first control of the detention is supposed to be done by 
the state that arrested the accused.363 For this reason, the requirement of promptness needs to be 
verified at the level of the arresting state. Even if the accused never applies for interim release, 
the Chamber may also conduct a proprio motu review of the detention despite the fact that it is not 
expressly provided for by the Statute or the Rules. The Chamber granted itself this power 
because Ôaccording to articles 55, 57 and 67, one of the functions of the Chamber is to be the 
ultimate guarantor of the rights of the Defence, including the right Ònot to be deprived of his or 
her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established in 
the StatuteÓÕ, so that this power Ôis a necessary tool to properly perform its functions as the 
ultimate guarantor of the rights of the DefenceÕ.364 
 
It must be noted that, if Article 60 only refers to the PTC, TCIII held that Ôunder Article 
61(11) of the Statute, the [TC] Òmay exercise any function of the [PTC] that is relevant and 
capable of applicationÓ in the trial proceedingsÕ, and considered it Ôappropriate, in fairness to the 
accused, to review his detention under Articles 58(1) and 60 of the Statute and Rule 118(2) of the 
Rules during the entirety of the pre-trial proceedings before the CourtÕ.365 In addition, even if 
Article 60, by its terms, concerns only the period prior to the commencement of trial, it was ruled 
that Ôthe commencement of trial does not extinguish the accusedÕs right to request that the 
Chamber review its previous ruling(s) on detentionÕ,366 but that it extinguishes the automatic 
review required every 120 days.  
 
                                                
363 See Article 59 of the ICC Statute. 
364 Katanga interim release decision of 18 March 2008 (n122). 
365 Decision on the review of detention of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo pursuant to Rule 118(2) of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, TCIII, ICC, 28 July 2010 
¤30. 
366 Bemba interim release decision of 16 August 2011 (n171) ¤46. The Chamber comes to this conclusion because: 
Ô45. Both Article 60(3) and Rule 118(2) provide that the Pre-Trial Chamber may review its ruling on the release or 
detention of the person Òat any time on the request of the Prosecutor or the personÓ (emphasis added). Article 
61(11) of the Statute provides that the Trial Chamber Òmay exercise any function of the Pre-Trial Chamber that is 
relevant and capable of application in th[e trial] proceedingsÓ. 46. Because Article 60(3) and Rule 118(2) employ the 
words "at any time" and because Article 61(ll)Õs grant of authority to the Trial Chamber does not specifically exclude 
the review of previous detention rulings, it follows that Article 60(3) of the Statute permits (i) the accused to apply 
for provisional release during trial; and (ii) the Trial Chamber to consider such an application when made.Õ  
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If the first review provided for by Article 60(1) controls whether the conditions set forth 
in Article 58 are met, Article 60(3) stipulates that the subsequent reviews may lead to a 
modification of the previous ruling only if the Chamber Ôis satisfied that changed circumstances 
so requireÕ. This requirement of Ôchanged circumstancesÕ Ôimports either a change in some or all 
of the facts underlying a previous decision on detention, or a new fact satisfying a Chamber that a 
modification of its prior ruling is necessaryÕ.367 It lies on the prosecution to Ôshow that there has 
been no change in those circumstancesÕ368. If Ôthe [PTC or TC] finds that there are no changed 
circumstances, that Chamber is not required to further review the ruling on release or 
detentionÕ.369 It must be noted that the ICC judge examines whether there was a change of 
circumstances for the grounds of detention under article 58(1)(b); however, the judge does not 
examine whether these change of circumstances include the fact that the person did not commit 
a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court in the first place.370 
 
Before exercising its control of the detention of an accused, Regulation 51 requires that 
the Chamber Ôshall seek observations from the host State and from the State to which the person 
seeks to be releasedÕ. 371  
 
In addition, Article 47 of the Headquarters Agreement of the ICC372 stipulates that it is 
the duty of the host state to facilitate the transfer and the departure of the person released. The 
Agreement does not, however, provide for the possibility of release in the Netherlands.  
 
Furthermore, according to Rule 119 (3) of the RPE, before imposing or amending any 
conditions restricting the liberty of a person whom the Chamber is considering releasing from 
                                                
367 Bemba interim release judgment of 2 December 2009 (n347) ¤1. 
368 Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber III of 28 July 
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custody, the PTC is required to seek the views of, among others, Ôvictims that have 
communicated with the Court in that case and whom the Chamber considers could be at risk as a 
result of a release or conditions imposedÕ. IHRL is silent as to whether it is fair or not for the 
victims to be heard regarding the freedom of a suspect. The fairness of this intervention is 
beyond the scope of this study and is related to the more general debate regarding the principle 
of equality of arms, namely whether this principle is respected when an accused has to face two 
opponents, the prosecution and the victims. 373  So far, the judges have never sustained an 
argument against the release of an accused that was only raised by the victims and not also by the 
prosecution. 
  
It stems from these considerations that the judicial procedure meets the requirements of 
the right to liberty as defined before. In fact, it is conducted by a judge, and therefore by 
someone independent, who is supposed to have the power of release. If admittedly the first 
review depends on the application of the accused and is thus not automatic, the ICC arrogated 
itself the power to review it proprio motu. The control of the detention then happens regularly and 
it rests on the prosecution to demonstrate that the detention is still necessary.  
 
4.2.! Conclusion  
 
This analysis demonstrates that the regime of interim release appears to fulfil the 
requirement of the right to liberty identified in section 3 and that it does not suffer any lacunae. 
Consequently, the ICC would indirectly be bound by the right to liberty due to a combination of 
Article 21(1)(a) and 21(3). It means that, while ruling on interim release requests, its judges would 
need to apply and interpret this regime in conformity with this right as long as it is internationally 
recognized. It also means that this right of the accused ought to be taken into account by the 
registry in its role of judicial support and of responsible of external relations and the presidency 
in its role of the work of the registry and of maintaining relations with states and other entities. 
The role of the registry and of the presidency to ensure the respect of liberty is not without 
consequences as it will be demonstrated in part II.   
 
                                                
373 See M. Damaska, ÔThe Competing Visions of Fairness: The Basic Choice for International Criminal TribunalsÕ 
(2010-2011)36 North Carolina journal of international law and commercial regulation 373-374; Davidson (n8) 27; 
Gradoni, Lewis, Mgret, Nouwen, David Ohlin, Reisinger-Coracini and Zappal (n12) 64-66. 
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It seems thus that, even if the right to liberty is not explicitly expressed in the ICC 
provisions, the drafters of the ICC rules indirectly paid attention to it. Nonetheless, the rare 
declarations related to detention in the travaux prparatoires demonstrate that the need to respect 
the right to liberty did not seem obvious for everyone.374  For instance, the delegation from 
Hungary clearly stated that Ôwe have doubts as to the advisability of allowing perpetrators of 
crimes as grave as those regulated by the statute to avoid custody in return for bail once prior 
arrest has been madeÕ and that Ôit is especially worth considering whether this opportunity given 
to the defendant would not endanger the success of the trialÕ.375 For the Nordic countries, Ôsuch 
procuring of the release of a charged individual is a procedure which most likely would not be 
realistic for this tribunal, considering the magnitude of the crimes in questionÕ.376 Similarly, for the 
United States, if it was normal to provide for the possibility of interim release, Ôgiven the nature 
of the offences the court may hear, consideration of both the risk of flight and of danger would 
seem appropriate and would frequently result in a decision not to grant releaseÕ.377  
 
On the contrary, the International Law Commission in its draft statute for the ICC Ôdid 
not see fit to depart from the principle that liberty should be the rule, despite the gravity of the 
                                                
374 Apparently, according to Judge Wald, it was not obvious for the ICTY either. Indeed, Ôwhen the judges first 
considered pre-trial release, some thought there should be no mention of it in the Rules at all. They anticipated no 
immediate problem with bringing suspects to trial quickly. Also, some judges thought that war crimes were akin to 
murder or other crimes carrying sentences of death or life imprisonment, crimes for which most judicial systems 
would not allow bail anyway. But judges who wanted the TribunalÕs rules to be in conformity with the European 
Convention on Human Rights, as well as non-governmental advocacy groups like the Lawyers Committee on 
Human Rights and Amnesty International, urged that the possibility of release be incorporated into the Rules.Õ (P. 
Wald and J. Martinez, ÔProvisional Release at the ICTY : a Work in ProgressÕ in R. May and others (eds.) Essays on 
ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (Brill, 2000) 232-233). 
375 ICC- A/CN.4/458 and Add.1-8 Observations of Governments on the report of the Working Group on a draft 
statute for an international criminal court. Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission:- 1994 
vol. II(1) 46 ¤38. 
376ICC- A/CN.4/458 and Add.1-8 Observations of Governments on the report of the Working Group on a draft 
statute for an international criminal court. Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission:- 1994 
vol. II(1) 64 ¤38. 
377 ICC- A/CN.4/458 and Add.1-8 Observations of Governments on the report of the Working Group on a draft 
statute for an international criminal court. Extract from the Yearbook of the International Law Commission:- 1994 
vol. II(1) 87 ¤75. 
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crimes falling within the competence of the future courtÕ.378 If its proposition was not sustained, 
there was though clearly an improvement between the first draft text of Article 60 as proposed in 
1997 and the actual one. In 1997, the proposition was that Ôthe person shall be detained unless 
the [PTC] is satisfied that the person, if released, will appear for trial, will not obstruct or 
endanger the investigation or the CourtÕs proceedings[, or will not continue to commit crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court]Õ.379 There had thus been an improvement in light of the right 
to liberty since the expression ÔunlessÕ demonstrates a preference for detention whereas the actual 
expression Ôif it is satisfied thatÕ is more orientated in favour of release.  
 
Be that as it may, the reality is that so far none of the accused charged with international 
crimes has been granted interim release despite the recurring statement that Ôpre-trial detention is 
not the general rule, but it is the exception, and shall only be resorted to when the [PTC] is 
satisfied that the conditions set forth in article 58 (1) of the Statute are metÕ.380 The interpretation 
in practice of the conditions of Article 58 thus needs to be examined for us to be able to 
conclude positively or negatively on the ICCÕs respect for the right to liberty. 
 
5.! Compliance of the ICC practice with the right to liberty 
 
5.1.!  Case law regarding interim release 
 
The case law of the ICC regarding interim release is examined briefly in this chapter. Only 





                                                
378 A-M. La Rosa, ÔA tremendous challenge for the International Criminal Tribunals: reconciling the requirements of 
international humanitarian law with those of fair trialÕ (1997)321 International Review of the Red Cross 5; 
ILC, ÔDraft statute of an international criminal courtÕ, Forty-Six session (1994) UN Doc A/49/10 ¤¤23-209; ILC 
(n59) ¤25. 
379 M. C. Bassiouni, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court Statute (Transnational Publishers, 2005) 434. 
380 Katanga interim release decision of 18 March 2008 (n122); Ntaganda interim release decision of 17 March 2014 
(n332) ¤24. 
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5.1.1.!  The Democratic Republic Congo cases 
 
5.1.1.1.!The Lubanga case 
 
On 10 February 2006, PTCI granted the prosecutionÕs application to issue an arrest 
warrant against Thomas Lubanga, president of the UPC (Union des Patriotes Congolais). 381  The 
reasons were the following: his concerns expressed publicly about the investigation of the 
situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the prospect of being prosecuted by 
the ICC; his national and international contacts that could allow him to attempt at least to evade 
an appearance before the Court for trial, and his interference with witnesses during previous 
trials. He was transferred to the ICC on 16 March 2006.  
 
His applications for interim release were always rejected, the judges mostly sustaining the 
same reasons as those stated in the arrest warrant and adding the gravity of the crimes, his 
knowledge of the names of the witnesses and the volatile character of the situation in DRC. The 
reasonableness of the length of the detention was always assessed but considered reasonable 
given the complexity of the proceedings and the fact that the case was not dormant.382 
 
It must be noted that, following his first application for interim release, the Court ordered 
Lubanga, pursuant to regulation 51 of the Regulations of the Court, to indicate the state to which 
he sought to be released.383 Lubanga then expressed the wish to be freed in Belgium or in Great 
                                                
381 Lubanga arrest warrant (n123) ¤¤100-102. 
382 Order on the application for release, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 29 May 
2006; Lubanga interim release decision of 18 October 2006 (n128); Lubanga interim release judgment of 13 February 
2007 (n155); Review of the ÒDecision on the application for the interim release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecutor 
v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, 14 February 2007; Second review of the ÒDecision on the 
application for the interim release of Thomas Lubanga DyiloÓ, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, PTCI, ICC, 11 June 2007; Decision reviewing the ÒDecision on the application for the interim release of 
Thomas Lubanga DyiloÓ, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, TCI, ICC, 9 October 2007; 
Decision reviewing the Trial ChamberÕs ruling on the detention of Thomas Lubango Dyilo in accordance with Rule 
118-2, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, TCI, ICC, 31 January 2008; Decision reviewing the 
Trial ChamberÕs ruling on the detention of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo in accordance with Rule 118(2), Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, TCI, ICC, 29 May 2008. 
383 Order on the application for release, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 29 May 
2006. 
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Britain.384 Nonetheless, in the end, the observations of these states were not required by the 
judge. 
 
The trial of Lubanga started on 26 January 2009. He never applied again for interim 
release. On 14 March 2012, he was convicted of committing, as co-perpetrator, war crimes 
consisting of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 years into the FPLC and 
using them to participate actively in hostilities in the context of an armed conflict not of an 
international character from 1 September 2002 to 13 August 2003.385 On 10 July 2012, he was 
sentenced to a total period of 14 years of imprisonment.  
 
5.1.1.2.!The Katanga case 
 
Germain Katanga was the commander of the Force de rsistance patriotique en Ituri (Patriotic 
Resistance Force in Ituri, FRPI). On 6 July 2007, PTCI granted the prosecutionÕs request to issue 
a warrant of arrest for him.386 It considered that his arrest was necessary because he was already 
detained and because, according to the prosecutionÕs application, he also had the means to 
obstruct or endanger the investigation. In this regard, the prosecution had indicated that he had 
the opportunity, inter alia, to influence potential witnesses or to arrange false testimonies. The 
prosecution also reported that investigations by MONUC into the crimes allegedly committed 
had already been obstructed by members of the FRPI. He was transferred to the ICC on 17 
October 2007.  
 
On 18 March 2008, in absence of any application from Katanga, PTCI decided that the 
circumstances warranted it carrying out a proprio motu review to determine whether the conditions 
for the pre-trial detention of Katanga continued to be met.387 On 1 April 2008, KatangaÕs lawyers 
announced they were instructed by Katanga not to pursue an application for interim release.388 
                                                
384 Submissions relative to the Order of 29.5.2006, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, 
ICC, 31 May 2006. 
385 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, TCI, ICC, 14 March 2012. 
386 Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for 
Germain Katanga, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 6 July 2007. 
387 Katanga interim release decision of 18 March 2008 (n122). 
388 Defence observations relative to Germain KatangaÕs pre-trial detention, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor 
v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 1 April 2008. 
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Despite this statement, on 21 April 2008, PTCI examined the legality of his pre-trial detention 
and found that the circumstances had not changed since the arrest warrant.389 In the following 
decisions, in addition to the reasons listed in the arrest warrant, the judge insisted on the gravity 
of the crimes, the knowledge of the names of the witnesses and the volatile character of the 
situation in DRC. The length of his detention was also considered as reasonable.390 Katanga 
never applied for interim release during his trial. 
 
It must be noted that, following an invitation by the Court to formulate observations 
regarding the potential interim release of Katanga, the Netherlands answered, on 27 February 
2008, that it was Ôunder no obligation to accept the entry into its territory of any person granted 
interim release by the [ICC]Õ, and that it would Ônot accept that silence on the part of the Defence 
as to the State to which the person seeks to be released would, by default, imply a release to the 
host StateÕ.391 On 16 April 2009, the Chamber refused to order the registry to engage in new 
negotiations with the Netherlands regarding this point of view.392 
                                                
389  Decision on the conditions of the pre-trial detention of Germain Katanga, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 21 April 2008. 
390 Review of the Òdecision on the conditions of the pre-trial detention of Germain KatangaÓ, Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 18 
August 2008; Second Review of the Decision on the conditions of Detention of Germain Katanga, Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, 
ICC, 12 December 2008; Troisime examen de la decision sur les conditions du maintien en detention de Germain 
Katanga, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-
01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 16 April 2009 (ÔKatanga interim release decision of 16 April 2009Õ); Fourth review of the 
Pre-Trial ChamberÕs Decision Concerning the Pre-Trial Detention of Germain Katanga pursuant to rule 118(2) of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. 
ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 21 July 2009; Fifth review of the Pre-Trial ChamberÕs decision 
concerning the pre-trial detention of Germain Katanga pursuant to rule 118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-
01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 20 November 2009. 
391 The NetherlandÕs observations, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-
01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 27 February 2008 (ÔThe Netherlands for Ngudjolo observations of 
27 February 2008Õ). 
392 Katanga interim release decision of 16 April 2009 (n390). 
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Katanga was found guilty on 7 March 2014 of murder, attacking a civilian population, 
destruction of property and pillaging 393  and was sentenced on 23 May 2014 to 12 years 
imprisonment.394 
 
5.1.1.3.!The Ngudjolo case 
 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was the former leader of the Front des nationalistes et intgrationnistes, 
(National Integrationist Front, FNI). PTCI issued an arrest warrant against him on 6 July 2007 
because, Ôby virtue of his current position as a Colonel of the Forces Armes de la Rpublique 
Dmocratique du Congo (FARDC) in Bunia and as the advisor to the Operational Zone 
Commander in the Ituri district, Mathieu Ngudjolo is able to make use of Òthe servicesÓ of 
former FNI and FRPI members who have integrated into the ranks of FARDC, and that he 
might use his connections and the means at his disposal in order to fleeÕ,395 and because Ôthe men 
under Mathieu NgudjoloÕs control have threatened witnesses in the past, both with regard to the 
ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of Court and to a domestic proceeding before the 
national Congolese judicial authoritiesÕ.396 He was arrested on 6 February 2008. 
 
As for Lubanga and Katanga, the judges upheld the same grounds as those in the arrest 
warrant for refusing interim release in Belgium, in France or in the United Kingdom (UK). 
Likewise, to justify their decisions, they referred to the gravity of the crimes, the knowledge of 
the names of the witnesses and the volatile character of the situation in DRC. The length of his 
detention was also considered as reasonable.397 It must be noted that Belgium, France, the UK 
                                                
393 Jugement rendu en application de lÕarticle 74 du Statut, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, 
TCII, ICC, 7 March 2014. 
394 Dcision relative  la peine (article 76 du Statut), Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, 
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395 Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest for 
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397  Decision on the application for interim release of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 27 March 2008; 
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Ngudjolo interim release decision of 19 November 2008 (n128) ¤13; Third review of the decision on the application 
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and the Netherlands had refused to accept him on their soil, namely because of the absence of 
his links with these countries.398 
  
The trial of Katanga and Ngudjolo started on 24 November 2009 and no applications for 
provisional release were ever filed. Ngudjolo was acquitted and subsequently released on 21 
December 2012.399 This acquittal was confirmed by the AC on 7 April 2015.400 On 11 May 2015, 
after the refusal of his asylum application, he was returned to the DRC.401 
 
5.1.1.4.!The Ntaganda case 
 
According to the arrest warrant delivered against him, Bosco Ntaganda is the former 
alleged deputy chief of the General Staff of the FPLC and the alleged chief of staff of the 
Congrs national pour la dfense du peuple (CNDP) armed group, active in North Kivu. On 22 
August 2006, PTCI issued a warrant of arrest against him,402 because he was escaping the criminal 
proceedings instituted against him in the DRC and was currently fighting and because he could 
be in a position to obstruct or endanger the investigation by threatening potential witnesses. The 
                                                                                                                                                   
for interim release of Mathieu Ngudjolo (rule 118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), Prosecutor v. Germain 
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399 Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, 
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warrant of arrest was unsealed on 28 April 2008. PTCI added new counts on 13 July 2012.403 On 
22 March 2013, Bosco Ntaganda voluntarily surrendered to the Court. 
 
So far, his applications for interim release have been rejected. In its decision of the 18 
November 2013, PTCII, referring to the two first decisions of PTCI, considered the conditions 
for detention to be fulfilled. It was not convinced by the argument raised by the defence 
regarding his voluntary surrender since Ôthe evidence or material available before the Single Judge 
suggests that Mr. NtagandaÕs voluntary surrender was prompted by the likelihood of him being 
killed or by pressure imposed on him by the Rwandan GovernmentÕ. It also recalled that Ôthe 
charges or counts Mr. Ntaganda is facing are numerous and of such gravity that they might result 
in an overall lengthy sentenceÕ and that Ôthese two factors if considered together may make it 
likely that Mr. Ntaganda will abscond, should the opportunity ariseÕ. It also noted that ÔMr. 
Ntaganda managed to move around undisturbed since 2006 until the date of his surrender in 
March 2013, despite the existence of a travel banÕ and that Ôthe fact that Mr. Ntaganda is used to 
the practice of crossing borders to different countries makes it likely that he will attempt to 
repeat the same practice within the Schengen areaÕ. It added that Ôthe available information also 
suggests that Mr. Ntaganda has the financial means to abscond, if the opportunity arisesÕ. 
Regarding the risk of obstructing investigation, it argued that, given his local influence and his 
knowledge of the names of some witnesses, this requirement was fulfilled. PTCII finally 
concluded that, due to the unwillingness of the Netherlands to accept him, it could not examine 
the application for conditional release. 404  In the latter decisions, the absence of change of 
circumstances was also cited.405 
 
                                                
403 Decision on the ProsecutorÕs Application under Article 58, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-
02/06, PTCII, ICC, 13 July 2012. 
404 Decision on the Defence's Application for Interim Release, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-
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The charges were confirmed against Ntaganda on 9 June 2015.406 
 
5.1.1.5.!The Mbarushimana case 
 
Callixte Mbarushimana was the alleged executive secretary of the Forces Dmocratiques pour 
la Libration du Rwanda Ð Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR-FCA, FDLR). At the time of the 
prosecutionÕs application to issue an arrest of warrant, he lived in Paris and held a French 
residency permit valid until 30 December 2013. On 28 September 2010, PTCI granted the 
prosecutionÕs application to issue an arrest of warrant against Mbarushimana.407  It found his 
arrest was necessary given his possibility of travelling freely in the Schengen area of the European 
Union, his international support network that could enable him to flee by providing financial 
support, his capacity through members of the FDLR to interfere with the prosecutor's 
investigation by fostering an atmosphere of intimidation against FDLR victims and ICC 
witnesses or potential witnesses and his participation in current crimes. He was arrested on 11 
October 2010. The arrest warrant was unsealed the same day. 
 
His applications for interim release were subsequently rejected on the basis of the same 
grounds as the arrest warrant. PTCI also referred to the gravity of the crimes, the disclosure of 
evidence and to Ôthe evidence of Mr Mbarushimana contemplating intimidating witnesses in the 
German proceedings and the evidence of him having in his possession documents obtained 
through leakageÕ.408 PTCI also found his detention necessary to prevent him from committing 
new crimes because of (i) the mode of liability attributed to Mbarushimana, which Ôdoes not 
require his physical presence at the scene of the crimeÕ; (ii) the fact that the situation in Eastern 
DRC, where the FDLR is still active, remained volatile, and (iii) MbarushimanaÕs information 
technology experience and his ability to have internet and telephone access in ways which cannot 
be easily monitored or controlled. The length of his detention was also considered to be 
reasonable.409 It must be noted that France did not oppose his release on its soil.410  
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On 16 December 2011, PTCI decided to decline to confirm the charges against 
Mbarushimana so that his release was ordered.411 
 
5.1.1.6.!The Mudacumura case 
 
The arrest warrant issued against Sylvestre Mudacumura presents him as the alleged 
supreme commander of the Forces Dmocratiques pour la Libration du Rwanda (FDLR). On 13 July 
2012, PTCII granted the prosecutionÕs application to issue a warrant of arrest against him 
because he faced serious charges, allegedly lived in a remote area in the North Kivu Province of 
the DRC and had access to an international support network which was capable of assisting his 
evasion from the CourtÕs jurisdiction. Other reasons were the sophisticated means of acquiring 
information he had at his disposal in the area of the eastern DRC where he was located and the 
necessity to prevent him from committing new crimes through his control over the FDLR which 
appeared to remain militarily active in the Kivus after September 2010.412 He is still on the run. 
 
5.1.2.! The Uganda cases 
 
Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen are 
all said to be senior LRA (LordÕs Resistance Army) commanders. On 8 July 2005, PTCII issued 
arrest warrants against them. It found that their arrests appeared necessary since Ôthe LRA has 
been in existence for the past 18 years; and that the LRA commanders are allegedly inclined to 
launch retaliatory strikes, thus creating a risk for victims and witnesses who have spoken with or 
provided evidence to the Office of the prosecutorÕ and since Ôthere is therefore a likelihood that 
                                                                                                                                                   
ICC-01/04-01/10, AC, ICC, 14 July 2011; Decision on Òsecond defence request for interim releaseÓ, Prosecutor v. 
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failure to arrest [them] will result in the continuation of crimes of the kind described in the 
ProsecutorÕs applicationÕ.413 
 
On 16 January 2015, Ongwen was surrendered by Central African Republic (CAR) to the 
ICC. Regarding his first application for interim release, PTCII observed that he Ôevaded arrest for 
more than nine years after the CourtÕs warrant for his arrest, of which he appears to have been 
aware, was made public on 13 October 2005Õ and that Ôthis demonstrates both his ability and 
willingness to abscondÕ. PTCII also noted the gravity of the intended charges and the very long 
prison sentence that he might face in case of conviction, which Ôconstitutes a strong possible 
incentive to abscond, increasing the risk of flightÕ. In addition, PTCII observed a risk of 
obstructing or endangering the investigation or the court proceedings and a risk of pressure over 
witnesses. PTCII added that the observations of Belgium were not needed because Ôthe identified 
risks exist independently of the question which State Dominic Ongwen is requested to be 
released to and irrespective of any possible observations from such StateÕ.414 
 
5.1.3.! The Central African Republic cases 
 
5.1.3.1.!The Bemba case 
 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo was the leader of the Mouvement de Libration du Congo (MLC) 
considered as having helped the national armed forces of Ange-Flix Patass, the then president 
of the CAR in his combat against a rebel movement led by Franois Boziz, former Chief-of-
Staff of the Central African armed forces. As president of the MLC, Bemba was a politician in 
the DRC. He was one of the four vice-presidents in the transitional government of the DRC 
from 17 July 2003 to December 2006. In January 2007, he won a Senate seat. He is considered as 
one of the richest men in the DRC.  
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414 Decison on the ÒDefence Request for the Interim Release of Dominic OngwenÓ, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, 
Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, PTCII, ICC, 27 November 2015 ¤16-25. 
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Bemba was arrested by the Belgian authorities on 24 May 2008 on a sealed arrest warrant 
issued by the ICC the day before. PTCIII granted the request of the prosecutor because there 
were reasonable grounds to believe Bemba was responsible for crimes within its jurisdiction 
committed in CAR and because his arrest appeared necessary to ensure his appearance at trial 
and to ensure that he did not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court proceedings.415 
PTCIII agreed with the prosecutor that these risks were demonstrated by the past and present 
political position of Bemba, by his international contacts, by his financial and professional 
background and by the availability of his network and financial resources.416 PTCIII added that 
many victims and witnesses were destitute and were particularly vulnerable since Bemba could 
find them easily given their place of residence.417 PTCIII also concluded that, as president of the 
MLC, he could still use his power to put pressure on witnesses and that, given his past behaviour, 
he would do so.418 
 
In his first application for release, Bemba mentioned his wish to be released in Belgium to 
stay with his family, or alternatively under the protection of the Portuguese authorities in his 
residence in Portugal or, as second alternative, in Switzerland.419 The same grounds referred to in 
the arrest warrant were still considered relevant to warranting the refusal of his applications. In its 
first decision, PTCIII added that Bemba did not bring any relevant arguments to overturn its 
decision regarding the risk of obstruction of the proceedings.420 Given the complexity of the case, 
the length of his detention was also considered to remain reasonable.421 The same conclusion was 
reached by PTCII on 16 December 2008 and on 14 April 2009.422 In this last decision, it also 
took into consideration that, according to the observations received from Portugal and Belgium, 
none of these countries seemed willing to accept him if conditionally released and that they 
offered no guarantees that would ensure his appearance at trial.423  
                                                
415 Bemba Article 58 decision (n128). 
416 Bemba Article 58 decision (n128) ¤87. 
417 Bemba Article 58 decision (n128) ¤88. 
418 Bemba Article 58 decision (n128) ¤89. 
419 Application for interim release, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, PTCII, ICC, 23 
July 2008. 
420 Bemba interim release decision of 21 August 2008 (n125) ¤59. 
421 Bemba interim release decision of 21 August 2008 (n125) ¤55-59.  
422 Decision on application for interim release, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 
PTCII, ICC, 16 December 2008; Bemba interim release decision of 14 April 2009 (n57) ¤45. 
423 Bemba interim release decision of 14 April 2009 (n57) ¤48. 
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Nonetheless, on 4 July 2009, PTCII authorized BembaÕs transfer to Belgium for a 
duration of 24 hours on 8 July 2009 in order to pay respect to his deceased father given the 
exceptional humanitarian circumstances.424 It must be mentioned that Belgium did not oppose 
this request, that one condition was 24-hour police surveillance, and that Bemba was responsible 
for the costs of the entire process. 
 
On 14 August 2009, ruling on the application for interim release of Bemba, PTCII 
expressed the need to have further observations from the states where Bemba was seeking 
release, namely Belgium, Portugal, France, Germany, Italy and South Africa, and from the host 
state, namely the Netherlands, because the implementation of its release decision would depend 
on the set of conditions to be imposed on Bemba and the state to which he was to be released.425 
To reach this conclusion, it examined whether the circumstances had changed and found they 
had. Despite the fact that Bemba maintained his political and professional position, that he 
continued to benefit from international contacts and ties and that he still faced a lengthy 
sentence, he showed good behaviour in detention, did not interfere with the proceedings and 
fully cooperated while he went to attend his fatherÕs funeral. PTCII accepted BembaÕs Ôbona fide 
intention to appear at trialÕ and his statement regarding his political career plans and his promise 
that he would not set aside those past Ôyears of sacrificeÕ and be a fugitive. It also noted his strong 
family ties.426 It added that it seemed unlikely that his release would endanger witnesses or victims 
or lead to the obstruction or endangerment of the investigation or the court proceedings because 
of the absence of concrete evidence presented by the prosecution or by the victims and because 
of his exemplary behaviour.427 Nonetheless, following the appeal of the prosecution, the AC 
found that PTCII misappreciated and disregarded relevant facts in ruling that the entirety of 
factors before it reflected a Ôsubstantial change of circumstancesÕ since the issuance of the 
Decision of 14 April 2009.428 Bemba was thus not released and his following applications were 
rejected for absence of change of circumstances.429  
                                                
424 Decision on the DefenceÕs urgent request concerning Mr. Jean-Pierre BembaÕs attendance of his fatherÕs funeral, 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, PTCII, ICC, 4 July 2009. 
425 Bemba interim release decision of 14 August 2009 (n124). 
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Rglement de Procdure et de preuve, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, TCIII, ICC, 
1 April 2010; Decision on the review of detention of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo pursuant to Rule 118(2) of the 
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The funeral of BembaÕs stepmother was considered as an exceptional circumstance that 
justified the Chamber exercising its inherent power for humanitarian reasons, pursuant to Article 
64 of the Statute.430 His request for release was granted but limited to 24 hours in Belgium under 
constant surveillance.  
 
On 16 August 2011, TCIII held that the only new circumstance was that a state, whose 
name was confidential, had agreed to accept Bemba on its territory in case of release. 431 
Nonetheless, the Chamber did not consider this new circumstance as sufficient since the letter of 
the state and its equally succinct submission conveyed little more than a general willingness to 
accept the accused into its territory and did not specify which of Rule 119(l)Õs conditions it would 
be able to implement.432 TCIII also denied BembaÕs request to travel to the DRC to complete his 
electoral registration.433 However, the AC directed the TCIII to reconsider BembaÕs request for 
interim release because Ôif a Chamber is considering conditional release and a State has indicated 
its general willingness and ability to accept a detained person and enforce conditions, the 
Chamber must seek observations from that State as to its ability to enforce specific conditions 
identified by the ChamberÕ.434  
 
Following this decision, TCIII did not, however, look for further information since the 
concerned state had sent two new letters stating which conditions it was able or willing to 
impose.435 In answer to those, TCIII first reiterated the four grounds upon which it based its 
previous decision to conclude that BembaÕs detention was necessary to ensure his appearance at 
trial. These are namely, the final dismissal of the defenceÕs challenge to the admissibility of the 
case, the commencement of the trial, the gravity of the charges confirmed against the accused, 
the potential substantial sentence in case of conviction and the financial and material support 
from which the accused benefits. TCIII was of the opinion that these grounds remained 
                                                                                                                                                   
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, TCIII, ICC, 28 
July 2010. 
430 Decision on the defence request for Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba to attend his stepmotherÕs funeral, Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, TCIII, ICC, 12 January 2011 ¤13. 
431 Bemba interim release decision of 16 August 2011 (n171) ¤43. 
432 Bemba interim release decision of 16 August 2011 (n171) ¤59. 
433 Bemba interim release decision of 16 August 2011 (n171) ¤72. 
434 Bemba interim release judgment of 19 August 2011 (n348) ¤1. 
435 Bemba interim release decision of 27 September 2011 (n334). 
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unchanged.436 It added that the accusedÕs trial was ongoing, which created an obligation for him 
to attend hearings regularly, that the personal undertakings were not sufficient to reverse its 
reasoning and that it was concerned by the alleged incidents of witness interference from 
whoever they came.437 It concluded that the proposed provisional release would meaningfully 
increase the accusedÕs ability to interfere with witnesses or to cause others to do so; and that the 
measures that the concerned state was willing to implement would not mitigate that risk to an 
acceptable degree.438 The AC confirmed this decision.439  
 
New letters from the concerned state where Bemba sought release for a recession period 
were not considered as bringing a change in the circumstances since, if they provided some new 
details, they did not address the issue of the flight risk or the factors upon which the ChamberÕs 
September 2011 Decision was based.440 The AC agreed with this view and confirmed that the 
mentions in the letters that ten police officers would be sufficient to prevent Bemba from 
absconding was not a change in circumstances.441 
 
On 5 December 2014, Bemba filed a new request for provisional release. Nonetheless, 
TCIII found that there were no changed circumstances regarding the risk of flight and that the 
confirmation of charges in the case against Bemba, Kilolo, Mangenda, Babala and Arido demonstrates 
the risk of interference with the administration of justice. TCIII also refused to consider 
conditional release because it found no conditions could mitigate these risks so that there were 
no need to consult with Belgium and Portugal, the two states mentioned by Bemba in his 
application.442 The appeal against this decision was rejected.443 
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On 21 March 2016, TCIII declared Bemba guilty of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.444  
 
5.1.3.2.!The case against Bemba, Kilolo, Mangenda, Babala and Arido 
 
On 20 November 2013, warrants of arrest were issued against Bemba, his lawyers, Aim 
Kilolo Musamba and Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, and two of his close friends, Fidle 
Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, because they were considered as allegedly criminally 
responsible for several offences against the administration of justice, including presenting 
evidence that the party knows to be false or forged to the Court and corruptly influencing a 
witness to provide false testimony in the Bemba case.445 
 
It must be noted that, according to Hall, Article 58 Ôdoes not apply to offences against the 
administration of justice under article 70Õ.446 He does not provide though any further information 
about this conclusion whereas Article 58 stipulates that it applies when a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the court is committed which is the case for the offences against the 
administration of justice. In any case, this opinion is apparently not shared by the ICC either 
since the AC explicitly ruled that Ôarticles 58 and 60 of the Statute are applicable to offences 
charged under article 70 of the StatuteÕ.447 
 
Arrest warrants were issued against BembaÕs close aids because the gravity of the 
offences 448  and their possibility to travel freely and to benefit from BembaÕs network 
                                                
444 Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 
TCIII, ICC, 21 March 2016. 
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demonstrated a risk of flight. It was also said that the offences with which they were charged 
demonstrated a risk to the administration of justice and of committing new offences.449  
 
In March 2014, PTCII confirmed the pertinence of these elements for Magenda, Babala 
and Kilolo. It added, for each of them, that Ôit is difficult to conceive of measures which might 
effectively counteract the risks associated with the suspectÕs communications with the external 
world and that, accordingly, the detention centre is the only environment providing adequate 
guarantees for the effective management of those risksÕ.450 Their appeals were rejected.451 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
administration of justice and the judiciary. Such seriousness is only enhanced by the fact that this effect is bound to 
be even more significant and strong when committed by highly educated individuals, particularly when their 
professional mission is to serve, rather than disrupt, justice.Õ (Decision on the ÒDemande de mise en libert 
provisoire de Matre Aim Kilolo MusambaÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 14 March 
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It is important to note that, regarding Magenda, neither the Netherlands nor the UK was 
willing to accept him on its soil for a potential interim release.452 Regarding Kilolo, 
 
[t]he Belgian authorities [his state of nationality] took a very cautious approach, noting 
inter alia the following: a. neither the Statute, nor the Rules provide for Ôune solution 
adequate en cas de ncessit dÕune rponse  donner dans lÕextrme urgence  une 
situation de violation flagrante des conditions de la libration provisoireÕ; b. the absence 
of a framework agreement between the Court and Belgium as to conditional release might 
make it impossible for the Belgian authorities to implement some of the measures which 
might be ordered by the Chamber, such as Ôla mise sous coute de lÕintressÕ.453  
 
The Congolese authorities, regarding their national Balaba, stated as follows:  
 
Au cas o, sur dcision de la Cour, lÕintress rentrait en Rpublique Dmocratique du 
Congo, il ne sera pas ais pour les autorits de lÕempcher de poursuivre la commission 
des faits lui imputs, notamment la subornation des tmoins, infraction qui peut se 
raliser en toute clandestinit.  
 
The Congolese authorities also raised the risk of retaliation against the people who 
denounced him.454 
 
                                                
452  Mangenda interim release decision of 17 March 2014 (n448) ¤42: Moreover, the Single Judge notes that no 
availability to accept Jean-Jacques Mangenda on their territory in the event of his release, with or without conditions, 
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On 10 June 2014, Arido filed a request for interim release.455 On 12 June 2014, PTCII 
requested observations from France where he had filed an application for asylum before being 
arrested.456 On 24 July 2014, PTCII found that Arido still presented a risk of flight given the 
possibility that he could benefit from BembaÕs network. It was not convinced by the fact that his 
application for asylum in France would relieve Arido of any interest to leave the country. It also 
confirmed the risk of obstructing or endangering the court proceedings and of committing new 
crimes. Regarding the conditional release request, it found that Ôit is difficult to conceive of 
measures which might effectively counteract the risks identified in this decisionÕ and noted that 
Ôno availability to accept Narcisse Arido on their territory in the event of his release, with or 
without conditions, has been shown by either the Netherlands or France, that is the State to 
which Narcisse Arido requested to be releasedÕ.457 
 
On 13 June 2014, PTCII requested Mangenda, Kilolo and Babala to submit observations 
on their detention.458 In answer to this, given the refusal of the DRC to accept him, Babala 
requested to be put at the disposal of the focus point of the ICC or the MONUC.459 Nonetheless, 
PTCII took the view that Ôno circumstances have intervened since the 14 March 2014 Decision 
suitable to weaken or otherwise impact the assessment made therein as to the persisting existence 
of reasonable grounds to believe that the requirements set forth under article 58(1) of the Statute, 
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and, in particular, the risks listed in paragraph (1)(b) thereof, are still outstandingÕ.460 On 4 July 
2014, following the observations of Mangenda and Kilolo, PTCII requested to be provided with 
the text of the Agreement on interim release concluded by Belgium, as well as with the views of 
the competent authorities of Belgium.461 Belgium replied that it would be easy for the accused to 
leave the country and that it could not legally monitor their communications.462 PTCII found 
that, in the complete absence of a system of monitoring of communications and in the presence 
of the risk of interference with the administration of justice, Ôconditional release to the territory 
of Belgium is not only unwarranted, but also practically unfeasibleÕ.463 Therefore, except for the 
conclusion of the agreement with Belgium, for both Mangenda and Kilolo, PTCII concluded that 
there was no change of circumstances.464 
 
On 26 September 2014, on its own initiative, PTCII ordered the Netherlands, the DRC, 
Belgium, France and the UK to submit their observations on the possible conditional release of 
the suspects to their territories and their ability to enforce the conditions restricting liberty listed 
in Rule 119(1) of the RPE.465 In fact, it found that Ôthe duration of the state of detention of the 
suspects makes it necessary for the Chamber to proceed proprio motu without delay to the review 
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of such of detention, in particular in light of the statutory penalties applicable to the offences at 
stake in these proceedings and of the paramount need to ensure that the duration of pre-trial 
detention shall not be unreasonableÕ. It also ordered Babala to indicate an alternative state where 
he would seek to be released, in the event that the DRC was to reiterate its unwillingness to 
accept him on its territory. Babala replied to this request by saying he would not want to be freed 
anywhere else.466 
 
On 21 October 2014,467 PTCII ordered the release of Kilolo in Belgium, of Mangenda in 
the UK where his family resides, of Babala in the DRC and of Arido in France because these 
countries are the countries where they sought to be released and for which they have a right to 
stay, either because it is their country of origin468 or because they hold a residence permit.469 
PTCII conditioned their release to the signature of a document stating their engagement to 
appear when summoned and to the indication of their address. It found that, Ôsince no additional 
conditions are imposed to the release, there is no need for the Chamber to further consult with 
the relevant States, whether in writing or by way of a hearingÕ. All the statesÕ observations are 
confidential and the decision does not enable us to understand whether these states agreed with 
the release or whether PTCII was of the opinion that their agreement was irrelevant given the 
lack of conditions.470 
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PTCII found that Article 60(4) of the Statute, which provides for the release of the 
defendant in case of unreasonable length of detention, made it necessary to order their release. It 
considered  
 
the advanced stage reached by these proceedings, the documentary nature of the relevant 
evidence and the fact that such evidence has by now been acquired in the record, all of 
which Ð contrary to what stated by the Prosecutor Ð also result in reducing the risks that 
these proceedings or the investigations might be obstructed or endangered, that the 
alleged crimes be continued or related offences be committed [and that] the 
reasonableness of the duration of the detention has to be balanced inter alia against the 
statutory penalties applicable to the offences at stake in these proceedings and that, 
accordingly, the further extension of the period of the pre-trial detention would result in 
making its duration disproportionate.  
 
On 22 October 2014, the registry informed PTCII that the UK had revoked the visa held 
by Mangenda with immediate effect.471 The UK explained this revocation Ôon the grounds that a 
change of circumstances since the entry of clearance was issued had removed the basis of his 
claim to be admitted to the United KingdomÕ, without further explanation. After confidential 
negotiations, the UK finally accepted that Mangenda entered its territory on 22 December 
2014.472 
 
On 23 January 2015, PTCII granted BembaÕs request for provisional release for this 
proceeding but he was not materially freed since he remained in detention for his personal case. 
It found that the same reasoning regarding the length of detention for this proceeding should be 
applicable to Bemba.473 
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Nonetheless, on 29 May 2015, following the prosecutionÕs appeal against the decision of 
21 October 2014 releasing the accused, the AC found, mainly, that,  
 
it is not apparent from the face of the Impugned Decision that a proper risk assessment 
under article 60(3) of the Statute was undertaken. First, unlike in the previous seven 
decisions on detention rendered in this case under articles 60(2) or 60(3) of the Statute, 
the suspects were not assessed as individuals, but were dealt with as a group. There was 
no individual consideration of their specific circumstances or whether those 
circumstances had changed from the previous decision(s). (É) Second, the [AC] is of the 
view that the divergence between the previous decisions to detain each suspect and the 
brief finding in the Impugned Decision that the risks under article 58(1)(b) of the Statute 
no longer necessitated detention or were reduced suggests, in the absence of any 
explanation, that no proper risk assessment was undertaken. (É) The [AC] considers that 
these findings are unclear in light of their divergence from findings made in the previous 
decisions, as well as the fact that the [PTC] did not explain the manner in which the facts 
underlying those previous findings had changed. (É) Moreover, without a proper 
assessment of the risks, it is unclear on what basis the [PTC] reached its conclusion that 
the imposition of one condition was sufficient to mitigate those risks. The [PTC] 
therefore erred in law in its review under article 60(3) of the Statute.474 
 
Despite these findings, the accused were not re-arrested Ôgiven the specific situation of 
the suspects in this case, i.e. that they were ordered to be released on 21 October 2014, to which 
suspensive effect was not granted by the [AC], and the length of time that has passed since their 
releaseÕ.475 
 
Similarly, regarding Bemba, the AC found that it Ôerred in not carrying out a proper 
determination of the risks set out in article 58(1)(b) of the Statute, which is also required for an 
article 60(2) assessmentÕ. They noted that Ôthe Impugned Decision does not contain any analysis 
of these risks, or any reference to this provisionÕ.476 
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5.1.4.! The Darfur cases 
 
5.1.4.1.!The Ahmad Harun and the Ali Kushayb case 
 
Ahmad Harun is the former minister of state for the Interior of the Government of 
Sudan and the current minister of state for Humanitarian Affairs of Sudan. Ali Kushayb is the 
alleged leader of the Militia/Janjaweed. Despite the initial request by the prosecution, PTCI 
refused to issue summonses against them because Kushayb was already detained by the Sudanese 
authorities and it was not convinced of their will to cooperate alleged by the prosecution. It 
added that there were proofs that Harun might have concealed evidence in a bid to protect the 
governmentÕs counter-insurgency policy.477 Neither of the two men is yet in the hands of the 
ICC. 
 
5.1.4.2.!The Al Bashir case 
 
Omar Al Bashir has been the president of the Republic of Sudan since 16 October 1993. 
On 4 March 2009, PTCI granted the prosecutionÕs application for an arrest warrant given Ôthe 
absolute lack of cooperationÕ from the Government of Sudan, his position of attempting to 
obstruct proceedings and possibly to threaten witnesses and the need to prevent him from 
committing further crimes.478 He has not yet been arrested. 
 
5.1.4.3.!The Abu Garda case 
 
Bahar Idriss Abu Garda is the chairman and general coordinator of Military Operations 
of the United Resistance Front. On 7 May 2009, PTCI granted the prosecutionÕs request to issue 
a summons to appear for him since, Ôaccording to the Prosecutor, Abu Garda has expressed his 
willingness to appear before the CourtÕ.479 On 8 February 2010, PTCI refused to confirm the 
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charges against Abu Garda. 480  On 23 April 2010, PTCI issued a decision rejecting the 
prosecutorÕs application to appeal the decision declining to confirm the charges.481 
5.1.4.4.!The Nourain and Jamus case 
 
Abdalla Banda Abakaer Nourain is the commander-in-chief of the Justice and Equality 
Mouvement Collective-Leadership. Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus was the former chief of staff 
of SLA-Unity, currently integrated into the Justice and Equality Movement. On 27 August 2009, 
PTCI granted the prosecutionÕs request to issue summonses for them to appear since the 
prosecutor alleged it would be sufficient.482 
 
Proceedings against Jamus were terminated by TCIV on 4 October 2013 after it received 
evidence pointing towards his death.483 On 11 September 2014, an arrest warrant was issued 
against Nourain because his trial was due to start in November 2014. TCIV decided that an arrest 
warrant was necessary because the absence of cooperation of Sudan would impede the accused 
from surrendering voluntarily. It recalled that Ôthe jurisprudence of the Court suggests that the 
summons to appear is intended for individuals that are not only personally willing to appear on a 
voluntary basis but are also in a position to do soÕ.484 NourainÕs appeal against this decision was 
rejected.485 
 
5.1.4.5.!The Hussein case 
 
Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein is the current minister of National Defence and 
former minister of the Interior and former Sudanese presidentÕs Special Representative in Darfur. 
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114 
On 1 March 2012, PTCI granted the prosecutionÕs request to issue a warrant of arrest for him 
given the history of non-cooperation by the Republic of Sudan and the gravity of the crimes he 
was alleged to have committed. It added that there was a risk that Hussein might Ôuse his position 
of power and influence to obstruct or endanger any investigation into the alleged crimes thereby 
preventing examination into any role he may have playedÕ.486 However, PTCI found that the 
prosecution failed to bring any evidence supporting its claim that the arrest of Hussein was 
necessary to prevent him from committing new crimes. 
 
5.1.5.! The Cte dÕIvoire cases 
 
5.1.5.1.!The Laurent Gbagbo case 
 
Laurent Gbagbo was the president of Cte dÕIvoire from 2000 until his arrest in April 
2011. On 25 October 2011, the prosecution submitted to PTCIII an application for the issuance 
of a warrant for his arrest. Such warrant appeared necessary because he was already detained, 
because he had the political support and economic resources to abscond and because forces close 
to him had probably obstructed investigations by the UN and the media as regard to serious 
crimes.487 PTCIII added that Ôgiven the fact that Mr Gbagbo has many supporters who have 
access to weapons, and bearing in mind that he appears to continue to consider that he remains 
the President of Cte dÕIvoire, there is a real likelihood that he will resort to violence if 
releasedÕ.488 
 
These elements, in addition to the gravity of the crimes, were kept as grounds to reject 
GbagboÕs following applications for interim release.489 A state, whose name is confidential,490 had 
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agreed to accept Gbagbo. Yet, PTCI stated that there was no condition short of detention that 
would be sufficient to mitigate the mentioned risks.491 Regarding the argument that his health 
condition should warrant his release, it was found that Ôthe necessary treatment to improve the 
physical and psychological condition of Mr Gbagbo may be provided in the Netherlands, either 
at the Detention centre of the Court or elsewhere in the country, as may be appropriateÕ so that 
there were Ôno medical reasons that would justify the conditional release of Mr. GbgaboÕ. 492 In 
this regard, the AC stated that: 
 
Medical reasons can play a role in decisions on interim release in at least two ways. First, 
the medical condition of a detained person may have an effect on the risks under article 
58 (1) (b) of the Statute, potentially negating those risks. Second, the medical condition of 
the detained person may be a reason for a Pre-Trial Chamber to grant interim release with 
conditions.493 
 
On 11 November 2013, PTCI recognized that the improved situation in Cte dÕIvoire 
was a new fact. It noted that Ôthe security situation in Cte dÕIvoire seems to be improving and 
that reconciliatory efforts suggest a reduced level of tension between the ÒGovernment and the 
supporters of Mr GbagboÓÕ so that the detention was no longer justified by a risk of recidivism. 
Nevertheless, the Chamber found that the other grounds were still justified. The same conclusion 
was held on 12 March 2014, on 11 July 2014, on 11 November 2014, on 11 March 2015, on 8 
July 2015, on 8 September 2015 and on 2 November 2015.494 
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On 21 October 2014, Gbagbo filed an urgent request to attend his motherÕs funeral. 
Nonetheless, on 29 October 2014, this request was rejected. The Chamber admitted this request 
did concern humanitarian circumstances but refused it for confidential reasons. It added that it 
was Ônot persuaded in the circumstances that any set of specific conditions can sufficiently 
mitigate the security and logistical concerns identified by Cte dÕIvoire, the Registry, the 
Prosecution and the Legal Representative of victimsÕ.495 
 
5.1.5.2.!The Simone Gbagbo case 
 
Simone Gbagbo is Laurent GbagboÕs spouse. On 12 March 2012, PTCIII granted the 
prosecutorÕs application to issue an arrest warrant against her. It found her arrest was necessary 
because she was already detained, because Ôshe appears to have the necessary political contacts as 
well as the economic resources to abscondÕ, because Ôthe evidence further indicates that pro-
Gbagbo forces have previously concealed crimes committed by Mr GbagboÕs inner circle, 
including Ms GbagboÕ and because, Ôgiven that during the post-election violence Ms Gbagbo 
declared her intention to fight until the end, and in light of her political connections, there is a 
real possibility that she will continue to commit the crimes that are the subject of this decision, if 
releasedÕ.496 Cte dÕIvoire still refuses to hand her over to the ICC.497  
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5.1.5.3.!The Bl case 
 
Charles Bl was minister of Youth. PTCIII concluded for the necessity of his arrest 
because he was escaping an arrest warrant for economic crimes issued by Cte dÕIvoire and 
because, given his control over approximately 20,000 pro-Gbagbo combatants who had fled to 
Ghana and given his declaration against the ICC, there was Ôa real possibility that Mr Bl Goud 
may use his resources to obstruct or endanger these proceedings before the ICC proceedings or 
to commit further crimes within the jurisdiction of the CourtÕ.498  
 
He has been in the custody of the ICC since 22 March 2014 and no application for 
interim release (at least non-confidential) was ever filed.499 
 
5.1.6.! The Kenya cases 
 
Regarding the post-election violence in Kenya in 2007Ð08, on 8 March 2011, PTCII 
agreed to the request of the prosecution to issue summons to appear for Henry Kiprono Kosgey, 
William Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang since such summons would be sufficient to ensure their 
appearance before the Court.500 On 23 January 2012, PTCII confirmed the charges against Ruto 
and Sang but not against Kosgey.501 Regarding the same violence, on 8 March 2011, PTCII 
agreed to the request of the prosecution to issue summonses to appear for Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali since such summonses were 
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found to be sufficient to ensure their appearance before the Court.502 On 23 January 2012, PTCII 
confirmed the charges against Muthaura and Kenyatta but not against Ali.503 On 13 March 2015, 
the charges against Kenyatta were also withdrawn.504 Their trials are still ongoing. 
 
On 2 August 2013, the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Walter Osapiri Barasa for 
three counts of offences against the administration of justice consisting in corruptly influencing, 
or attempting corruptly to influence three ICC witnesses. The reasons are so far still confidential. 
He has not yet been arrested. 
 
5.1.7.! The Libya cases 
 
PTCI charged Muammar Gaddafi, the former leader of Libya, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and 
Abdullah Al-Senussi with murder and persecution as crimes against humanity. On 27 June 2011, 
PTCI granted the prosecutorÕs request and issued three arrest warrants against them because they 
challenged the legitimacy of UN Security Council Resolution 1970 which confers jurisdiction of 
the Court in this case and because their position of power and their public pronouncements 
suggested that they would not appear for trial unless compelled to do so by arrest. It added that 
they had also been engaged in an operation to cover up and obstruct the investigation of the 
crimes committed by their subordinates and that their arrest was necessary to prevent them from 
continuing the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.505 In the meantime, 
Muammar Gaddafi was killed and Libya still refuses to hand his son over to the ICC.506 
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5.2.!  Lessons from this case law 
 
As explained in sub-section 4.1.2.1, the prosecutor has the choice to apply either for an 
arrest warrant or a summons to appear. A summons to appear is used when such summons 
would be sufficient to ensure the personÕs appearance. The prosecutor chose this option for all 
the accused charged with international crimes in the Kenya situation,507 and for all the accused in 
the Darfur situation who were not members of the government.508 Unfortunately, he did not give 
any explanation as to why he decided to do so. Apparently, the prosecutor would have negotiated 
with them before choosing to apply for a summons to appear. The only conclusion is that they all 
appeared when summoned. These cases are not relevant for the interim release issue as such 
since they are not detained. However, it shows that those accused of such horrific crimes do not 
necessarily have to be detained. 
 
If no reason is needed to apply for the issuance of a summons to appear, on the other 
hand, specific reasons have to be given for the issuance of an arrest warrant. As seen in section 4, 
Article 58 stipulates that: 
 
The arrest of the person has to appear necessary (i) To ensure the personÕs appearance at 
trial; (ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the 
court proceedings; or (iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with 
the commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction of the 
Court and which arises out of the same circumstances. 
 
It must be recalled that when the accused is already detained,509 or when the government 
of the country refuse to surrender him or her,510 the ICC considers that the only option is to 
deliver an arrest warrant. Nonetheless, even in such a case, the ICC has examined whether the 
other criteria are fulfilled.511 The only exception is the case of Nourain where it restrained itself to 
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examining the first criterion.512 The reason is probably because this arrest warrant was only issued 
because of the lack of cooperation of Sudan. TCIV specifically highlighted that should he 
Ônonetheless appear voluntarily before the Court, the Chamber will take the voluntary appearance 
into consideration and revisit accordingly the conditions of his stay in the Netherlands during 
trialÕ.513 
 
Regarding the first ground required to apply for an arrest warrant, namely the need to 
ensure the personÕs appearance at trial, it can be concluded that Ôpersonal circumstances of the 
suspect such as the suspectÕs education, professional or social statusÕ need to be taken into 
account.514 The necessity to ensure the personÕs appearance could stem from one of these four 
factors: the expression of defiance regarding the ICC,515 the existence of national or international 
contacts available or willing to help the accused to abscond,516  the years of escape517  or the 
influence that the accused may exert due to his political position.518 The second ground, namely 
the need to ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court 
proceedings, is fulfilled in case of proof of previous experience of interference with witnesses by 
the accused,519 or by his close relatives and friends,520 or of the capacity for such interference.521 
The third ground, namely the need to prevent the person from continuing to commit crimes, was 
found to be valid in view of the crimes committed by the accused or by his supporters,522 the risk 
of violence due to the accusedÕs supporters,523 or the support or justification of this violence by 
the accused.524  
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Once the defendant is arrested and detained, the judge has to control whether this 
detention is still necessary. This necessity is assessed with the same criteria as for the necessity of 
arrest with the exception that the judges give more detail of their reasoning. One reason for this 
is because they need to answer the arguments raised by the defendants. However, some 
differences need to be mentioned. Regarding the risk of flight, it is interesting to note that, 
contrary to the decisions on application for an arrest warrant,525 all the judges mention that the 
gravity of the charges and the likely long length of the sentence are elements that have to be 
taken into account.526 They all stress that this argument is even more relevant once the charges 
have been confirmed.527 In addition, all the judges mention that the disclosure of witnessesÕ or 
victimsÕ names enhances the risk of interference with the administration of justice.528 They also 
consider relevant the interference made by supporters of the accused, even if not ordered by 
him,529 the access to complete unmonitored communications with the outside world,530 and the 
volatile character of the situation where the crimes were committed.531 The volatile character of 
the situation and the experience with technology and the capacity to use it without being 
monitored have also been found relevant for the assessment of the criteria related to the 
commission of new crimes.532 
 
5.3.! Compliance of the ICC case law with HR standards 
 
As seen in section 4, the ICC provisions are in conformity with the right to liberty as 
defined before. In fact, they provide for the possibility of interim release. In addition, the 
ÔnecessityÕ criterion of Article 58 implies the exceptional character of the detention, the burden of 
proof on the prosecution and the obligation of motivation. It was also shown that the judicial 
procedure as provided for in the Statute meets the requirements of the right to liberty as defined 
before. The fact that Bl has never seen the legality of his detention reviewed because he never 
filed an application for interim release does not prevent the procedure from being in conformity 
                                                
525 Except for Mudacumura and Darfur situation. 
526 Lubanga, Katanga, Ngudjolo, Mbarushimana, Bemba, Laurent Gbagbo. 
527 Lubanga, Katanga, Ngudjolo, Bemba. 
528 Lubanga, Katanga, Ngudjolo, Mbarushimana, Bemba. 
529 Lubanga, Katanga, Ngudjolo, Mbarushimana, Laurent Gbagbo, Bemba. 
530 Lubanga. 
531 Lubanga, Katanga, Ngudjolo. 
532 Mbarushimana. 
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since he is not a vulnerable person, such as a handicapped person, who does not know his rights, 
as demonstrated by his other requests. 
 
Nonetheless, is this framework applied by the judges in conformity with the right to 
liberty as internationally recognized? At first sight, it seems to be roughly the case. Indeed, the 
exceptional character of detention and the burden of proof are regularly restated by the judges. 
The necessity of detention is appreciated in light of the conditions stipulated by IHRL and the 
reasonable character of the length of detention is controlled during each review. These four 
affirmations will be deepened further in order to verify whether this apparent human rights 
friendly attitude by the ICC judges does not hide another reality. 
 
5.3.1.! The exceptional character of pre-trial detention and detention pending trial 
 
The first affirmation is related to the fact that all international human rights regimes 
recognize that pre-conviction detention is acceptable as an exception to the right to liberty, but 
that its use should be exceptional. The ICC also agrees that Ôwhen dealing with the right to 
liberty, one should be mindful of the fundamental principle that deprivation of liberty should be 
an exception and not a ruleÕ,533 and, by referring to IACtHRÕs case law, that Ôpre-trial detention is 
not to be considered as pre-trial punishment and shall not be used for punitive purposesÕ.534 
Furthermore, when a state willing to accept the accused is found, as in the Bemba and in the 
Gbagbo cases, the ICC judges examine alternatives to detention. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
assess them since they have never been used. The ICC adopts the extensive interpretation of the 
presumption of innocence since it considers it plays a role in the determination of the necessity 
of the pre-conviction detention.535 Be that as it may, the reality is that no accused person charged 
with international crimes has ever been released, so that these statements do not seem to have a 
real impact in practice. Nonetheless, at the same time, the obligation to respect the right to liberty 
does not imply an automatic release since exceptions to the principle are accepted. 
 
                                                
533 Bemba interim release decision of 14 April 2009 (n57) ¤36.  
See also Babala interim release judgment of 11 July 2014 (n331). 
534 Bemba interim release decision of 14 August 2009 (n124) ¤38. 
535 Bemba interim release decision of 14 August 2009 (n124) ¤37; Mbarushimana interim release decision of 19 May 
2011 (n333) ¤33. 
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5.3.2.! The burden of proof 
 
The second affirmation concerns the fact that, in theory, the ICC agrees with the ECtHR 
and the HRC that the burden of proof rests on the prosecution to demonstrate that the detention 
is or remains necessary.536 The obligation to give reasons for the decisions was recalled by the AC 
who sanctioned the insufficient explanation regarding the fulfilment of some criteria. 537 
Nonetheless, despite these statements, Hartwig rightly noticed that: 
 
When it comes to decisions pursuant to Art. 60 (2) ICCSt, the ChambersÕ approach 
corresponds to a reversal of the burden of proof. Here, the [PTCs] constantly refer to the 
decision on the issuance of a warrant of arrest, without examining the requirements of 
Art. 58(1) ICCSt anew. Rather, the detained person is put in a situation where he or she 
has to rebut the existence of facts warranting detention. This constitutes a reversal of the 
burden of proof.538  
 
Furthermore, the expression Ôchanged circumstancesÕ is interpreted quite restrictively 
since the time is not considered as such circumstance. Yet, as argued by Golubok, Ôtime is a very 
relevant circumstance, and it is always changing, by definitionÕ.539 He argues his point by referring 
to the ECtHRÕs case law according to which, Ôfor example, risk of threatening witnesses, even if 
proven, will no longer justify continued detention when witnesses have already been heard or 
when it becomes clear that their testimony is no longer necessaryÕ.540 Admittedly, the decision 
regarding BembaÕs close aids is a step in the right direction in this regard but it does not concern 
accused charged with international crimes and it was reversed on appeal.541 It stems from these 
                                                
536 Katanga interim release decision of 18 March 2008 (n122). 
537 Lubanga interim release judgment of 13 February 2007 (n155) ¤136; Judgment in the Appeal by Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui of 27 March 2008 against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber 1 on the Application of the Appellant for Interim 
Release, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-
01/04-01/07, AC, ICC, 9 June 2008 ¤26. 
538 Hartwig (n323) 305; 
See also C. Deprez, ÔLa mise en libert avant jugement dans la pratique de la Cour pnale internationale : une rupture 
avec lÕhritage des tribunaux ad hoc ?Õ in D. Bernard and D. Scalia, Vingt ans de justice internationale pnale (La Charte, 
2014) 161. 
539 Golubok (n1) 306-307. 
540 Golubok (n1) 306-307. 
541 BembaÕs close aids interim release decision of 21 October 2014 (n343). 
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considerations that, in order to respect the right to liberty in practice also, an effort should be 
made regarding the burden of proof so that it really rests on the prosecution.542  
 
5.3.3.! The criteria justifying pre-conviction detention 
 
The third affirmation is related to the ICC judgesÕ practice of reference to the same 
criteria as those recognized by IHRL to justify detention on remand. The first condition, namely 
the existence of Ôreasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the CourtÕ, meets at least in theory the Ôreasonable suspicionÕ standard set by the 
ECHR. For example, PTCI referred to this standard while examining whether there were 
reasonable grounds to believe Lubanga had committed the crimes he was charged with.543 It is 
obviously impossible to verify if this suspicion matches the reality since it depends on factual 
elements that have yet to be determined.544  
 
The criteria required by the ICC for demonstrating the necessity of the arrest or the 
detention also correspond to those retained by human rights practice. However, some differences 
exist in their interpretation, among others regarding the role played by the expected sentence 
deduced by the gravity of the charges. Indeed, as seen in sub-section 3.4.3., for the ECtHR, the 
danger of flight necessarily diminishes as the detention continues because the balance of the 
sentence that the person concerned may expect to have to serve is reduced.545 On the contrary, 
for the ICC, this risk is enhanced once the charges have been confirmed because the accused is 
then aware of all the evidence existing against him or her.546 This difference of interpretation can 
play a role since the accused has no impact on the perceived gravity of the charges and the 
expected sentence. In response to the argument that this element applies to any suspect before 
the Court so that it amounts to an irrebuttable presumption, the AC held that Ôwhat is important 
                                                
542 Deprez (n538) 161. 
543 Lubanga arrest warrant (n123) ¤11;  
See also Harun Article 58 decision (n128) ¤28. 
544  See M. Ramsden and C. Chung, ÒReasonable Grounds to BelieveÕ An Unreasonably Unclear Evidentiary 
Threshold in the ICC StatuteÕ (2015)13(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 555-577. 
545 ECtHR, Judgment, Neumeister v. Austria (App. No. 1936/63), 27 June 1968 ¤10; ECtHR, Judgment, Matznetter 
v. Austria (App. No. 2178/64), 10 November 1969 ¤11. 
546 Fifth review of the decision on the application for interim release of Mathieu Ngudjolo (rule 118(2) of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence), Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-
01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 4 November 2009 ¤12. 
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is whether a given factor exists in respect of the particular detained personÕ and that Ôwhether 
charges may be similarly serious in respect of some or all other suspects who are brought before 
the Court is irrelevant because even if this were the case, this does not detract from the fact that 
the charges against [the accused] are seriousÕ.547  
 
The same difference exists regarding the second criterion. Whereas the ECtHR and the 
IACtHR consider that the risk of prejudice to the administration of justice continues to exist only 
as long as the evidence has not been collected or the witnesses heard,548 the ICC does not make 
this distinction. To the contrary, the ICC rather implies that the mere knowledge of the identities 
of the witnesses is sufficient to demonstrate this risk. Nonetheless, a good step was again taken 
by PTCII in the BembaÕs close aids case.549   
 
Regarding the third criterion, namely the risk of recidivism, the ICC case law is in 
conformity with the ECtHRÕs case law stating that the danger has to be plausible and the 
detention appropriate, in light of the circumstances of the case and in particular the past history 
and the personality of the person concerned.550 It must be noted that in the Gbagbo case the judge 
admitted that, once the situation in Cte dÕIvoire had been stabilized, this risk had disappeared.551  
 
Despite this apparent respect for the criteria required for an exception to the right to 
liberty, I cannot help but question the logic of the ICC regarding its interpretation of the criteria 
that could justify provisional release. Indeed, as held by Starygin, an accused has nearly no 
influence on the prongs retained by the ICC judges,552 especially regarding the fact that the names 
of the witnesses have been disclosed to him. The disclosure of the witnessesÕ or victimsÕ identities 
is part of the trial process, even a guarantee of fair trial for each accused, 553 and, as the ICTY 
held, 
                                                
547 Laurent Gbagbo interim release judgment of 26 October 2012 (n57) ¤54. 
548 ECtHR, Judgment, Letellier v. France (App. No. 12369/86), 26 June 1991 ¤39 ; ECHR, I. A. v. France, 23 
September 1998 ¤110;  ECtHR, Judgment, Mamedova v. Russia (App. No. 7064/05), 1 June 2006 ¤79; IACmHR, 
Bronstein and Al. v. Argentina (Case No. 11.205), 11 March 1997 ¤35. 
549 BembaÕs close aids interim release decision of 21 October 2014 (n343). 
550 ECtHR, Clooth v. Belgium (App. No. 49/1990/240/311), 27 November 1991 ¤40. 
551 Fourth decision on the review of Laurent Gbagbo's detention pursuant to article 60(3) of the Rome Statute, 
Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, PTCI, ICC, 11 November 2013. 
552 Starygin (n357) 347-348. 
553 Admittedly there is some controversy regarding anonymity of witnesses. 
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It is a strange logic employed by the prosecution Ð that, once it has complied with its 
obligation (É) to disclose to the accused the supporting material which accompanied the 
indictment and the statements of the witnesses it intends to call, the accused thereafter 
should not be granted provisional release because his mere ability to exert pressure upon 
them is heightened.554 
 
Likewise, the accused does not exercise any influence on the volatile character of the 
situation in his or her country of origin, another criterion sustained by the ICC to justify the 
necessity of the detention.555 Similarly, if a Chamber takes account of the risk of interference with 
witnesses or victims because of the actions of the accusedÕs supporters, as in the Gbagbo case, then 
the accused does not necessarily even play a role in it and, be that as it may, his or her provisional 
release will, in most circumstances, have little impact on whether or not such interference 
occurs.556 Therefore, is the ICC really sincere in its claim to respect the right to liberty?  
 
Admittedly, the ICC went never as far as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC)557 and the SCSL558 in this respect. Indeed, in contrast with the ICC, these two 
tribunals recognize as acceptable grounds for detention the risk to the security of the accused and 
the risk to public order.559 Obviously, the accused is powerless regarding the fact that the acts 
alleged against him or her Ôare of a gravity such that, 30 years after their commission, they 
                                                
554 Decision on Motion by Radsilav Brdanin for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin and Momir Talic, 
Case No. IT-99-36, TCII, ICTY, 25 July 2000 ¤¤19-20 (ÔBrdanin provisional release decision of 25 July 2000Õ). 
555 Lubanga, Katanga, Ngudjolo. 
556 G. McIntyre, ÔDefining Human Rights in the Arena of International Humanitarian Law: Human Rights in the 
Jurisprudence of the ICTYÕ in G. Boas (ed.), International criminal law developments in the case law of the ICTY (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2003) 228. 
557 So far, only one accused, Thirit IENG, was ÔprovisionallyÕ released because she was considered to be unfit for 
trial. It must be noted that the Prosecution did not oppose to her release but that it wanted that strict conditions 
were imposed on her. Nonetheless, this is different than interim release since there will not be any trial. 
See A. Appazov, ÔAnalysis of Decisions on Interim Release at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC)Õ in A. Klip and S. Freeland (eds.), Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals (Vol. 43) 
(Intersentia, 2015). 
558 No accused was ever provisionally released. 
559 See C. L. Davidson, ÔMay It Please the Crowd? Ð The Role of Public Confidence, Public Order and Public 
Opinion in Bail for International Criminal DefendantsÓ, (2011) available at 
http://works.bepress.com/caroline_davidson/2/ (last accessed 21 March 2015) 16-19. 
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profoundly disrupt the public order to such a degree that it is not excessive to conclude that the 
release of the person concerned risks provoking, in the fragile context of todayÕs Cambodian 
society, protests of indignation which could lead to violence and perhaps imperil the very safety 
of the person concernedÕ.560 Similarly, the SCSL refused an application for provisional release, 
among others, because the release of the accused Ôcould well undermine his own safety and, 
indeed, his appearance for trialÕ.561 The ICC has never used these criteria which relate to matters 
over which the accused would really have no control. 
 
In a nutshell, with some discrepancies regarding the effect to give to some steps of the 
trial, it seems that the ICC judges correctly interpret the criteria of Article 58 in light of the right 
to liberty. 
 
5.3.4.! The release in case of unreasonable length of detention 
 
The fourth affirmation relates to the duty of the ICC to release the accused in case of 
unreasonable delay. As seen in sub-section 4.1.2.1., in conformity with the right to liberty, Article 
60 of the ICC Statute lays down that release can be granted in case of detention for an 
unreasonable period prior to trial due to inexcusable delay by the prosecutor. However, IHRL 
does not distinguish who is responsible for the delay.562 The reason is that, for the accused, it 
does not matter who is responsible for it.563 Admittedly, as observed in sub-section 4.1.2.1., the 
ICC does not seem to feel constrained by the terms of the Statute and accepts that other 
circumstances would cause the inexcusable delay.564  
                                                
560 Order of provisional detention, Prosecutor v. Guek Eav Kaing, Case No. 002, OCOIJ, ECCC, 31 July 2007; Order of 
provisional detention, Prosecutor v. Chea Nuon, Case No. 002, OCOIJ, ECCC, 19 September 2007; Provisional 
Detention Order, Prosecutor v. Thirit Ieng, Case No. 002, OCOIJ, ECCC, 14 November 2007; Provisional Detention 
Order, Prosecutor v. Sary Ieng, Case No. 002, OCOIJ, ECCC, 14 November 2007; Provisional Detention Order, 
Prosecutor v. Samphan Khieu, Case No. 002, OCOIJ, ECCC, 19 November 2007; Order on extension of provisional 
detention of Ieng Sary, Prosecutor v. Sary Ieng, Case No. 002, OCOIJ, ECCC, 10 November 2009. 
561 Decision on the motion by Morris Kallon for bail, Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, 
Case No. SCSL-04-15-PT, TC, SCSL, 23 February 2004 ¤44. 
562 ECtHR, Judgment, Muller v. France (App. 21802/93), 17 March 1997 ¤48; ECtHR, Judgment, Punzelt v. the 
Czech Republic (App. No. 31315/96), 25 April 2000 ¤78. 
563 Rearick (n9) 587; K. A. A. Khan, ÔArticle 60Õ in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Beck/Hart, 2008) 1167. 
564 BembaÕs close aids interim release decision of 21 October 2014 (n343). 
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So far, in none of the cases of persons charged with international crimes has the ICC 
found that the detention was unreasonably long. 
 
While examining whether the length of the detention is still reasonable, the ICC judges 
refer to the case law of human rights institutions. An example is the following extract from a 
decision of PTCI containing numerous such references. 
 
Considering that since pre-trial detention cannot be extended to an unreasonable degree 
(European Court of Human Rights, Wemhoff v. Germany judgment of 27 June 1968, 
Application No. 2122/64, ÒAs to the LawÓ, para. 5); that reasonableness cannot be 
assessed in abstracto but depends on the particular features of each case (See European 
Court of Human Rights, Stgmuler v. Austria judgment of 1 November 1969, Application 
No. 1602/62, ÒAs to the LawÓ, para. 4 or European Court of Human Rights, W. v. 
Switzerland judgment of 26 January 1993, Application No.14379/88, para. 30.); and that to 
assess the reasonableness of the detention, it is particularly important to assess the 
complexity of the case (European Court of Human Rights, Van der Tang v. Spain judgment 
of 13 July 1995, Application No.19382/92, para. 75  );  
(É) 
Considering that the case before the Court is complex, particularly because the vast 
majority of the evidence is abroad (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Guy 
Malary v. Haiti, Case No. 11.335, Report No. 78/02, 27 December 2002, para. 64) and 
that the volume of evidence supporting the prosecution is huge (European Court of 
Human Rights, Contrada v. Italy judgment of 24 August 1998, paras. 66 and 67; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 29 January 
1997, Series C No. 30, para. 78).565  
 
Since reasonableness cannot be assessed in abstracto but depends on the particular features 
of each case, it is difficult to determine whether the length of detention in a case before the ICC 
violates IHRL.566 Indeed, as held by the AC, Ô[i]nterim release and the issue of the reasonableness 
of the period of detention are fact intensive and case specificÕ.567 What is crucial is that the judges 
must regularly control the reasonableness of the length of detention, which they do.  
                                                
565 Lubanga interim release decision of 18 October 2006 (n128). 
566 See Doswald-Beck (n273) 293-294. 
567 BembaÕs close aids interim release judgment of 29 May 2015 (n344) ¤45. 
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To give an example of a case similar to those tried by the ICC, the ECtHR was satisfied 
that a substantial risk of the applicantÕs absconding persisted throughout his detention since the 
applicant, who had been extradited from Lebanon to Germany for the purposes of criminal 
proceedings in the context of international terrorism, had neither a fixed dwelling nor social ties 
in Germany.568 In this case, the ECtHR found that the length of the applicantÕs detention Ð six 
years Ð was reasonable given that it involved a particularly complex investigation and trial 
concerning serious offences of international terrorism. In order to examine the diligence of the 
German authorities, the ECtHR took into consideration the special features of the case, including 
the potential life sentence, the great number of witnesses and the fact that the crime occurred 
outside of Germany. These features could be said to characterize all the cases before the ICC. 
Similarly, in three early cases of the former European Commission on Human Rights related to 
to charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, lengthy periods of pre-conviction 
detention of over six years were considered as reasonable because of the difficulties of 
investigation and of trial of such cases, particularly because of the historical nature of the charges, 
the number of accused, the complex contextual elements, the number of witnesses and the fact 
that many of these witnesses as well as a portion of the evidence were located abroad.569 Besides, 
a study of the length of detention before the ICTY and the SCSL, whose proceedings are of 
similar length to the ICC, suggests that Ôthe actual pace of proceedings is less dramatic from a 
comparative perspective than conventional wisdom suggests, and that international cases are only 
Òmodestly slowerÓ that complex cases in domestic settingsÕ.570 It seems therefore that the length 




It stems from these considerations that the ICC judges respect more or less the right to 
liberty. In fact, it recognizes the exceptional character of detention and the obligation to assess 
                                                
568 ECtHR, Judgment, Chraidi v. Germany (App. No. 65655/01), 26 October 2006 ¤40. 
569 ECmHR, Decision, X. v. Federal Republic of Germany (App. No. 920/60), 19 December 1961 ¤¤2-3; ECmHR, 
Decision, W.R. v. Federal Republic of Germany (App. No. 3376/67), 4 February 1969 ¤¤ 14-15; ECmHR, Opinion, 
Jentzsch v. Federal Republic of Germany (App. No. 2604/65), 30 November 1970 ¤163. 
570 See also M. Harmon, ÔThe pre-trial process at the ICTY as a means of ensuring expeditious trials: a potential 
unrealizedÕ (2007)5(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 383; C. Stahn, ÔBetween ÔFaithÕ and ÔFactsÕ: By What 
Standards Should We Assess International Criminal Justice?Õ (2012)25(2) Leiden Journal of International Law 263; 
Meernik (n5) 276-287. 
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alternatives or to issue a summons to appear when possible. In addition, the ICC judges always 
control the reasonableness of the length of detention. Regarding the burden of proof and the 
influence of the disclosure of evidence and the expected sentence, though there are some efforts 
still to be made, the criteria used correspond in general to those required in the context of IHRL. 
 
Nonetheless, it is quite striking that, whereas the ICC recognizes that detention is 
supposed to be the exception, none of the detained accused charged with international crimes 
has ever been released. Why is this so? Would it mean that human rights are only respected in 
theory? Or would it mean that it is just impossible to respect them in practice? Is it really realistic 
to think that, as the erstwhile European Commission on Human Rights held, an applicant is not 
debarred from the protection of his or her right to liberty by reason of the fact that he or she had 
been charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity?571 Or to think that, as one TC of the 
ICTY once argued, Ôno distinction can be drawn between persons facing criminal procedures in 
their home country or on an international levelÕ?572  
 
The instinctive answer to these questions is that it is obvious that the ICC works in a 
different context than a state so that the bar should not be put as high. In fact, there is one aspect 
of the procedure of interim release before the ICC which is not regulated as such by IHRL 
because this issue does not arise at the national level: the need to find a state. The AC stipulated 
that a state that is willing and able to receive the accused must be identified before an order for 
interim release can be made.573 Consequently, it means, as noticed by Golubok, that Ôthe ICC, as 
matters stand now, lacks effective power to releaseÕ. 574  Power to release is, however, a 
requirement of IHRL for the judicial authority that controls the detention. This reliance is 
admitted by the ICC, which recognizes that it  
 
exercises its functions and powers on the territories of States Parties and as such is 
dependent on State cooperation in relation to accepting a person who has been 
conditionally released as well as ensuring that the conditions imposed by the Court are 
                                                
571 ECmHR, Opinion, Jentzsch v. Federal Republic of Germany (App. No. 2604/65), 30 November 1970. 
572  Decision on Request for Provisional Release of Accused Jokic, Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic, Dragan Obrenovic, 
Dragan Jokic, Case No. IT-02-53-PT, TCII, ICTY, 28 March 2002 ¤15. 
573 Bemba interim release judgment of 2 December 2009 (n347) ¤106. 
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enforced. Without such cooperation, any decision of the Court granting conditional 
release would be ineffective 575  (É) since it lacks the direct means to re-arrest a 
suspect/accused if he/she has absconded.576  
 
It must be noted that, despite this awareness, the ICC judges still examine applications for 
provisional release even when the accused presents no guarantees from a state, which raises some 
issues. In fact, it is obvious that the risk of flight, of interference with the administration of 
justice or of recidivism varies depending on the location of the accused. Nevertheless, it does not 
seem to bother the ICC that examines these risks only in abstracto. As Fairlie held, it would be 
more honest to recognize its incapacity to assess the risks in the absence of a state.577 Indeed, it 
seems hypocritical and a poor front to hide a potential violation of human rights. 
 
Given these considerations, before trying to give any more detailed answers to the 
questions whether the ICC is able to respect the right to liberty, it is important to examine the 
debate on the pertinence of the reference to human rights while keeping in mind that Article 
21(3) of the ICC Statute imposes this reference. 
 
6.! Conclusion: Is this reference to human rights pertinent and desirable? 
 
6.1.!  Schools of thought regarding the pertinence of the reference to human rights 
 
The objective of this thesis is to determine the respect for the right to liberty by the ICC 
and its ability to respect this right as prescribed by IHRL. This question arises because, as 
demonstrated in section 1, human rights are applicable to the ICC amongst others through 
Article 21(3) of its Statute. Nonetheless, what if the ICC is unable to apply a specific right? 
Regarding the right to liberty in particular, could it not be argued, as PTCII held in reference to 
the non-refoulement principle,578 that the ICC cannot apply it because Ôonly a State which possesses 
territory is actually able to applyÕ this rule?  
 
                                                
575 Bemba interim release judgment of 2 December 2009 (n347) ¤107. 
576 Bemba interim release decision of 14 April 2009 (n57) ¤49. 
577 Fairlie (n9) 1166. 
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Two different, but quite similar, schools of thought are present in the literature in relation 
to the need for an international criminal tribunal to respect IHRL. According to the first school, 
the reference to human rights as such is inappropriate whereas the second school of thought 
pleads for such a reference alongside an adaptation of IHRL befitting the specificities of the 
context in which international criminal tribunals operate. In this thesis I discuss the pertinence, at 
least regarding the right to liberty, of these two schools of thought and propose a third line of 
argument. In fact, I question the reality of the specific context that would, according to the first 
two schools, require an adaptation of IHRL and advocate for an application of IHRL as such.  
 
It is important to note that, in the case of the right to liberty, the issue of application of 
IHRL is not an issue of conflict as such, at least as it is understood by the International Law 
Commission in its Report on Fragmentation of International Law. This Report rests on a Ôwide 
notion of conflict as a situation where two rules or principles suggest different ways of dealing 
with a problemÕ.579 In this case, the procedural rules of international criminal law suggest the 
same way of dealing with interim release as IHRL but this way is not necessarily pertinent due to 
the specific context in which international criminal procedural law has to be applied. 
Consequently, the methods of resolution of conflict as suggested by the International Law 
Commission Report on Fragmentation of International Law, 580  or the alternative method 
proposed by Michaels and Pauwelyn,581 are not taken into account. The only relevant notion of 
this debate on fragmentation of international law is that of Ôself-contained regimeÕ, described as a 
branch of international law handled by specific rules and techniques of interpretation and 
administration.582 This notion is interesting because international and internationalized tribunals 
have sometimes been qualified as such regimes,583 which amounts to allowing them to be Ôfull 
masters of their human rights regime, with a freedom either to keep it impenetrable to the 
authority of the human rights case law and even the language of the human rights conventions or 
to leave the door ajar if the circumstances of the tribunal or the case before it favour thatÕ.584 This 
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qualification as self-contained regimes is partially recognized in the first of the two schools of 
thought because of the specificities of their context. The third approach aims to demonstrate that 
these specificities can be challenged, which implies that the ICC has to respect its human rights 
obligations as prescribed by Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute. 
 
The first approach pleads for the definition of a new framework to define Ôan 
international procedural ÒidentityÓ based on the specificity of international tribunalsÕ.585 The idea 
is that Ôinternational criminal tribunals should not feel obliged to Òshoot themselves in the footÓ 
by too rigidly adhering to principles [IHRL] developed for application in other contextsÕ.586 In 
this vein, for Damaska, 
 
some departures by international criminal tribunals from domestic standards of fairness 
can be justified, given their sui generis goals, the complexity and the atrocity of crimes 
they process, and the innate weaknesses of these tribunals. And while it is true that only 
the defendant has the right to fair trial, the determination of what this right entails does 
not exclude consideration of the needs generated by the distinctive environment of 
international criminal justice, including consideration of the interest of other procedural 
participants affected by this environment.587  
 
Damaska argues that this continuous reference to human rights is superfluous because it 
would not necessarily infringe its legitimacy if the tribunal does not necessarily respect human 
rights perfectly. He adds that, on the contrary, an overly strict respect of human rights could also 
damage its legitimacy.588 He illustrates this view by examining the perception of the exclusionary 
rule: 
 
The idea that the criminal defendant has a fairness based claim to the automatic rejection 
of all illegally obtained evidence does not agree with ordinary perception of justice. 
Ordinary people tend to believe that such evidence should be used, at least in 
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prosecutions of serious crime, and that the appropriate reaction to the wrongful manner 
of acquisition is to punish those responsible for it. Even if a few exclusionary rules of this 
genre encounter a measure of sympathy, stretching them to their full logical potential is 
not likely to be met with approval.589 
 
Mgret adopts a similar view and illustrates it with the example of the presumption of 
favour in release: 
 
While the principle should be one of conditional liberation, it is also well understood that 
release from custody can be limited on valid grounds such as the threat of absconding 
and risks to witnesses. Internationally, these concerns translate in a particularly stark 
fashion. There is, for example, a long history of suspects escaping detention and going 
into hiding. The difficulties faced by tribunals in apprehending the accused are often 
daunting. Moreover, the very presence of persons suspected of committing international 
crimes on the streets may create concerns for public order (not to mention the security of 
the accused themselves) that would not normally arise for most ordinary crimes. This 
suggests the risk of letting suspects free, pending trial, will often be too great in light of 
the stakes. Moreover, the international environment implies the interest of Ôhost statesÕ 
should be taken into account Ð a factor which would obviously be irrelevant domestically. 
Hence, factors relating to the accused or victims are relevant, as are factors dealing with 
the public order of the society in which the individual would be released. Note that the 
tribunals have not gone so far as to explicitly overturn the presumption against freedom; 
however, the de facto circumstances of the international trial have in effect turned the 
presumption upside down.590 
 
Consequently, for Mgret, the reference to IHRL is inadequate in this case. Like 
Damaska, he argues that the focus must not only be on the accused but also on the other 
stakeholders of the international criminal proceedings, namely the victims, the prosecution and 
society as a whole.591 For the same reasons, Weisbord and Smith plead for a new normative 
theory of international criminal procedure, which would focus on the absence of a state 
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apparatus accompanying international tribunals.592 In addition to the problem due to the specific 
environment, the other problem of the continuous reference to human rights according to this 
approach is the fact that Ôinternational human rights will in most cases be under-determinative of 
the issues at stakeÕ.593 For Mgret, Ôhuman rights law only sets a broad frameworkÕ.594  
 
If these scholars argue in favour of a new normative framework, they do not reject the 
idea that IHRL should be respected. Indeed, Mgret argues that his attempt to redefine this 
framework by using the notion of Ôbecoming internationalÕ is Ôan attempt to develop a procedure 
that is uniquely suited to the reality and the values of the tribunalsÕ international nature while 
simultaneously drawing from domestic traditions and seeking to respect the right to a fair trialÕ.595 
In other words, these scholars plead for the definition of a new normative framework where the 
expression Ôhuman rightsÕ would be banned but where human rights, although not referred to as 
such, would be applied when the context in which the tribunals operate allows for their 
application. It is merely because of this rejection of the expression Ôhuman rightsÕ and of their 
focus on all the stakeholders that they distinguish themselves from the second approach. This 
distinction between these two approaches is thus quite thin. The problem with this approach is 
that, as demonstrated in section 1, IHRL is applicable to the ICC and the ICC Statute itself refers 
to it, so that its pertinence cannot simply be denied.  
 
The second approach does not drop the focus on the accused and the reference to IHRL 
but pleads for its adaptation to the specific context of the international criminal tribunals. As held 
by Dimitrijevic and Milanovic, it is the idea that Ôdistinct features of international criminal 
proceedings make it impossible to simply transpose to them the human rights standards 
developed in the context of domestic criminal justiceÕ. 596  Similarly, for Soares, Ôthere is an 
undeniable mutual influence between human rights law and international criminal lawÕ but Ôwhat 
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they import from each other needs to undergo a maturation processÕ.597 This vision is shared by 
most scholars,598 even by the proponents of the first approach while waiting for the adoption of a 
new framework. For this school of thought, this adaptation is possible because human rights are 
provided for in broad terms and allow for a margin of appreciation.599 It is important to note that 
this translation would not necessarily entail a reduction in the rights of the accused. On the 
contrary, Vasiliev argues in favour of the application of the highest standards.600 In other words, 
this approach does not necessarily support the view that each international criminal tribunal 
should form a self-contained regime with its own regime of human rights depending on its 
context. They argue that the international criminal tribunal should address IHRL, apply it when 
possible and justify a possible departure from its prescriptions.601 The adaptation of human rights 
they argue for would accept, for example, witness anonymity and additional requirements for 
provisional release. 
 
This approach seems to be the most convincing one, legally and logically. On the one 
hand, Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute imposes such respect for human rights. On the other hand, 
the specific context in which the ICC operates cannot be negated as such. Besides, it does not 
necessarily contradict the intention of the drafters of the ICC rules. It cannot be contested that 
IHRL leaves a margin of appreciation to states as regards its application so that the adaptation of 
a human right to the specific context of the international criminal tribunal could arise in this 
margin of appreciation. In addition, as TCII argued, Ôwhen they created the Court and decided 
that it would sit in The Hague, the States Parties were fully mindful of the consequences this 
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would entail for the accused brought before the Court and considered that they were not 
infringing their fundamental rightsÕ. 602  This imperfect transposition of IHRL to international 
criminal proceedings should thus be accepted since it could be seen as the only way of 
maintaining the influence of this law. As Cohen suggested, in order to keep the influence of 
human rights, Ôthe key to the success (É) has been a willingness to accept the imperfect 
translation from human rights to other areas, to accept that the careful constructions of human 
rights bodies will be misunderstood, misapplied, and mutated by other bodies, tribunals, and 
courtsÕ.603 Nonetheless, as Cohen also correctly asked, ÔWhy shouldnÕt human rights law demand 
fidelity to the specific rules it has developed?Õ604 
 
This question reflects the point of view of the third approach, the one I have adopted in 
this thesis. This approach questions two assumptions on which the two first approaches rest: the 
fact that IHRL remains under-developed and underdetermined, at least regarding its approach to 
interim release, and the alleged specific context in which international criminal tribunals work. 
This third approach is justified because, as Sluiter noted, Ôthe mandatory and specific content of 
Article 21(3) of the Statute appears to prevent Judges from adjusting the content of human rights 
law to the unique ICC-contextÕ.605 Admittedly, he added that Ôwhile this offers certain safeguards, 
a too rigid stance on this matter should be rejectedÕ.606 Nonetheless, the ICC Statute, which rests 
on statesÕ consent, does not mention any mutation that Ôinternationally recognized human rightsÕ 
would have to undergo before being applied by the judges. In addition, as will be seen later, states 
cannot delegate to an international organization a power they do not possess, namely that of 
violating human rights.607 Therefore, a strict application of IHRL should legally be preferred. 
Another logic underlying this approach is that there is no reason why an accused should not 
benefit from the same human rights he or she would be supposed to benefit from at a national 
level. In addition, as held by Davidson, Ôone should reject a gravity-based model of human rights 
protection that is antithetical to the administration of justiceÕ because, inter alia, Ôthe gravity of a 
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crime ought to be reflected when sentencing, not when determining the extent of human rights 
protection during trialÕ.608 
 
In contrast to the two other schools of thought, this approach adopts a more active 
attitude regarding the issue of the application of human rights to international criminal tribunals. 
Indeed, it cannot be contested that the persons detained by the ICC are accused of having 
committed horrific crimes or that the Court depends on statesÕ cooperation. Nonetheless, instead 
of accepting these facts as justifying a framework other than that of IHRL, as argued by the first 
approach, or instead of proposing that IHRL be adapted and modified, as argued by the second 
approach, the third approach suggests that the gist is whether this difference of context really 
necessitates such adaptation and if so, whether this context could not be modified, by, inter alia, 
using IHRL.  
 
This third approach could be considered coterminous with the second one. Nevertheless, 
it is important to distinguish this approach from the two others because, at least regarding 
interim release, the third school of thought demonstrates that the fundamentals of the two other 
approaches can be contested. On the one hand, as seen above, the principles of the right to 
liberty governing interim release are not necessarily underdetermined. Admittedly, it is the case 
regarding the determination of the reasonableness of the length of the detention. Nonetheless, 
regarding the presumption in favour of release, the burden of proof, the demonstration of the 
continuous necessity of detention and the conditions justifying provisional release, IHRL is clear. 
On the other hand, many accused have been provisionally released before the ICTY whereas this 
tribunal is operating in a context similar to that of the ICC which questions the pertinence of the 
argument of the specific context for the implementation of the interim release regime. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to examine whether the basis of the two first approaches could be 
contested for each human right before each international criminal tribunal. This thesis intends 
only to demonstrate that this third approach might substitute the first two, at least regarding the 
application of the right to liberty to the ICC, and that the two fundamentals of the first two 
schools should not therefore be taken for granted for the application of other human rights.  
 
To reach this objective, the practice of the other tribunals regarding interim release of 
persons accused of international crimes and the specificity of the context in which the ICC 
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operates will first be examined. Secondly, the potential mechanisms existing to work on this 
context will be identified. However, the potential consequences the ICC could face in case of lack 
of strict respect of IHRL are first outlined. 
 
6.2.! Consequences for the ICC in case of lack of strict respect of international human 
rights law 
 
The respect of human rights by the ICC is important for two reasons: first, the framers of 
the ICC Statute made clear, by inserting Article 21(3), that the ICC had to respect IHRL. 
Secondly, a lack of respect of human rights could prevent future cooperation by states, notably 
regarding future surrender of accused persons. Admittedly the ICC cooperation regime does not 
provide that a state can refuse to surrender an accused because his/her rights would be violated 
by the ICC. In fact, it only recognizes potential grounds for refusal in case of competing requests 
for surrender,609 or in case of inconsistency with the obligation of the state under international 
law with respect to the state or diplomatic immunity of a person.610 Nonetheless, to surrender a 
person to a Court where the state knows that his or her human rights will not be respected could 
engage the responsibility of the state according to IHRL. This is the reasoning argued by Jenks 
regarding the surrender by a state of an accused to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) where 
the accused had been tried in absentia.611 
 
The rationale for this argument is that, as some authors note, certain human rights 
occupy a hierarchically superior position among the norms of international law. The hierarchical 
nature of international legal norms can be implicitly inferred by Article 103 of the UN Charter. 
Moreover, such a conceptualization can be corroborated by the erga omnes character of many 
human rights norms.612 As argued by De Schutter: 
 
These doctrines imply that, when confronted with a choice between two conflicting 
international obligations Ð one imposed under [IHRL], the other resulting from a decision 
adopted by an international organization to which the State has transferred certain powers 
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which this organization may exercise by adopting decisions binding upon its Member 
States Ð a State is not only allowed to set aside the latter obligation in order to comply 
with the former: it is obliged, under international law, to recognize such primacy of 
human rights obligations.613  
 
These doctrines have been put into practice in extradition cases by the ECtHR and the 
HRC. In these cases, the courts held that the execution of an extradition decision could lead to 
the culpability of the extraditing state because of the prohibition of torture and of inhumane and 
degrading treatment.614  
 
What about the right to liberty? As stated by Gradoni, Ôthe test [of the HRC] is set out in 
general termsÕ and Ôin principle, it covers any individual right protected by the CovenantÕ.615 He 
also notes that the HRC has used ÔmayÕ so that Ôthe finding that an infringement of an individualÕs 
right as a foreseeable consequence of his extradition or expulsion does not of itself warrant the 
conclusion that the state which removes that individual from its territory acts in breach of the 
CovenantÕ.616 In addition, if the ECtHR admitted that Ôit cannot be ruled out that an issue might 
exceptionally arise under Article 6 of the Convention [the right to a fair trial] by an extradition 
decision in circumstances where the fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of 
fair trial in the requesting countryÕ,617 Safferling rightly noticed that this language Ôis remarkably 
cautiousÕ.618 As developed by Judges Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan in the Mamatkulov and Askarov 
case, the qualifying term ÔflagrantÕ was meant Ôto impose a stringent test of unfairness going 
beyond mere irregularities or lack of safeguards in the trial procedures such as might result in a 
breach of Article 6 if occurring within the Contracting State itselfÕ.619 In the Al-Moayad case, the 
ECtHR specified that: 
 
                                                
613 De Schutter (n36) 96-97. 
614 ECtHR, Judgment, Soering v. the United Kingdom (App. No. 14038/88), 7 July 1989 ¤91; HRC, Kindler v. 
Canada (Comm. No. 470/1991), CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, 30 July 1993 6.2. 
615 L. Gradoni, ÔÔYou will receive a fair trial elsewhereÕ The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals Acting as 
Human Rights JurisdictionsÕ (2007)54 (1) Netherlands International Law Review 1-49. 
616 Gradoni (n615) 1-49. 
617 ECtHR, Decision, Al Moayad v Germany (App. No. 35865/03), 20 February 2007 ¤100. 
618 C. Safferling, International Criminal Procedure (OUP, 2012) 159. 
619 As cited in Gradoni (n615) 1-49. 
141 
A flagrant denial of justice undoubtedly occurs where a person is detained because of 
suspicions that he has been planning or has committed a criminal offence without having 
any access to an independent and impartial tribunal to have the legality of his or her 
detention reviewed and, if the suspicions do not prove to be well-founded, to obtain 
release (É) Likewise, a deliberate and systematic refusal of access to a lawyer to defend 
oneself, especially when the person is detained in a foreign country, must be considered a 
flagrant denial of a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 ¤¤1 and 3c.620 
 
Even if no reasons would justify that these findings would not apply to a case regarding 
the surrender of an accused to the ICC,621 it is doubtful that the risk of the violation of the right 
to liberty in case of the absence of real possibility of interim release would reach the threshold 
required by these human rights institutions. It must be kept in mind that, in this case, it only 
concerns a risk of violation since a willing state could still be found by the accused, as in the 
Bemba or Gbagbo cases. It does not seem thus to reach the threshold set up by the ECtHR of a 
flagrant denial of justice. It is thus very unlikely that a state would refuse to surrender an accused, 
at least with sincerity, because of this risk of violation.  
 
Furthermore, another obstacle to this ground for refusal for surrender may be the non-
inquiry rule, well known in extradition procedure. Indeed, thisrule Ôprevents a judicial inquiry into 
the fairness of the judicial procedures and the penal conditions in the requesting stateÕ,622 or in 
this case the ICC. This is demonstrated by the Ntakirutimana case before the ICTR. In this case, 
the accused objected to his transfer from the United States to the ICTR because of the risk of a 
violation of his guarantee of a fair trial before the ICTR. His request was rejected because of the 
rule of non-inquiry.623  
 
It is interesting to note that, after a thorough analysis of the case law of national 
jurisdictions, Aspremont and Brlmann concluded that, Ôeven when the opportunity arose, there 
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only are a few cases in which domestic courts have actually reviewed the acts of an international 
criminal tribunal. And when it happened, domestic judges did it with the tip of the toe.Õ624 They 
noted the Ôreluctance to possibly engage the responsibility of the State, which after all remains 
bound by a general international duty to cooperate with the international tribunal concerned. 
Non-compliance with the international obligation to cooperate usually prompts the use of 
compliance mechanisms, a prospect to which judges generally show reservationÕ. 625  This 
reluctance is shared by the ECtHR as demonstrated in the Naletilic case. In this case challenging an 
extradition to the ICTY, the ECtHR recalled that Ôexceptionally, an issue might be raised under 
Article 6 of the Convention by an extradition decision in circumstances where the applicant risks 
suffering a flagrant denial of a fair trialÕ but that Ôinvolved here is the surrender to an international 
court which, in view of the content of its Statute and Rules of Procedure, offers all the necessary 
guarantees including those of impartiality and independenceÕ, without commenting any further.626 
For Sluiter, this non-inquiry rule should not be applied to proceedings for surrender to the ICC 
because of the absence of international supervisory mechanisms for human rights, because of the 
need for the ICC to still demonstrate that it respects human rights and because of the findings in 
the Soering case.627 
 
It follows from these considerations that it is highly unlikely that a state would refuse to 
surrender an accused because of the risk of violation of his or her right to liberty. Nonetheless, 
the absence of consequences for the ICC in case of failure to respect this right in no way changes 
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PART. II. THE ABILITY OF THE ICC TO RESPECT 
THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY 
 
1.! Is the ICC sui generis? Comparison with other tribunals 
 
As seen in part I, according to some authors, the specificity of the context in which the 
ICC operates implies that Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute cannot be applied literally because the 
right to liberty, as an internationally recognized human right, would need to be adapted. They 
believe that this adaptation of the right to liberty would be justified considering the gravity of the 
offences the ICC deals with and the lack of a state apparatus. In order to see whether this 
adaptation is really necessary, the practice of the ICTY and of the ICTR will be examined. 
Indeed, these two other truly international tribunals act in the same environment as the ICC: they 
deal with similar crimes and they cannot rely on a state apparatus either since they are not located 
where the atrocities were committed. By contrast, the other international(ized) criminal tribunals, 
like the SCSL, the ECCC, the STL or the Special Panel for Serious Crimes in East Timor (SPSC), 
either apply national criminal law or have their seat in the concerned state. Their practice will 
thus only be mentioned when it is relevant for the ICC.  
 
The interest of this section is to examine the impact of the gravity of the crimes and of 
the absence of state apparatus on provisional release issues in the case law of the ad hoc tribunals. 
This examination does not equate to an evaluation of the respect of the right to liberty by these 
tribunals since they are not governed by the same applicable law as the ICC and consequently 
they are not necessarily bound by the same right to liberty as the ICC. The purpose of this 
section is not to conduct an exhaustive analysis of this case law either, since the legal regime of 
provisional release is not identical to that of the ICC. For example, the ICTYÕs case law regarding 
the need to demonstrate sufficiently compelling humanitarian grounds to be released has no 
relevance for the ICC since it is linked to a mechanism that does not exist in the ICC, namely the 
possibility of applying for a motion for acquittal provided by Rule 98bis of the ICTY RPE.628 The 
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interest of the ad hoc tribunalsÕ case law thus lies especially in its practical aspects as their practical 
situation is similar to that of the ICC. 
 
The ICTYÕs practice will be studied in more depth than that of the ICTR not only 
because the ICTR has been confronted with much fewer applications but also because the 
motivation of its few decisions is much less full. Furthermore, the ICTYÕs practice is more 
interesting for the study of the ability of the ICC to respect the right to liberty due to the large 
number of accused who were conditionally provisionally released before the beginning of their 
trial.   
 
1.1.! The ICTY: proof of the lack of a specific context? 
 
Before examining the ICTYÕs practice as such, its legal regime of provisional release 
needs to be generally described since it differs from that of the ICC. 
 
1.1.1.! The ICTYÕs procedure 
 
According to Article 19 of the ICTY Statute, upon confirmation of an indictment, the 
judge may, at the request of the prosecutor, issue orders and warrants for the arrest, detention, 
surrender or transfer of persons. 629 By contrast to the ICC, detention is thus the only option, as 
there is no procedure for a summons to appear. 630  Neither the Statute nor the RPE lists 
conditions for the issuance of an arrest warrant. It is only provided that the TC may order an 
arrest warrant upon confirmation of the indictment.631 An indictment is confirmed following the 
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Chaumette, ÔProvisional Release in International Criminal Proceedings: The Limits of the Influence of Human 
Rights LawÕ in N. Weiss and J-M. Thouvenin (eds.), The influence of Human Rights on International Law (Springer, 2015) 
131-144. 
629 UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (as amended), 25 May 1993  
630 Schabas (n326) 389. 
631 Article 19 of the ICTY Statute.  
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presentation by the prosecutor of a prima facie case,632 in other words, a credible case which 
would, if not contradicted by the defence, provide a sufficient basis to convict the accused of the 
charges.633 Once transferred to the ICTY, the accused may apply for provisional release. Contrary 
to the ICC, the legality or the necessity of the detention is not automatically reviewed.   
 
Provisional release is ruled by Rule 65 of the RPE. Rule 65 applies to provisional release 
issues arising during the course of trial, just as it applies during pre-trial and pre-appeal 
proceedings.634 The latest version of Rule 65 stipulates that: 
 
Once detained, an accused may not be released except upon an order of a Chamber. 
Release may be ordered at any stage of the trial proceedings prior to the rendering of the 
final judgment by a Trial Chamber only after giving the host country and the State to 
which the accused seeks to be released the opportunity to be heard and only if it is 
satisfied that the accused will appear for trial and, if released will not pose a danger to any 
victims, witness or other person. The existence of sufficiently compelling humanitarian 
grounds may be considered in granting such release. The Trial Chamber may impose such 
conditions upon the release of the accused as it may determine appropriate, including the 
execution of a bail bond and the observance of such conditions as are necessary to ensure 
the presence of the accused for trial and the protection of others.635  
 
Akin to the ICC, the ICTY judge must thus assess the risk of flight and of prejudice to 
the administration of justice. Nonetheless, a difference lies in the fact that the expression Ômay 
not be released exceptÕ clearly presents the detention as the rule and the release as the exception. 
The use of ÔmayÕ also implies that, in contrast to the ICC regime, the judge has a discretionary 
power to refuse the release, even when the conditions for provisional release are met.636  
 
Before November 1999, this discretionary power was reinforced by the need for the 
accused to prove, in addition to the other conditions, the existence of Ôexceptional circumstancesÕ 
                                                
632 Article 19 of the ICTY Statute. 
633 Hartwig (n323) 294. 
634 Milutinovic provisional release decision of 14 December 2006 (n165). 
635 Version of October 2011. 
636 For a criticism, see Davidson (n8) 34-52; Starygin (n357) 315-35 ; Trotter (n628) 353-374. 
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that would justify the release.637 This requirement and the shifting of the burden of proof to the 
accused were Ôjustified by the extreme gravity of the offences (É) charged and the unique 
circumstances under which the International Tribunal operatesÕ.638 This gravity was considered as 
Ôself-evidentÕ since the ICTY Ôonly has subject-matter jurisdiction over serious violations of 
international humanitarian lawÕ,639 and the unique circumstances as Ôreadily apparentÕ because the 
ICTY was Ônot in possession of any form of mechanism, such as a police force, that could 
exercise control over the accused, nor does it have any control over the area in which the accused 
would reside if releasedÕ so that it was Ôforced to rely on the cooperation of national governments 
or entities, some of which have so far failed to surrender suspects upon requestÕ. 640  This 
requirement was suppressed in November 1999 allegedly because of the length of the pre-trial 
proceedings and the number of detainees in custody.641 Nevertheless, despite this amendment, 
the burden of proof continues to weigh on the accused. According to the ICTY, this is justified 
because Ôthere is nothing in customary international law to prevent the placing of such a burden 
in circumstances where an accused is charged with serious crimes, where an International 
Tribunal has no power to execute its own arrest warrants, and where the release of an accused 
carries with it the potential for putting the lives of victims and witnesses at riskÕ.642  
 
Rule 65 also provides for the host country and the state to which the accused seeks to be 
released the opportunity to be heard. This is only required in the case of a potential provisional 
                                                
637 Rule 65 of the ICTY RPE (Feb 1994): (B) Release may be ordered by a Trial Chamber only in exceptional 
circumstances, and only if it satisfied that the accused will appear for trial and, if released, will not pose a danger to 
any victim, witness or other person. 
Rule 65 ICTYRPE (Nov. 1999): (B) Release may be ordered by a Trial Chamber only after hearing the host country 
and only if it is satisfied that the accused will appear for trial and, if released, will not pose a danger to any victim, 
witness or other person. 
638 Decision on motion for provisional release filed by the accused Zejnil Delalic, Prosecutor v. Mucic et al., Case No. 
IT-96-21, TC, ICTY, 25 September 1996 ¤18 (ÔDelalic provisional release decision of 25 September 1996Õ). 
639 Delalic provisional release decision of 25 September 1996 (n638) ¤19. 
640 Delalic provisional release decision of 25 September 1996 (n638) ¤19. 
641 G. Boas, ÔDevelopments in the Law of Procedure and Evidence at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal CourtÕ (2001)12(2) Criminal Law Forum 170; 
According to Judge Wald, the two deaths in the unit detention and the depressive effect of long pre-trial detention 
also played a role (Wald and Martinez (n374) 233). Judge Robinson also advanced as a reason, the need to bring Rule 
65 in line with human rights law (Fairlie (n9); Mller (n628); Sznajder (n9) 116).  
642 Decision on Momcilo KrajisnikÕs notice of motion for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajisnic, Case No. 
IT-00-39, TC, ICTY, 8 October 2001. 
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release and not in the case of a negative decision.643 This condition is considered to be fulfilled 
when the host country Ð the Netherlands Ð has been informed of the applicantÕs motion and has 
had adequate time to file submissions.644  
 
From these considerations can be inferred some salient differences between the legal 
regime of the ICTY and that of the ICC. These are: the possibility of summons to appear before 
the ICC; the absence of discretionary power for the ICC judges; and the imposition, before the 
ICC, of the burden of proof on the prosecution. At first sight, the ICC legal regime appears thus 
more human rights friendly than that of the ICTY.645 Nonetheless, closer analysis of the ICTYÕs 
practice seems to contradict this conclusion. 
 
1.1.2.!  The ICTYÕs practice 
 
1.1.2.1.! Numbers  
 
Before the amendment of 1999, only four out of 38 accused were granted provisional 
release and only for a few days:646 Djordje Djukic647 and Milan Simic648 both for medical reasons, 
Mario Cerkez649 for visiting his father when he was in a critical condition, and Drago Josipovic650 
for attending the funeral of his father. In addition, Blaskic could benefit from house arrest, 
which, however, differs from provisional release as it is still a detention.651 This experience of 
                                                
643 Decision on defence motion of Ljube Boskoski for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-
PT, TC, ICTY, 18 July 2005 ¤29; Decision on interlocutory appeal from Trial Chamber decision granting Nebojsa 
PavkovicÕs provisional release, Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87, AC, ICTY, 1 November 2005 ¤12. 
644 Decision on interlocutory appeal from Trial Chamber decision denying Savo TodovicÕs application for provisional 
release, Prosecutor v. Todovic, Case No. IT-97-25/1, TC, ICTY, 7 October 2005. 
645 See also Vaurs-Chaumette (n628) 137. 
646 See Doran (n9) 719. 
647 Decision Rejecting the Application to Withdraw the Indictment and Order for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. 
Dorde Dukic, Case No. 1T-96-20-T, TC, ICTY, 24 April 1996. 
648 Decision on Provisional Release of the Accused, Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9-PT, TC, ICTY, 26 
March 1998.  
649 Order on Motion of the Accused Mario Cerkez for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-
95-14/2, TC, ICTY, 14 September 1999. 
650 Decision on the Motion of Defense Counsel for Drago Josipovic, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-
T, TC, ICTY, 6 May 1999. 
651 Decision on the Motion of the Defence Seeking Modification to the Conditions of Detention of Tihomir Blaskic, 
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house arrest has never been renewed. The reasons would be that, Ôwith a growing number of 
accused detained on remand, it became increasingly difficult, in the light of the principle of 
equality in treatment, to single out certain individuals for privileged treatmentÕ and that Ôthe host 
state was quite reluctant to cooperate in further house arrests due to the cost and security 
issuesÕ.652 
 
Nonetheless, since the amendment of 1999, more than 40 accused have been granted 
conditional provisional release. Such release was ordered until the start of the trial,653 or limited to 
specific events such as the funeral of a family member,654 the memorial of a deceased family 
member,655 or the visit to an ill family member.656 The accused have always been recalled from 
release for the start of their trial.657 After the beginning of their trial, some accused have been 
                                                                                                                                                   
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, President, ICTY, 3 April 1996. 
652 de Meester, Pitcher, Rastan and Sluiter (n322) 323. 
653 Decision on Miroslav TadicÕs application for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9, TC, 
ICTY, 4 April 2000; Decision on Milan SimicÕs application for provisional release Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case No. 
IT-95-9, TC, ICTY, 29 May 2000. 
654 Decision on provisional release, Prosecutor v. Hadzhasanovic & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, TC, ICTY, 18 January 
2004: funeral of his brother; Decision pursuant to Rule 65 granting MrksicÕs request to attend his motherÕs funeral, 
Prosecutor v. Mrksic et al, Case No. IT-95-13/1, TC, ICTY, 30 January 2004; Decision on PandurevicÕs request for 
provisional release on compassionate grounds, Prosecutor v. Popovic et al, Case No. IT-05-88, TC, ICTY, 11 December 
2007. 
655 Decision on defendant Dusan FustarÕs emergency motion seeking a temporary provisional release to attend the 
40-day memorial of his fatherÕs death, Prosecutor v. Mejakic et al., Case No. IT-02-65, TC, ICTY, 11 July 2003; 
Decision on motion of Blagoje Simic pursuant to Rule 65(I) for provisional release for a fixed period to attend 
memorial services for his father, Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9, TC, ICTY, 21 October 2004; Decision on 
defence request for provisional release of Stanislav Galic, Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29, TC, ICTY, 
23 March 2005; Decision granting provisional release to Haradin Bala to attend his daughterÕs memorial service, 
Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66, TC, ICTY, 20 April 2006. 
656 Decision on Ojdanic motion for temporary provisional release, Prosecutor v. Sainovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87, TC, 
ICTY, 4 July 2007. 
657 Eg: Order terminating the provisional release of Miroslav Kvocka, Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al, Case No. IT-98-30/1, 
TC, ICTY, 9 February 2005; Order terminating the provisional release of Beqa Beqaj, Prosecutor v. Beqa Beqaj, Case 
No. IT-03-66, TCI, ICTY, 7 April 2005; Order scheduling a start of trial and terminating provisional release, 
Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90, TCI, ICTY, 6 February 2008; Order terminating the provisional release 
of Veselin Sljivancanin, Prosecutor v. Mrksic et al., Case No. IT-95-13/1, TC, ICTY, 9 April 2009. 
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released during the tribunalÕs recess,658 whereas this opportunity has been refused to others.659 To 
give an example, in April 2006, among the 40 accused persons awaiting trial at the Tribunal, 17 
were detained and 23 others were on provisional release in various parts of the former 
Yugoslavia.660 
  
These releases arose not only because of the suppression of the Ôexceptional 
circumstancesÕ criterion but also because Ôthe quality of co-operation with the Tribunal, 
particularly from Croatia and Serbia, but also from entities in Bosnia drawing support from 
Croatia and Serbia, began to improveÕ.661 
 
These provisional releases have always662 been granted under specific conditions, such as 
providing an address, staying in a specific city or village, surrendering the passport, reporting 
regularly to a police station, consenting to unannounced visits, not having contact with victims or 
witnesses or interfering with evidence, not discussing the case, cooperating with the Tribunal and 
complying with any requirements of the authorities.663 
                                                
658 Eg: Decision on joint motion for temporary provisional release during summer recess, Prosecutor v. Sainovic et al., 
Case No. IT-05-87, TC, ICTY, 1 June 2006; Decision on motions for provisional release during the winter judicial 
recess, Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., Case No. IT-05-88, TCII, ICTY, 7 December 2007; Decision on Mr. PerisicÕs motion 
for provisional release during the CourtÕs winter recess, Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81, TC, ICTY, 17 
December 2008; Decision on Mr. PerisicÕs motion for provisional release during the easter Court recess, Prosecutor v. 
Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81, TC, ICTY, 6 April 2009; Decision on Slobodan PraljakÕs motion for provisional release 
(2009 summer judicial recess) of 18 May 2009, Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. IT-04-74, TCIII, ICTY, 25 May 2009; 
Decision on Simatovic defence motion requesting provisional release during the winter court recess, Prosecutor v. 
Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69, TCIII, ICTY, 14 December 2009; Decision granting Mico StanisicÕs motion 
for provisional release during the court summer recess, Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Zupljanin, Case No. IT-08-91, TCII, 
ICTY, 16 July 2010. 
659 Milutinovic provisional release decision of 14 December 2006 (n165); Decision denying Mico StanisicÕs motion for 
provisional release during the court summer recess, Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Zupljanin, Case No. IT-08-91, TCII, ICTY, 
29 June 2011. 
660 Gaynor (n42) 185. 
661 Gaynor (n42) 185. 
662 Except: Order on the Provisional Release of the Accused Proprio Motu, Prosecutor v. Vojislav Seselj, Case No. IT-03-
67, TCIII, ICTY, 6 November 2014. 
663 Eg: Decision on request for pre-trial provisional release, Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48, TC, ICTY, 13 
December 2001; Order on Miodrag JokicÕs motion for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-42/1, 
TC, ICTY, 20 February 2002; Decision on provisional release, Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69, 
TCIII, ICTY, 28 July 2004 (ÔStanisic provisional release decision of 28 July 2004Õ); Decision on defence request for 
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It follows from these considerations that, despite the fact that the legal regime of 
provisional release in the ICTY appears more severe than that of the ICC, the ICTY does not 
hesitate to use its power to release some accused. The gravity of the offences and the lack of state 
apparatus seem thus, at first sight, not to be insurmountable barriers for the ICTY to grant 
provisional release. Why would it be different for the ICC? Before answering this question, it is 
important to study the ICTYÕs case law more thoroughly in order to understand the reasoning of 
the ICTY judges. 
 
1.1.2.2.! ICTYÕs case law 
 
According to the ICTY, to decide upon a provisional release inquiry, the following factors 
are relevant: the gravity of the offences, the potential sentence, the circumstances of the accusedÕs 
surrender, the degree of cooperation provided by the authorities of the state to which the accused 
seeks to be released, the guarantees offered by those authorities, any personal guarantees offered 
by the accused, the accusedÕs degree of co-operation with the prosecution and the indications of 
a previous interference with the administration of justice.664 In addition, the health condition and 
considerations regarding treatment of ill detainees can also play a role.665 
 
It follows from an analysis of the case law that the first two factors, namely the gravity of 
the crimes with which the accused is charged and the perspective of a long sentence, are 
considered as evident since the ICTY Ôonly has subject-matter jurisdiction over serious violations 
of international humanitarian lawÕ.666 Nonetheless, these two criteria alone are not considered as 
sufficient to maintain the detention.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
provisional release, Prosecutor v. Delic, Case No. IT-04-83, TC, ICTY, 6 May 2005; Order of provisional release for 
Mladen Markac, Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90, PTC, ICTY, 9 February 2007. 
664 Stanisic provisional release decision of 28 July 2004 (n663); Decision on fourth application for provisional release, 
Prosecutor v. Sainovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87, TC, ICTY, 14 April 2005; Decision on defence request for provisional 
release, Prosecutor v. Sainovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87, TC, ICTY, 14 April 2005; Decision on provisional release, 
Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69, TCIII, ICTY, 26 May 2008 ¤39. 
665 Decision on provisional release, Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69, TCIII, ICTY, 26 May 2008 
¤40;  
Gaynor (n42) 202-203. 
666 Delalic provisional release decision of 25 September 1996 (n638) ¤19. 
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Among the other factors taken into consideration, the circumstances of the surrender are 
decisive, especially to assess the risk of flight of the accused. The importance of this is 
demonstrated by the fact that provisional release was granted in virtually all the cases where the 
accused voluntarily surrendered.667 It must be noted that, when the accused has been arrested 
under a sealed indictment, this has served as a neutral factor, i.e. it has not exerted any adverse 
influence on the risk of flight.668  
  
Other crucial factors are the degree of cooperation and the guarantees provided by the 
authorities of the state to which the accused seeks to be released. It was held that, even if, in 
theory, Rule 65 Ôplaces no obligation upon an accused applying for provisional release to provide 
guarantees from a State as a prerequisite to obtaining provisional releaseÕ, Ôsuch a guarantee, if 
deemed credible, may carry considerable weight in support of such an applicationÕ.669 Besides, the 
UN Secretary-GeneralÕs October 2000 report to the General Assembly expressly stated that Ôin 
those cases in which no guarantee is given by the relevant state, a release will not be grantedÕ.670 
In practice, no accused has ever been released without such guarantees.671 Nonetheless, such 
guarantees are not necessarily sufficient to be granted provisional release. For example, despite 
the guarantees from Russia for Slobodan Milosevic, the Chamber was not satisfied that, if 
released, he would return for the continuation of his trial, since he was in the latter stages of a 
very lengthy trial, in which he was charged with many serious crimes, and at the end of which he 
might face the possibility of life imprisonment.672 
                                                
667 DeFranck (n628) 1432-34;  
Eg.: Decision granting provisional release to Amir Kubura, Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, 
TC, ICTY, 19 December 2001; Decision granting provisional release to Enver Hadzihasanovic, Prosecutor v. 
Hadzhasanovic & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, TC, ICTY, 19 December 2001; Order on motion for provisional 
release, Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78, TC, ICTY, 20 February 2002; Decision concerning motion 
for provisional release of Radijove Miletic, Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., Case No. IT-05-88, TCII, ICTY, 19 July 2005. 
668 DeFranck (n628) 1432-34;   
Eg., Brdanin provisional release decision of 25 July 2000 (n554); Decision on Momcilo KrajisnicÕs Notice of Motion 
for Provisional release, Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajisnic, Case No. IT-00-39, TC, ICTY, 8 October 2001 ¤20-21; Decision 
on provisional release of Haradin Bala, Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66, TC, ICTY, 16 September 2003. 
669 Decision on interlocutory appeal against trial chamberÕs decisions granting provisional release, Prosecutor v. Popovic 
et al., Case No. IT-05-88, TCII, ICTY, 19 October 2005. 
670 Fairlie (n9) 1165. 
671 Fairlie (n9) 1165. 
672 Decision on assigned counsel request for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Slobodan, Case No. IT-02-54, 
TC, ICTY, 23 February 2006. 
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These guarantees are used to compensate the lack Ôof any form of mechanism, such as a 
police force, which could exercise control over the accusedÕ or of Ôany control over the area in 
which the accused would reside if releasedÕ.673 These guarantees must thus be reliable. The weight 
given to these guarantees depends on the degree to which that government has previously 
cooperated with the ICTY.674 For example, the guarantees provided by the ÔgovernmentÕ of the 
Republic of Srpska started to be taken into consideration only when this ÔgovernmentÕ began to 
demonstrate compliance with court orders.675 To determine this degree of cooperation, the judge 
examines, in each case, Ôwhat would occur if the relevant authority were obliged under its 
guarantee to arrest the accused person seeking provisional release in that caseÕ.676 The judge also 
takes into consideration the position of the accused since it can impact on the stateÕs Ôwillingness 
and readinessÕ to ensure the appearance of the accused at trial.677 The assessment of the reliability 
of the guarantees provided is important as conditions are also imposed on the state. For example, 
the state has to undertake to ensure the personal security and safety of the accused, to submit a 
written report every fixed term as to the presence of the accused and his or her compliance with 
the terms of his or her conditional release and to detain the accused immediately should he or she 
breach any of these terms.678  
                                                
673 Delalic provisional release decision of 25 September 1996 (n638) ¤19. 
674 Stanisic provisional release decision of 28 July 2004 (n663); Decision on fourth application for provisional release, 
Prosecutor v. Sainovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87, TC, ICTY, 14 April 2005; Decision on defence request for provisional 
release, Prosecutor v. Sainovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87, TC, ICTY, 14 April 2005; 
DeFranck (n628) 1435-1436; Gaynor (n42) 193-194. 
675 Rearick (n9) 592; Gaynor (n42) 193-194. 
676  Stanisic provisional release decision of 28 July 2004 (n663); Decision on Appeal Against Refusal to Grant 
Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Mrksic et al, Case No. IT-95-13/1, TC, ICTY, 8 October 2002 ¤9; 
Mller (n628) 605-606. 
677 Decision on provisional release, Prosecutor v. Sainovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87, TC, ICTY, 30 October 2002; Stanisic 
provisional release decision of 28 July 2004 (n663); 
Mller (n628) 605-606; Gaynor (n42) 194. 
678 Eg: Decision granting provisional release to Amir Kubura, Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-
47, TC, ICTY, 19 December 2001; Decision on applications for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Sainovic et al., Case 
No. IT-05-87, TC, ICTY, 26 June 2002; Decision on interlocutory appeal against Trial ChamberÕs decision denying 
provisional release, Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90, AC, ICTY, 2 December 2004; Decision on 
Momcilo PerisicÕs motion for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81, TC, ICTY, 9 June 2005; 
Order of provisional release for Mladen Markac, Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90, TCI, ICTY, 9 
February 2007. 
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The last factor to be taken into consideration by the judge is previous behaviour of the 
accused persons including their interference with the administration of justice. It is interesting to 
note that, to determine the existence of this risk, the ICTY requires real evidence. By contrast, as 
seen before, the ICC considers that the knowledge of the names of the witnesses may be 
sufficient as such to conclude the existence of this risk. The ICTY prosecutor tried to create a 
similar presumption but the TC rejected the idea that Ôthe heightened ability to interfere with 
victims and witnesses, by itself, suggests that he [the accused] will pose a danger to themÕ.679 
Similarly, the ICTY does not accept that the Ômere possibility Ð that the willingness of witnesses 
to testify would be affected by an accusedÕs provisional release Ð would be a sufficient basis for 
refusing that provisional releaseÕ since Ôit is for the prosecution to reassure its own witnessesÕ.680 
Nonetheless, in one case, the ICTY recognized that, Ôalthough a general fear of intimidation and 
threatening of witnesses cannot in itself constitute a ground for denying provisional release, the 
volatile situation in Kosovo makes the possibility that such incidents might occur so vivid that it 




The foregoing considerations suggest that, despite the fact that the ICTY has struggled 
with the same issues as the ICC, namely the gravity of the offences and the absence of a state 
apparatus, and that the ICTYÕs legal regime has appeared less respectful of IHRL, the ICTY has 
nevertheless granted conditional provisional release to many accused. Apparently, the ICTY did 
not consider that the gravity of the crimes committed by the accused was sufficient to justify 
their continuing detention. Furthermore, it compensated its lack of state apparatus by guarantees 
from the state where the accused sought to be released. It is interesting to note that, so far, all the 
conditionally and provisionally released accused have returned to appear in court when requested. 
Are the gravity of the offences and the lack of state apparatus therefore real excuses for the ICC 
not to fully respect the right to liberty? What could explain this difference of practice?  
 
A first difference could be that, contrary to the former practice of the ICTY, the ICC 
arrest warrants of nearly all the accused currently in detention have been issued under seal. The 
                                                
679 Brdanin provisional release decision of 25 July 2000 (n554) ¤¤19-20. 
680 Brdanin provisional release decision of 25 July 2000 (n554) ¤¤19-20. 
681 Decision on Lahi BrahimajÕs motion for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Case No. IT-04-84, TCII, 
ICTY, 3 November 2005. 
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arrest warrants are unsealed only once the accused is arrested.682 Exceptions are the cases of 
Ntaganda and Ongwen whose arrest warrants were unsealed prior to their ÔsurrenderÕ. Due to 
these sealed arrest warrants, these accused did not have the chance to show their willingness to 
surrender whereas it could be, as seen through the ICTY practice, a crucial element to appreciate 
the risk of flight. Some of the accused tried to demonstrate a posteriori this willingness but their 
arguments were not considered as sufficiently convincing.683 It falls outside the scope of this 
thesis to examine the adequacy of the prosecutorÕs policy regarding the issuance of a sealed arrest 
warrant.684 
 
The real success of the ICTY provisional release regime seems to lie in the capacity of its 
accused to present reliable states guarantees. This capacity of the ICTY accused to provide such 
guarantees is another factor explaining the difference of practice with the ICC. Before exploring 
the elements that could influence this capacity, it is interesting to examine the ICTRÕs practice. 
Indeed, the ICTR operates in a context similar to that of the ICC and, contrary to its European 
counterpart, the ICTR has never provisionally released any accused, most likely because of this 
lack of guarantees.  
 
1.2.!  The ICTR: confirmation of the specific context? 
 
The ICTR legal regime regarding provisional release is nearly identical to that of the 
ICTY since the ICTR adopted the same amendments of Rule 65, except for the criterion of 
sufficiently compelling humanitarian grounds. Nonetheless, despite this similarity, the ICTR is yet 
to provisionally release any of its accused.685 In addition, contrary to the ICTY, the ICTR did not 
feel compelled to substantiate its decisions beyond observing the non-existence of exceptional 
circumstances,686 or the absence of any states guarantees.687 Another difference is that, probably 
                                                
682  Available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/cases/Pages/cases%20index.aspx (last accessed 8 April 2015). 
683 Ngudjolo, Mbarushimana, Bemba. 
684 See C. Ryngaert, ÔThe International Prosecutor: Arrest and DetentionÕ (2009)24 Working Paper, Leuven Centre for 
Global Governance Studies, 24-25. 
685 See Rearick (n9) 577-595. 
686 Decision on the defence motion for the provisional release of the accused, Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, Case No. 
ICTR-96-15-T, TCII, ICTR, 21 February 2001; Decision on the defenseÕs motion for provisional release pursuant to 
Rule 65 of the Rules, Prosecutor v. Jrme-Clment Bicamumpaka, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, TCII, ICTR, 25 July 2001; 
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because of the ICTRÕs strict case law and the absence of states willing to provide any guarantees, 
there have not been many applications for release so that the ICTR case law regarding 
provisional release is very scarce.688  
 
Until the suppression of the Ôexceptional circumstancesÕ criterion in May 2003, all 
applications were rejected on the sole ground of non-existence of such circumstances. For 
instance, a serious illness was not considered as such circumstance since the ICTR could arrange 
for the administration of adequate medical treatment. 689  It was also ruled that five years of 
detention did not amount to exceptional circumstances.690 
 
The suppression of the Ôexceptional circumstancesÕ criterion did not improve the 
situation. Indeed, the inability to find a state willing to accept the provisionally released accused 
person on its soil became the new criterion used to reject applications. This criterion was 
recognized as an essential condition:  
 
The Defence must provide at least prima facie evidence that the country in question 
agrees or would agree to accept the Accused on its territory, and that the country will 
guarantee the AccusedÕs return to the Tribunal at such times as the Chamber may 
order.691  
                                                                                                                                                   
Decision on the defence motion for release, Prosecutor v. Thoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, TCIII, 
ICTR, 12 July 2002. 
687  Decision on NsengimanaÕs motion for the setting of a date for a pre-trial conference, a date for the 
commencement of trial, and for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Hormisdas Nsengimana, Case No. ICTR-01-69-I, TCII, 
ICTR, 11 July 2005. 
688 I could find only 39 decisions for 161 accused. 
689 Decision on the Request Filed by the Defense for Provisional Release of Georges Rutaganda, Prosecutor v. Georges 
Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, TC, ICTR, 7 February 1997; Decision on the defenseÕs motion for provisional 
release pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules, Prosecutor v. Jrme-Clment Bicamumpaka, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, TCII, 
ICTR, 25 July 2001; 
Rearick (n9) 585. 
690 Decision on the defence motion for the provisional release of the accused, Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, Case No. 
ICTR-96-15-T, TCII, ICTR, 21 February 2001; Decision on the defence motion for release, Prosecutor v. Thoneste 
Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, TCIII, ICTR, 12 July 2002. 
691 Decision on defence motion to fix a date for the commencement of the trial of Father Emmanuel Rukundo or, in 
the alternative, to request his provisional release, Prosecutor v. Emmanuel Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-I, TCIII, 
ICTR, 18 August 2003 ¤22. 
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Consequently, without state guarantees, the ICTR contented to note, for example, that Ôin 
the absence of appropriate submissions from Austria and France and no submissions from 
Tanzania, the Chamber finds that the defence has failed to fulfil the first requirement that would 
allow it to order the provisional release of the AccusedÕ and that Ôsince the Defence has failed to 
fulfil the first of the cumulative requirements under rule 65(B), the Chamber does not find it 
necessary to consider the other requirementsÕ.692 At least, as noticed by Fairlie, by limiting itself to 
reference to the lack of state guarantee, Ôthe jurisprudence of the ICTR appears more honest than 
its Yugoslav counterpartÕ.693  
 
This lack of capacity of the accused to provide guarantees might be explained by the fact 
that Rwanda was not an acceptable option due to the risk of being prosecuted there or of being 
submitted to torture or degrading or inhumane treatment.694 None of the accused has ever tried 
to be released there. Regarding Tanzania, the only indication that it was ever contacted for the 
potential provisional release of an accused is the paragraph of a decision stating that Ôthe 
Republic of Tanzania advises that it is unable to host the Accused as requestedÕ.695 Otherwise, it 
seems that no other state has ever been heard or even contacted by the ICTR.  
 
In a nutshell, the ICTR justifies the fact that none of its accused has ever been 
provisionally released because of its lack of state apparatus and the absence of any state 
guarantees which might compensate for this lack. Contrary to the ICTY, it is not possible to 
examine its arguments further given the lack of motivation of its decisions. 
 
1.3.!  Lessons that can be learnt from the practice of the ICTY and ICTR 
 
Why this difference of practice between two international tribunals working in, a priori, 
the same environment, sharing the same procedure and dealing with the same kind of crimes? 
                                                
692  Decision on NsengimanaÕs motion for the setting of a date for a pre-trial conference, a date for the 
commencement of trial, and for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Hormisdas Nsengimana, Case No. ICTR-01-69-I, TCII, 
ICTR, 11 July 2005 ¤¤18-19. 
693 Fairlie (n9) 1166. 
694 Rearick (n9) 592; B. Henry, ÔThe Acquitted Accused, a Forgotten Party at the ICTRÕ (2005)12 New England Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 82; Heller (n2) 665, 672-673; B. Hol and J. van Wijk, ÔLife after Conviction at 
International Criminal Tribunals. An Empirical OverviewÕ (2014)12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 131. 
695 Decision on defence motion for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Lonidas Nshogoza, Case No. ICTR-07-91-PT, 
TCIII, ICTR, 17 December 2008 ¤7. 
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The ICTYÕs practice demonstrates that provisional release can be implemented with success 
when a trustworthy state presents guarantees in favour of the accused. On the other hand, the 
ICTRÕs practice seems to show that, without any guarantees of states, it cannot be implemented. 
The ICTRÕs practice also highlights the fact that states are not necessarily willing to accept 
provisionally released accused persons on their soil. It is important to stress that the countries of 
origin of the accused before the ICTY were willing to host them during their provisional release 
and to submit guarantees for them. By contrast, no state seemed to be willing to accept the 
accused of the ICTR, even after their acquittal.696  
 
Two lessons can thus be learned from the practice of the ad hoc tribunals regarding the 
potential need to adapt the right to liberty given the issue of the gravity of the crimes and the lack 
of state apparatus. On the one hand, the ICTY practice demonstrates that the first issue related 
to the gravity of the offences is not necessarily a real one. On the other hand, the need to find a 
cooperative state to compensate for the lack of state apparatus is confirmed. 
 
1.3.1.! The first lesson: the issue of the gravity of crimes 
 
The gravity of the crimes with which the accused before the ICC are charged is 
uncontestable. Indeed, akin to the ICTY, the ICC could argue that Ôthe gravity of the offences 
with which persons accused before the International Tribunal are charged is self-evidentÕ since it 
Ôonly has subject-matter jurisdiction over serious violations of international humanitarian lawÕ.697 
Nonetheless, like the ICTY, the ICC could reach the conclusion that, since Ôthe [ICC]Õs full name 
stated explicitly that it presided exclusively over ÒseriousÓ crimesÕ and since Article 60 
Ônonetheless provided for provisional release of the accused, that provisional release was clearly 
meant to apply in the TribunalÕs specific contextÕ.698 Indeed, the states parties to the ICC agreed 
to Article 21(3) and the possibility of provisional release while being aware that it would apply to 
persons accused of international crimes. Article 58 of the ICC Statute even provides for the 
possibility of a summons to appear without arrest. The fact that the accused before the ICC are 
charged with horrific crimes does not of itself justify an adaptation of the right to liberty. 
 
                                                
696 Heller (n2) 664. 
697 Delalic provisional release decision of 25 September 1996 (n638) ¤19. 
698 Sznajder (n9). 
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To be fair, the ICC does not only focus on the gravity of the crimes to justify the 
necessity of the detention. It thus seems that, as for the ICTY, the ICC does not accept this 
criterion as one that could justify as such a deviation from the right to liberty. It mostly refers to 
it because the gravity of crimes has a role to play in the appreciation of the risks linked to 
provisional release. Indeed, as seen before, the risk of flight is assessed among others in light of 
the length of the expected sentence. The danger of the accused regarding the risk of interference 
with the witnesses or the risk of recidivism is also examined together with the gravity of the 
offences in mind. The gravity of the crimes may have an impact on the complexity of the 
investigation and therefore on the appreciation of the reasonableness of the length of the 
detention. These roles are also recognized by in the context of IHRL.699 Therefore, contrary to 
what some scholars think,700 what the practice of the ICTY demonstrates is that the fact that an 
accused is charged with international crimes is not a real obstacle for a strict application of the 
right to liberty as internationally recognized. No adaptation of IHRL is thus needed for this 
reason. 
 
It must be noted that the SPSC also provisionally released some accused.701 Likewise, 
some accused charged with similar horrific crimes were also provisionally released before national 
jurisdictions: Tomo Mihajlovic (Serb), Dominik Ilijsavic (Croat) or Edin Hakanovic (Bosnian) 
before the Zenica Cantonal Court,702 the Matonovic case (11 Serb defendants) before the Banja 
Luka District Court,703 Papon before the French Court of Bordeaux,704 or the six Belgo-rwandans 
still awaiting their trial.705 Admittedly, these situations are not really comparable with that of the 
ICC since these jurisdictions have at their disposal a state apparatus and apply national law. 
                                                
699 see part I. 
700 Mgret (n585) 65. 
701 de Meester, Pitcher, Rastan and Sluiter (n322) 336. 
702 OSCE, ÔWar Crimes Trials Before the Domestic Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Progress and ObstaclesÕ 
(March 2005) available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_doc_2010122311024992eng.pdf (last 
accessed 8 April 2015) 58. 
703 OSCE (n702) 58. 
704  A. Chemin, ÔUne dcision exceptionnelle qui bouleverse la jurisprudenceÕ, Le Monde (12 October 1997). 
Admittedly he fled in Switzerland and was arrested 3 days later. 
705 ÔGnocide au Rwanda: lÕimpunit perd du terrainÕ Le Vif (6 April 2013) available at 
http://www.levif.be/actualite/international/genocide-au-rwanda-l-impunite-perd-du-terrain/article-normal-
77267.html (last accessed 8 April 2015). 
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Nevertheless, they illustrate the fact that the gravity of the crimes is not necessarily an obstacle to 
the provisional release of an accused and does not prevent a strict respect of the right to liberty.  
 
It stems from these considerations that there is no need to adapt the right of the liberty 
because of the gravity of the crimes the accused are charged with. The gravity of the crimes is 
sufficiently taken into account by the right to liberty through the interpretation of the criteria 
justifying detention. Consequently, were there a need for an adaptation of the right to liberty, it 
would be because of the necessity to find a state that would implement the potential interim 
release. 
 
1.3.2.! The second lesson: the need for state guarantees 
 
The second lesson revealed by the practice of the ICTY and ICTR is that guarantees of a 
state willing to accept a provisionally released accused on its soil are a condition sine qua non for 
an effective provisional release regime. This need was also recognized by the AC in the Bemba case 
when it stated that Ôa State willing and able to accept the person concerned ought to be identified 
prior to a decision on conditional releaseÕ.706  
 
Regarding the identification of such a ÔState willing and ableÕ, the ICTYÕs practice reveals 
the success of the choice of the state of origin when the accused still benefits from official 
support in his or her country. On the other hand, the ICTRÕs practice reveals that, when the 
accused come from the losing side of the conflict, they would not want to go back there or the 
state would not want them on its territory.  
 
The practice of the SCSL is interesting in this respect. Indeed, in this case, the question of 
finding a state did not really arise since the Court was based in the same country where the 
crimes were committed and since nearly all the accused came from Sierra Leone. The exception 
was Charles Taylor who came from Liberia but, if he ever applied for provisional release, the 
applications and the decisions were confidential. The provisional release regime before the SCSL 
was similar to that of the ICTR.707 Like the ICTR, the SCSL has never granted provisional release 
                                                
706 Bemba interim release judgment of 2 December 2009 (n347) ¤36. 
707 Article 14 of the SCSL Statute stipulates that Ôthe Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda obtaining at the time of the establishment of the Special Court shall be applicable mutatis 
mutandis to the conduct of the legal proceedings before the Special CourtÕ. 
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to any accused.708 All of its decisions offer the same explanation, namely the context in which it 
operates: 
 
In this early stage of its development, the courts with jurisdiction to try persons accused 
of international crimes have few enforcement powers or procedures to ensure that 
indictees attend for trial: there is no international police-force, and co-operation between 
States in respect to the return of fugitives is inadequate. In Sierra Leone, attention must 
be paid by both the tribunal and the parties to the reality on the ground, such as the 
overall security situation and the lack of police facilities to enforce or monitor conditions 
of bail.709 
 
Interestingly, the Court referred to its context without noting that, in any case, 
implementing a provisional release in Sierra Leone would not have been feasible because the 
Sierra Leone government had declared its inability to implement it with the same common 
observations it gave in each case. Its position was that bail should not be granted given the Ôgrave 
consequences for the security situation in Sierra LeoneÕ in such case and Ôthe impossibility for its 
authorities to ensure that the Accused remains under house arrest in their custodyÕ or Ôto prevent 
the Accused from fleeing or hidingÕ. The government then stressed Ôits current lack of police and 
military capacities in remote areas of the country and generally in the whole of the territory, as 
well as its lack of financial resources to be able to respond to the requirements that could be 
imposed by such a releaseÕ. 710  These arguments of the Sierra Leone government are thus 
interesting to demonstrate the importance of finding a state both ÔableÕ and ÔwillingÕ. This practice 
of the SCSL confirms thus the previous findings according to which there must be a state both 
willing and able to accept the accused on its soil in order to implement provisional release.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
The SCSL RPE were adopted in July 2002, namely a few months before the suppression of the Ôexceptional 
circumstancesÕ requirement by the ICTR ; the SCSL suppressed it in October 2003 so that this requirement was 
never examined in any decision on provisional release. 
708 See M. C. Nicol-Wilson, ÔThe realization of the right to bail in the Special Court for Sierra Leone: Problems and 
prospectsÕ (2007)7 African Human Rights Law Journal 516. 
709 Norman bail decision (n166) ¤31. 
710 Decision on the motion by Morris Kallon for bail, Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, 
Case No. SCSL-04-15-PT, TC, SCSL, 23 February 2004 ¤13; Decision on application of Issa Sesay for provisional 
release, Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-PT, TC, SCSL, 31 March 
2004; Norman bail decision (n166).  
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1.4.! Conclusion: Is there really a specific context justifying tuning the standard of the 
right to liberty? 
 
In the first part, we have seen how some authors argue that it is illusory that the right to 
liberty may be applied as such by the ICC because of the gravity of the offences with which it 
deals and of the lack of state apparatus at its disposal. However, the ICTYÕs practice 
demonstrates that the gravity of the offences is not a veritable obstacle to an application as such 
of the right to liberty. It has been confirmed by the SPSC practice and the practice of some 
national jurisdictions. In addition, it has been demonstrated that, where an able and willing state 
is found, provisional release might be implemented. Since this need to find an able and willing 
state is not addressed by the case-law of IHRL, it might bolster some scholarsÕ argument 
advocating for an adaptation of the right to liberty to particular circumstances of international 
criminal proceedings. Nonetheless, if an able and willing state would enable the ICC to respect 
the right to liberty, should not a solution be to find such state willing to present such guarantees? 
As pointed earlier, the presidency and the registry also have to respect the right to liberty and 
they have a role to play in finding such able and willing state. 
 
Before examining the potential solutions, it is important to insist that the right to liberty 
would not provide for the automatic release of each accused that could present such guarantees. 
Indeed, the absence of the risks of flight, of interference with the administration of justice and of 
recidivism would still need to be demonstrated. For example, the ICC was not necessarily wrong 
to conclude, in the Bemba case, that the guarantees presented by a state whose name remains 
confidential were insufficient mostly because, regarding the risk of flight, the measures were not 
designed to prevent the accused from absconding but rather to monitor his physical location and 
to determine whether he complied with the conditions imposed by the ICC.711 By the same 
token, the ICC rightly noted that the state could not appropriately monitor the calls made to 
Bemba and his visits since the state would not know the sensitive issues in the case, like the 
identities of the protected witnesses.712  
 
This example illustrates again that the ICC is able to respect the right to liberty when an 
able and willing state is found. Indeed, the judge appreciated the alternatives to detention, namely 
                                                
711 Bemba interim release decision of 27 September 2011 (n334) ¤41. 
712 Bemba interim release decision of 27 September 2011 (n334) ¤41. 
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the release of Bemba in this state, and, had the risks been sufficiently mitigated by these 
guarantees, would have had a real power of release. This attitude is thus conform to the one 
prescribed by the right to liberty as internationally recognized. It demonstrates that the ICC is 
able to respect IHRL when an able and willing state is found so that an adaptation of IHRL is 
not needed.  
 
When state guarantees are provided, whether the ICC acts in conformity to the 
requirement of the right to liberty becomes a practical issue. It thus cannot be solved by this 
thesis. Indeed, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to assess in concreto the respect by the ICC of 
the right to liberty since the necessity of the detention can only result from a case-by-case analysis 
and has to be appreciated in light of all the factual elements of the case.713 The same issues arise 
regarding the appreciation by the ICC of the willingness and the ability of a state since one does 
not have all the evidence for factual elements to assess them in concreto. By contrast, the 
mechanisms to find a state to host an accused on its soil can be explored. This is the purpose of 
the following section.  
 
2.! The issue of finding a state to host provisionally released detainees 
 
Before examining the existing mechanisms to find a state, it is necessary to understand 
the reasons for refusal of the states to answer positively to a request of the ICC or of the accused. 
These reasons demonstrate that other factors play a role in the interim release context. 
Nonetheless, as stated in the introduction, these factors do not prevent that legal obligations exist 
and are thus outside of the scope of this analysis. 
 
2.1.!  Positions of the states regarding requests for provisional release on their soil 
 
So far, only Bemba and Gbagbo have been able to present guarantees, and these were 
from states whose names remain confidential. No information could thus have been found as to 
how these states were contacted and about the conditions of their intervention. In addition, the 
content of the observations from the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the UK and the DRC 
                                                
713 ECtHR, Judgment, Case of Bernobic v. Croatia (App. No. 57180/09), 21 June 2011 ¤77. 
Mangenda interim release judgment of 11 July 2014 (n331); Babala interim release judgment of 11 July 2014 (n331); 
Kilolo interim release judgment of 11 July 2014 (n331). 
163 
provided upon requests by the ICC is not always accessible. Observations requested by the ICC 
from other states, if ever provided, were totally confidential.  
 
The analysis of the available observations reveals that all these observations start with the 
fact that the state has no say regarding the decision of interim release as such. Usually, they all 
raise the same kind of arguments for their refusal to host the accused: 
 
- the absence of links of the accused with their country;714 
- the need for the accused to demonstrate the possession of sufficient material and economical 
resources;715 
- the need to respect the procedure regarding a visa;716  
- the absence of procedure available to arrest the accused;717  
- the inability to impede the recidivism.718 
 
These states thus raise issues linked to the implementation of the interim release as such. 
In order to examine the validity of such arguments, it is interesting to deepen the arguments of 
two states key to this issue: Belgium and the Netherlands. The former is a central actor for this 
issue because several accused have wanted to be released on its soil, because it is within easy 
reach of the ICC and because it is so far the only state that signed an agreement with the ICC to 
implement interim release on its soil. The Netherlands is another key actor because it is the host 
state and therefore the only state that could implement an interim release during the trial as such.   
                                                
714 The United Kingdom for Ngudjolo, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. 
ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 22 February 2008 (ÔThe United Kingdom for Ngudjolo 
observations of 22 February 2008Õ); France for Ngudjolo, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 25 February 2008 (ÔFrance for Ngudjolo 
observations of 25 February 2008Õ); Belgium for Ngudjolo, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 28 February 2008 (ÔBelgium for 
Ngudjolo observations of 28 February 2008Õ). 
715  France for Ngudjolo observations of 25 February 2008 (n714); Belgium for Ngudjolo observations of 28 
February 2008 (n714). 
716 The United Kingdom for Ngudjolo observations of 22 February 2008 (n714); Belgium for Ngudjolo observations 
of 28 February 2008 (n714); Mangenda interim release decision of 17 March 2014 (n448) ¤42. 
717 France for Ngudjolo observations of 25 February 2008 (n714); Kilolo interim release decision of 14 March 2014 
(n448) ¤45. 
718 Babala interim release decision of 14 March 2014 (n448) ¤28. 
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2.1.1.! BelgiumÕs arguments 
 
In March 2014, Belgium and the ICC signed an agreement regarding, among others, the 
potential implementation of interim release of accused persons ordered by the ICC on Belgian 
territory.719 The agreement as such is confidential but the Belgian law implementing it provides 
for practical elements such as the legal recognition of an interim release ordered by the ICC,720 
and the possibility to arrest the accused in case of the violation of the conditions provided for by 
the ICC.721 According to its travaux prparatoires, one of the reasons justifying the conclusion of 
this agreement was the fact that a concrete possibility for an accused to benefit from interim 
release was essential to secure both fair trial and the right to liberty. It is also added that all costs 
would be borne by the ICC or by the accused himself.722 It is important to keep in mind that, as 
noted by the ICC,  
 
the Agreement, far from witnessing to an unconditional availability and willingness on the 
part of the Kingdom of Belgium to accept that detainees from the Court be released on 
its territory or, even less, establishing an obligation on their part to do so, makes such 
acceptance explicitly conditional upon an assessment to be made Ôau cas-par-casÕ on the 
basis of the specific appreciation that the Belgian authorities may make of a given case.723  
 
So far, Belgium has provided observations in the Ngudjolo case, in the Bemba case and in its 
related case. Those provided in the two first cases are examined separately since they dated from 
before the signature of the agreement.724  
 
The first argument concerns the fact that the stay of Ngudjolo and Bemba on the 
territory would be illegal which is an offence under Belgian law. Belgium was thus afraid that the 
                                                
719 Loi modifiant la loi du 29 mars 2004 concernant la coopration avec la Cour pnale internationale et les tribunaux 
pnaux internationaux (26 March 2014) MB 1 April 2014. 
720 Article 20bis ¤1. 
721 Article 20 bis ¤2. 
722 Projet de loi modifiant la loi du 29 mars 2004 concernant la coopration avec la Cour pnale internationale et les 
tribunaux pnaux internationaux (17 Januari 2014) DOC 533299/001 available at 
http://www.senate.be/www/?MIval=dossier&LEG=3&NR=478&LANG=fr (last accessed 8 April 2015). 
723  Mangenda interim release decision of 17 March 2014 (n448) ¤ 32. 
724 Belgium for Ngudjolo observations of 28 February 2008 (n714); Bemba interim release decision of 14 April 2009 
(n57); Bemba interim release decision of 16 August 2011 (n171). 
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accused would apply for asylum in order to have a temporary authorization to stay, which would 
put Belgium in an uncomfortable situation. No further explanation is given as to why this 
situation would be uncomfortable. This reference to an Ôuncomfortable situationÕ is a bit puzzling 
since the interim release would have been ordered by the ICC so that the ICC would not 
consider this situation as ÔuncomfortableÕ. In addition, it is important to keep in mind that the 
accused would be provisionally released only if the ICC had judged that the risk of flight was 
inexistent. Be that as it may, the irregular situation of the accused seems to be a false problem 
since the Belgian authorities could have decided, under Article 9 of the law of 15 December 
1980,725 to grant the accused a temporary authorization to stay.  
 
The second argument concerns the fact that a criminal complaint could be filed against 
the accused so that, according to the Belgian legislation, Belgium would have no other choice 
than to prosecute him. Therefore, according to Belgium, a problem of conflict of jurisdiction 
would arise with the ICC and, on top of that, the Belgian arrest warrant would deprive the 
accused of his or her liberty. Nonetheless, this argument does not take into account the fact that 
the federal prosecutor is not forced to prosecute a case when it would be in the interest of the 
good administration of justice that the case is brought before an international jurisdiction, which 
would already be the case.726  
 
The third argument raised by Belgium is the potential risk to the public order and the 
need for protection for the accused given the importance of the Congolese community in 
Belgium. It further stipulates that the measures of protection could restrict the liberty of the 
accused and be costly. 
 
The fourth argument concerns the impact of the presence of the accused, the impact of 
their potential flight on BelgiumÕs international relations and the risk of degradation of their 
contact with the Congolese authorities and the following risks for BelgiumÕs interests and for 
those of the Belgians living in the Great Lakes region.  
 
Needless to say, these arguments are only based on risks, and they are not necessarily 
verified in practice so that it would only require a change of political will to tackle these issues. It 
                                                
725 Loi sur lÕaccs au territoire, le sjour, lÕtablissement et lÕloignement du territoire (15 December 1980) MB 31 
December 1980. 
726Loi contenant le titre prliminaire du Code de procdure pnale (17 avril 1978) MB  25 April 1878, Art. 10.  
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is interesting to note that the agreement does not deal with any of these arguments. A new 
political will might be inferred from the signature of the agreement, however; the travaux 
prparatoires seem to imply this.  
 
Nonetheless, despite the conclusion of this agreement, in the BembaÕs close aids case, 
Belgium again provided negative observations. The reasons justifying them for both Mangenda 
and Kilolo, a Belgian national, were: 
- The fact that the accused could easily flee Belgium given its configuration and the presence of 
the airport near their residence;727 
- The fact that Belgium could not avoid a risk of recidivism since it would not be able to legally 
monitor the accusedÕs conversation or intercept their mail since those measures could only be 
legally ordered in case of perpetration of new crimes which would justify the detention of the 
accused.728 
 
Yet, it must be noted once again that the ICC would have already ruled out a risk of flight 
and of recidivism so that these seem to be more excuses than real reasons. 
 
Unfortunately, the observations given before the release of Kilolo are confidential.729 
 
2.1.2.! The NetherlandsÕ arguments 
 
Even if the situation could improve thanks to the new agreement with Belgium, the issue 
remains that, as for the ICTY, if the Netherlands continues to oppose any interim release on its 
territory, accused persons will have no other choice than to remain in detention during their trial 
whereas IHRL does not distinguish between pre-trial detention and detention pending trial. As 
noted by Schomburg, Ôit is bizarre, to say the least, that those provisionally released have to be 
                                                
727 Mangenda interim release decision of 17 March 2014 (n448) ¤32; Kilolo interim release decision of 5 August 2014 
(n462) ¤21. 
728 Mangenda interim release decision of 17 March 2014 (n448) ¤32; Kilolo interim release decision of 5 August 2014 
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sent back for some weeks to their home countries. Upon return, absent any flight risk or any 
other reason warranting ongoing pre-trial detention, they have nevertheless to be incarcerated in 
the UN detention unitÕ.730 Given the similarity of the arguments raised by the Netherlands before 
the ICTY and the ICC, those raised before the ICTY are also examined. 
 
The issue first arose in the Dukic case in 1996. 731  In this case, the delegate of the 
Netherlands summarized the situation this way:  
 
If the person is released by the Tribunal then the Dutch law would apply in that case and 
in that situation (É) he becomes a foreigner without an authorization to stay in the 
Netherlands. For the Netherlands authority it would mean that the person should leave 
the country by virtue of that law, because there is no legal title any longer for him to stay 
in the Netherlands.732  
 
Interestingly, the judge was quite surprised and noted:  
  
Suppose that tomorrow we had a case where there was an accused whose detention was 
no longer absolutely necessary but who should and had to remain available to the 
Prosecutor, and that the Trial Chamber would hear you speak, would take a decision 
requiring bail and a certain kind of summons requiring the person to remain under house 
detention how could the host country not assume its obligations then? (É) I think this is 
because the possibility of provisional release within the host state is a real one, otherwise 
one would not release conditionally somebody saying that we will send that person to 
France or to another country. I think that the 65(B) refers to provisional release in the 
country where that person is; not in another country. Perhaps that is not the correct 
interpretation.733 
 
                                                
730 Schomburg (n317) 916. 
731 Decision rejecting the application to withdraw the indictment and order for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Dukic, 
Case No. IT-96-20, TC, ICTY, 24 April 1996.  
732 Transcript, Prosecutor v. Dukic, Case No. IT-96-20, TC, ICTY, 24 April 1996. 
733 Transcript, Prosecutor v. Dukic, Case No. IT-96-20, TC, ICTY, 24 April 1996. 
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Despite the accurate remark of the judge, the Netherlands has never changed its 
standpoint, either for the ICTY 734  or for the ICC. 735  The Netherlands also argued that no 
obligation to accept the entry into its territory of any person granted interim release by the ICC 
was Ôforeseen by the statute of the [ICC], or by the Headquarters AgreementÕ.736 It is important to 
stress that the ICC seems to have given up trying to change the position of the Netherlands. 
Indeed, following an application by Katanga to find a solution with the Netherlands, the ICC 
contented to note that the negotiations, which started in 2008 with the registry, had failed and 
that there was no sign of a change in the situation.737  
 
The position of the Netherlands is thus only one of principle. In contrast to Belgium, it 
does not raise any substantive arguments. Admittedly the reason could be that the accused do not 
apply for provisional release in the Netherlands so that the Netherlands Ôwill not accept that 
silence on the part of the Defence as to the State to which the person seeks to be released would, 
by default, imply a release to the host StateÕ.738 It must be noted that, among the so-called Dutch 





This analysis reveals that states are usually not keen to accept provisionally released 
accused, even if they are their own nationals, on their soil. The arguments they raise to justify 
their refusal could easily be addressed by granting a temporary authorization to stay or by 
                                                
734 Delalic provisional release decision of 25 September 1996 (n638). 
735 The Netherlands for Ngudjolo observations of 27 February 2008 (n391); Kilolo interim release decision of 14 
March 2014 (n448) ¤44; Mangenda interim release decision of 17 March 2014 (n448) ¤42. 
736 The Netherlands for Ngudjolo observations of 27 February 2008 (n391). 
737 Katanga interim release decision of 16 April 2009 (n390). 
738 The Netherlands for Ngudjolo observations of 27 February 2008 (n391). 
739 E.g. Nzapali, Mpambara, Heshamuddin, Abbibulah, Khad-e-Nezami (acquitted),Van Aanrat (W. Ferdinandusse, 
ÔThe Dutch ExperienceÕ in M. C. Bassiouni (ed.) International Criminal Law. Volume III International Enforcement 
(Transnational Publishers, 2008) 385-397, E. Van Der Borght, ÔProsecution of International Crimes in The 
Netherlands: An Analysis of Recent Case LawÕ, (2007) 18 Criminal Law Forum 87-136). 
740 Kouwenhoven was freed after 2 years of detention pending his appeals proceedings after he was convicted to 8 
years for breaking the UN arms embargo against Liberia because there were some delays in the investigation in 
Liberia (Decision of 19 March 2007, Gerechtshof 's-Gravenhage, Kort Geding, 22-004337). 
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adopting new laws, such as one that would provide for monitoring of the conversations of the 
accused. Since these arguments do not raise real legal hurdles, they demonstrate a certain bad 
faith or lack of will from states. Not all states demonstrate such lack of will. For example, Bemba 
and Gbagbo could find a state that was willing but not able. Unfortunately, this state (or states) 
has not been identified and no explanation is given as to the reasons for its willingness to present 
guarantees. The ICTYÕs practice seems to indicate that, when an accused is supported by the 
government of his or her state of origin, this state will be keen to present guarantees for him or 
her. The problems are that, as revealed by the practice of the ICTR or the SCSL, the state of 
origin is not always willing and the accused would not necessarily want to go back there. Heller 
confirms this hypothesis by stressing the issues faced for the relocation of persons acquitted by 
the ICTR.741  
 
Release to the state of origin will most likely not be an option before the ICC. Indeed, 
since the ICC only has jurisdiction when a state is either unwilling or unable to prosecute the 
accused, were guarantees by the states of origin provided, the judge would not grant them much 
credit. For example, as noted by Rearick, Ôbecause of the ICCÕs complementarity regime, smaller, 
poorer countries with less established legal systems are likely to be the first experiments 
presented before the permanent courtÕ,742 so that, even if the states of origin were willing to host 
the accused, they would be qualified as unable. Furthermore, Bekou and Cryer rightly held that Ôit 
is unrealistic to expect that a State which has proved unwilling will in fact cooperate with an ICC 
request to collect evidence, to arrest and surrender an accused and generally to cooperate in 
accordance with the StatuteÕ.743 In addition, if the state is able but unwilling, it will probably be 
because, as before the ICTR, the accused is not welcome in that country so that he or she would 
not want to go back there. Therefore, the mechanisms that are going to be addressed in the next 
section start from the premise that the state of origin is not an option. 
 
                                                
741 Heller (n2) 675; 
See also J. Van Wijk, ÔWhen international criminal justice collides with principles of international protection: 
assessing the consequences of ICC witnesses seeking asylum, defendants being acquitted, and convicted being 
releasedÕ (2013)26(1) Leiden Journal of International Law 185-186. 
742 Rearick (n9) 594. 
743 O. Bekou and R. Cryer, ÔThe International Criminal Court and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?Õ 
(2007)56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 63. 
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3.! Obligations of the ICC to prevent a violation of the right to liberty  
 
As seen before, the states could, if they wanted, overcome the juridical or practical 
hurdles that, according to them, would prevent the implementation of provisional release on their 
soil. Some refusing states would thus be unwilling rather than truly unable. The solution is thus 
to work on this willingness since they agreed to their human rights obligations. The states that are 
truly unable are left aside from this study because it is beyond its scope to suggest mechanisms 
that could help, for example, to strengthen the police force and the legal system of each potential 
country. 
 
For this analysis, it is important to keep in mind that the combination of Article 21(1)(a) 
and Article 21(3) requires the ICC to respect the right to liberty and therefore to act on its 
capacity to do so. Nonetheless, it is important to note that it is not an obligation of result but an 
obligation of conduct, namely an obligation that requires the ICC to use its Ôbest effortsÕ to reach 
the relevant result without ÔguaranteeingÕ that the result will actually be achieved.744 
 
The first step for the ICC is thus to identify states that are able and then to devise 
solutions that could help to encourage the willingness of these states. So far, none of these 
solutions has ever been tried regarding the provisional release of an accused so that their 
practicability has not yet been tested. In this analysis, the role that the presidency and the registry 
can play to devise solutions is also taking into account since, as shown before, they are also 
indirectly bound to respect the right to liberty.  
 
3.1.!  Identification of able states  
  
It was demonstrated in the previous section that the state of origin would not really be an 
option for the accused. The problem is then to choose another state, but which one? Except for 
the recent case of the agreement with Belgium, no indication exists in the ICC legal regime. In 
fact, the only rules linked to this issue are Regulations 51 and Article 47 of the Headquarters 
Agreement of the ICC. These provisions only provide, on the one hand, that, before exercising 
                                                
744 P. Dupuy, ÔReviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On AgoÕs Classification of Obligations of Means and 
Obligations of Result in Relation to State ResponsibilityÕ (1999)10(2) European Journal of International Law 379; J. 
Crawford, The International Law CommissionÕs Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (CUP, 
2005) 140. 
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its control of the detention of an accused, the Chamber shall seek observations from the host 
state and from the state to which the person seeks to be released, and, on the other hand, that it 
is the duty of the host state to facilitate the transfer and the departure of the person released. The 
practice of other tribunals is not more helpful since, even if the possibility of finding a foreign 
state to implement a provisional release was not excluded by their legal provisions, they have not 
dealt with this issue.  
 
So far, before the ICC, it has always been the accused persons who have come up with 
the names of potential states. Sometimes their choices (when the identity of the state is disclosed) 
could be explained by their links with these countries, but sometimes no indication was given 
about the choices made. The second step has then been that either the accused directly presents 
the guarantees of the state to the judge or the registry, upon order of the judge, contacts the host 
state and the states mentioned in the application. It thus seems that it is incumbent on the 
accused to find a willing state.  
 
The problem is that an accused has no indication regarding which names to propose 
because he or she would not necessarily know which states are both able and willing. The ICC 
through its registry should thus make this assessment.745 The registry has indeed to offer counsel 
support and is responsible for external relations.746 I even argue that the ICC is under a duty to 
do so. In fact, as seen before, in order to be able to respect the right to liberty, the ICC needs to 
have at its disposal willing and able states, hence, due to the effectiveness principle, it has an 
obligation to look for them. 
 
How could the ICC fulfil this obligation? By holding negotiations. Admittedly the extent 
to which this obligation is fulfilled by the ICC is difficult to assess due to the confidentiality of 
the negotiations. A step in the right direction is the conclusion of the agreement with Belgium. 
Nonetheless, so far, it is an isolated case. Unfortunately, nothing is provided for in the Statute 
regarding the hosting of accused on interim release. Davidson rightly noted that the tribunals 
Ôshould actively seek to make arrangements with the host country to allow international 
defendants on their territories outside of detention, preferably before the tribunals agree to set up 
                                                
745 See M. Dubuisson, A-A. Bertrand and N. Schauder, ÔContribution of the Registry to greater respect for the 
principles of fairness and expeditious proceedings before the International Criminal CourtÕ in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter 
(eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 565-584 
746 E.g. : Rule 20 RPE, Rule 176 RPE. 
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shop thereÕ and that Ôthe tribunals should also make arrangements in advance on the supervision 
of released defendantsÕ.747 This obligation for the registry could also be inferred from Rule 185(1), 
which provides that: 
 
Subject to sub-rule 2, where a person surrendered to the Court is released from the 
custody of the Court because the Court does not have jurisdiction, the case is 
inadmissible (É), the charges have not been confirmed (É), the person has been 
acquitted at trial or on appeal, or for any other reason, the Court shall, as soon as possible, make 
such arrangements as it considers appropriate for the transfer of the person, taking into account 
the views of the person, to a State which is obliged to receive him or her, to another State 
which agrees to receive him or her (É).748  
 
Admittedly, this rule does not mention the case of an accused who is provisionally 
released. Nevertheless, Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute requires a parallel to be made and for 
attempts by the Court to make such arrangements. The registry was ordered by the ICC to make 
such arrangements following the acquittal of Ngudjolo.749  
 
It is interesting to note that Article 103(1) of the ICC Statute provides that the ICC has to 
find states where its sentences can be enforced:  
 
1. (a) A sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the Court from 
a list of States which have indicated to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced 
persons. 
(b) At the time of declaring its willingness to accept sentenced persons, a State may attach 
conditions to its acceptance as agreed by the Court and in accordance with this Part. 
(c) A State designated in a particular case shall promptly inform the Court whether it 
accepts the CourtÕs designation. 
 
                                                
747 Davidson (n8) 66. 
748 Emphasis added. 
749 Decision on Mr NgudjoloÕs request to order the Victims and Witnesses Unit to execute and the Host State to 
comply with the acquittal judgment of 18 December 2012 issued by Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal 
Court, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-
01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 12 June 2013. 
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Article 103 also stipulates that:  
 
4. If no State is designated under paragraph 1, the sentence of imprisonment shall be 
served in a prison facility made available by the host State, in accordance with the 
conditions set out in the headquarters agreement referred to in article 3, paragraph 2. 
In such a case, the costs arising out of the enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment 
shall be borne by the Court. 
 
Even if it is not expressly envisaged by the Statute, the presidency and the registry could 
arrange to hold negotiations with a view to setting up a similar list of states available for the 
enforcement of interim release. To choose the most appropriate state from this list, the registry 
could then use the same criteria as proposed in Rule 201, namely the principle of equitable 
geographical distribution, the need to afford each state on the list an opportunity to receive 
sentenced persons, the number of sentenced persons already received by that state and other 
states of enforcement and any other relevant factors. Strijards rightly notes, regarding Article 103, 
that other relevant factors could be the wealth of the concerned state Ð given the costs of 
implementing the conditions of the interim release Ð or the capacity of the state to implement 
those conditions foreseen by the ICC.750 The creation of such a list may seem idealistic but it has 
actually worked for the enforcement of sentences.751 Furthermore, the arrangement concluded 
with Belgium illustrates that it is possible for the ICC to respect this obligation. Admittedly, as 
shown with Belgium, despite the existence of an arrangement, a state could still use unconvincing 
arguments in order to refuse to provide guarantees.  
 
Be that as it may, given the obligation of conduct stemming from Article 21(3) of the ICC 
Statute, the ICC through the presidency and the registry should make every effort to find able 





                                                
750 G. A. M. Strijards, ÔArticle 103Õ O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Beck/Hart, 2008) 1653. 
751 Austria, Belgium, UK, Finland, Serbia, Colombia and Finland. 
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3.2.!  Contact with the states 
 
In addition to the obligation to identify able and willing states for interim release, the 
registry also ought to help the accused to enter into contact with the identified states. Article 20 
of the RPE confirms this obligation since it provides that the registry has ÔResponsibilities 
relating to the rights of the defenceÕ. As Bemba argued, Ôhelp and assistance from the Registry in 
the present matter [to find an able and willing state] is clearly one of the functions required to 
ensure the principle of a fair trial, the list in paragraph 1 of rule 20 being non-exhaustiveÕ.752 He 
rightly argued that since he was unable to liaise directly with government organs or with the UN, 
the registryÕs assistance in this regard was essential.753 Nevertheless, his request was not properly 
considered as it had not been filed in the correct way.754 It is interesting to note that, unlike the 
ICC, before the STL, the Defence Office is empowered to seek state cooperation on behalf of 
the defence.755 
 
The respect of this obligation by the ICC judges is mixed. Indeed, in the Katanga case, the 
judge did not validate the position that the registry had no obligation to try to change the mind of 
the host state regarding its standpoint towards provisional release.756 In addition, in the Bemba 
case, the Court rejected BembaÕs request to seek observations from two states regarding a 
potential provisional release into their respective territories. The judge estimated that Bemba 
must Ôfirst submit a legally and factually substantiated request for provisional releaseÕ,757 and this, 
despite the fact that, without knowing in which state he could be released, it was difficult for 
Bemba to raise new arguments for a request for interim release. It is interesting to note that, in 
this case, Bemba had first tried to write to one of the states but that this state replied that only an 
official request from the Chamber, pursuant to Rule 119 of the RPE, would enable it to give its 
                                                
752 Bemba interim release judgment of 19 November 2010 (n368) ¤62. 
753 Bemba interim release judgment of 19 November 2010 (n368) ¤62. 
754  Bemba interim release judgment of 19 November 2010 (n368) ¤69: The Appeals Chamber agrees with the 
submissions of the Prosecutor that Mr Bemba has failed to identify how the alleged error of the Trial Chamber in 
addressing the Request for Assistance from the Registry could have had an impact on the Trial ChamberÕs decision 
to maintain Mr BembaÕs detention. 
755 M. Gillet and M. Schuster, ÔThe Special Tribunal for Lebanon swiftly adopts its Rules of Procedure and EvidenceÕ 
(2009)7(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice 891. 
756 Katanga interim release decision of 16 April 2009 (n390). 
757  Decision on defence request for observations regarding the potential provisional release of Mr Jean-Pierre 
Bemba, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, TCIII, ICC, 11 June 2014. 
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observations on any potential period of provisional release. Bemba then tried to ask for the help 
of the registry but the registry advised him to approach the TC directly.758 This advice shows that 
the registry was not expecting this result from the Chamber.  
 
In contrast, in the BembaÕs close aids case, the judge found it appropriate, on his own 
initiative, to know the views of the DRC, of France and of Belgium before pronouncing on a 
potential implementation of provisional release.759 This difference of attitude with that held in the 
Bemba case may be due to the fact that, unlike his co-accused in this case, BembaÕs trial had already 
started so that there was no longer an automatic control of his detention. Nonetheless, in answer 
to the request of BabalaÕs defence requesting the Court to order the DRC to explain the reasons 
for its refusal to host him on its territory,760 the Court considered that Ôthere is no appropriate 
legal basis for the Court (É) to engage in a debate with a State as to the reasons underlying its 
position as regards the release of one of its citizens and that, accordingly, the relief sought by 
Fidle Babala by means of his Request should be pursued before the competent and appropriate 
authorities of the Democratic Republic of the CongoÕ.761 
 
                                                
758 Defence Request to Trial Chamber to request [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] for their submissions regarding 
the potential provisional release of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-
01/08, TCIII, ICC, 9 June 2014. 
759 Dcision sur la Ç Requte de la Dfense sollicitant de la Chambre prliminaire II une nouvelle et urgente approche 
des autorits congolaises comptentes en vue d'obtenir une position prcise et non-quivoque relativement  l'accueil 
de M. Fidle Babala È, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle 
Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 5 June 2014; Decision requesting the 
Kingdom of Belgium to provide its views for the purposes of the review of Aim Kilolo MusambaÕs and Jean-
Jacques MangendaÕs detention pursuant to article 60(3) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo 
Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, 
ICC, 4 July 2014. 
760 Requte URGENTE de la Dfense sollicitant de la Chambre prliminaire lÕapproche des autorits comptentes 
de la Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo aux fins de connatre les motivations juridiques du refus de lÕapplication  
M. Fidle Babala Wandu des dispositions constitutionnelles et legislatives en vigueur relativement  son accueil dans 
son pays en cas de lise en libert provisoire, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 15 September 
2014. 
761 Decision requesting observations from States for the purposes of the review of the detention of the suspects 
pursuant to regulation 51 of the Regulations of the Court, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, 
Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 26 
September 2014. 
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It is interesting to note that the ICTY does not adopt such a passive attitude. Indeed, on 
13 June 2013, following the disqualification of Judge Harhoff and the subsequent appointment of 
Judge Niang and the potential delay it would cause, TCIII invited, on its own initiative, the 
parties, among others the Netherlands and Serbia, to make submissions on the potential 
provisional release of the accused Seselj, knowing he had been in detention since 24 February 
2003 and had already served the whole prison sentence handed down to him for contempt.762 
Nonetheless, on 14 July 2014, this process of finding statesÕ guarantees was stopped since the 
accused expressed that he would not be subject to any conditions other than not leaving Serbia 
so that no guarantees from Serbia were needed.763 
 
3.3.!  Conclusion 
 
It follows from these considerations that, in order to respect its obligation, the ICC 
should improve the assistance it offers to accused persons to identify states able and willing to 
take them on interim release and then to enter into contact with them in order to respect its 
obligation of conduct stemming from the combination of Article 21(1)(a) and Article 21(3). 
Indeed, so far, only the agreement with Belgium can be cited as an illustration of the fulfilment of 
its obligation to identify an able and willing state. In addition, the ICC considered itself bound to 
contact states only in particular cases of a request for interim release whereas the search for state 
cooperation should be continuous. 
 
The problem is that the obligations imposed on the ICC to identify able and willing states 
and to play the intermediary with them are limited to the extent that states agree to negotiate and 
to cooperate with the ICC. Nonetheless, as demonstrated, the ICC is obliged to try every means 
possible to secure for this possibility. It should thus be examined to what extent it could use its 
cooperation regime to persuade the states to become willing. This issue is the topic of the next 
section. 
 
                                                
762 Order inviting the parties to make submissions on possibile (sic) provisional release of the accused proprio motu, 
Prosecutor v. Vojislav Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67, TCIII, ICTY, 13 June 2014. 
He was then released without conditions: Order on the Provisional Release of the Accused Proprio Motu, Prosecutor v. 
Vojislav Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67, TCIII, ICTY, 6 November 2014. 
763 Order terminating the process for provisional release of the accused proprio motu, Prosecutor v. Vojislav Seselj, Case 
No. IT-03-67, TCIII, ICTY, 14 July 2014. 
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4.! The binding means at the disposal of the ICC: the cooperation regime 
 
As set out above, the ICC, through the presidency and the registry, has an obligation to 
identify states able and willing to host accused persons on interim release and to enable the 
accused to enter into contact with them. These obligations entail the obligation of holding 
negotiations in order to try to persuade the states to become willing and of establishing 
communication channels with them. Besides this possibility of negotiation at the disposal of the 
ICC, could it use its cooperation regime to persuade, or even force, the states to become willing? 
In order to answer this question, the duties of the states under the ICC cooperation regime and 
the recourses at the disposal of the ICC in case of violation of these duties will thus be examined 
with a specific focus on the Netherlands since it has a specific regime given its position as the 
host state and since it is the only one that could make interim release pending trial effective. This 
question is related to the ability of the ICC to use its cooperation regime and not to the 
opportunity for the ICC to do so. This distinction is important because, as it has widely been 
demonstrated in the literature, the decisions of the ICC and its organs are also influenced by 
extra-legal factors, such as, for example, their desire to attract cooperations from states for matter 
they would judge more important or to use their budget for other purposes.764 As held by Ciampi, 
Ôthe limits of the ICC cooperation regime lie in the political realities and policy choices of the 
                                                
764  See V. Peskin, International Justice and the Balkans (CUP, 2008); V. Peskin, ÔCaution and Confrontation in the 
International Criminal CourtÕs Pursuit of Accountability in Uganda and SudanÕ (2009)31 Human Rights Quarterly 655-
691; S. C. Roach, ÔHow Political Is the ICC? Pressing Challenges and the Need for Diplomatic EfficacyÕ (2013)19 
Global Governance 507-523; Bosco (n33); Peskin (n33) 122-125, P. K. Kambale, ÔA story of missed opportunities: the 
role of the International Criminal Court in the Democratic Republic of CongoÕ in C. De Vos, S. Kendall and C. 
Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice. The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (CUP, 2015) 171-197; M. 
Kersten, ÔBetween justice and politics: the ICCÕs intervention in LibyaÕ in C. De Vos, S. Kendall and C. Stahn (eds.), 
Contested Justice. The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (CUP, 2015) 456-479; A-A. Bertrand 
and N. Schauder, ÔPractical Cooperation Challenge Faced by the Registry of the International Criminal CourtÕ in O. 
Bekou and D. Birkett (eds.), Cooperation and the International Criminal Court. Perspectives from Theory and Practice (Brill, 
2016) 152-184; A. Ciampi, ÔLegal Rules, Policcy Choices and Political Realities in the Functioning of the Cooperation 
Regime of the International Criminal CourtÕ in O. Bekou and D. Birkett (eds.), Cooperation and the International Criminal 
Court. Perspectives from Theory and Practice (Brill, 2016) 7-57; T. Parker, ÔPollyannas Need Not Apply: International 
Justice is, to a Certain Extent, Political JusticeÕ in R. H. Steinberg (ed.), Contemporary Issues Facing the International 
Criminal Court (Brill, 2016) 445-452; L. Smith-van Lin, ÔNon-Compliance and the Law and Politics of State 
Cooperation: Lessons from the Al Bashir and Kenyatta CasesÕ in O. Bekou and D. Birkett (eds.), Cooperation and the 
International Criminal Court. Perspectives from Theory and Practice (Brill, 2016) 114-151. 
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Court, rather than in the legal regime designed by the ICC StatuteÕ765. Nonetheless, as stated in 
the introduction, the goal of this analysis is to examine the legal obligations of the ICC and its 
capacity to respect them and not to argue why, the ICC does not and/or should not respect 
them.  
 
It must be mentioned that the case of the non-party states to the ICC Statute is not 
envisaged separately. Indeed, according to Article 87 of the ICC Statute, they are submitted to the 
cooperation regime only if they refer their situation to the ICC and if so, to the same extent as 
states parties,766 so that the present findings would apply to them indiscriminately. They could 
also be submitted to the cooperation regime if they conclude an agreement with the ICC. In that 
case, the obligations of cooperation would depend on the content of the agreement so that the 
obligation would require a case-by-case analysis. The same conclusion applies to the obligation of 
cooperation for the non-party states to the ICC Statute when a situation has been referred by the 






                                                
765 Ciampi (n764) 7 
766 Article 87¤5(a): The Court may invite any State non party to this Statute to provide assistance under this Part on 
the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis. 
(b) Where a State non party to this Statute, which has entered into an ad hoc arrangement or an agreement with the 
Court, fails to cooperate with requests pursuant to any such arrangement or agreement, the Court may so inform the 
Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, the Security Council. 
767 See H-P. Kaul and C. Kreb, ÔJurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Principles and CompromisesÕ (1999)2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 158-160; Sluiter (n621) 612-616; R. 
Rastan, ÔTesting Co-operation: The International Criminal Court and National AuthoritiesÕ (2008)21(2) Leiden Journal 
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4.1.! The obligations of states under the ICC cooperation regime 
 
The cooperation regime of the ICC is qualified as a weak vertical cooperation regime.768 It 
is vertical because there is no mutual assistance requirement.769 It is weak because the states have 
the possibility to refuse to cooperate in some cases770 and because it is binding only on states 
parties, on states that have referred their situation to the ICC, on states that have concluded an 
agreement with it and on non-party states when the Security Council referral foresees it.771 The 
term ÔweakÕ is also used in comparison to the cooperation regime of the ad hoc tribunals who 
benefit from an obligation of cooperation on all UN member states and from the SCÕs support.772 
But what is the scope of the cooperation regime? 
 
As seen before, in the Bemba case, PTCII solicited, by asking for further observations, the 
cooperation of the states where Bemba was seeking release, namely Belgium, Portugal, France, 
Germany, Italy and South Africa, and from the host state.773 It justified its request by referring to 
Article 86 of the ICC Statute, or the general obligation of cooperation, and to Article 88 of the 
ICC Statute, or the general obligation to provide for procedure under national law. Nonetheless, 
its judgment was quashed in appeal because, before ordering BembaÕs interim release, PTCII 
should have first designated a state able and willing to accept the accused. The AC does not refer 
to the cooperation regime in its decision, which led Sluiter to regret that the AC did Ônot consider 
assistance in the protection of the right to liberty to fall within the ambit of the ICCÕs 
cooperation regimeÕ.774 Nonetheless, the AC did not explicitly reject this conception. Whether 
PTCII was correct to refer to Articles 86 and 88 is thus left open. This thesis will demonstrate 
that PTCII was right. 
 
Indeed, Article 86 of the ICC Statute provides for a general obligation to cooperate. It is 
the first provision of Part IX of the ICC Statute that regulates the cooperation regime and has 
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thus to be considered as an Ôoverarching interpretive guidelineÕ.775 It provides that ÔStates Parties 
shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the CourtÕ. The other 
provisions of Part IX then detail the different aspects of this general obligation. For example, 
Article 89 regulates the procedure regarding surrender of persons to the Court and Article 92 the 
provisional arrest procedure. Article 93 then lists the other forms of cooperation. None of them 
concerns an obligation to accept a provisionally released accused. As Sluiter puts it, Ôit is 
disturbing that none of the above complex questions of moving individuals involved in ICC 
proceedings to a state has been properly anticipated in the Statute or secondary sources of ICC 
lawÕ.776  
 
Nonetheless, as just explained, Article 86 refers to the whole Statute and, therefore, also 
to provisions regarding interim release. In addition, Article 93(1)(l) stipulates that: 
 
1. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and under procedures 
of national law, comply with requests by the Court to provide the following assistance in 
relation to investigations or prosecutions: 
(É) 
(l) Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested State, 
with a view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
 
It could be argued that hosting a provisionally released accused would be part of 
Ôfacilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimesÕ. Article 21(3) and the principle of 
effectiveness require indeed this interpretation to avoid violation of a human right. This is also 
SluiterÕs opinion.777 In addition, as El Zeldy argues, referring to the ICJ advisory opinion on the 
Reparation case,778 Ôthe ICC Òmust be deemedÓ to have implied powers to rule on any violation 
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resulting from the non-compliance with the terms of the Statute, which are essential to the 
ÒperformanceÓ of its functions, despite the lack of an explicit provision to that effectÕ.779 This 
reasoning could be applied to the finding of an able and willing state since the regime of interim 
release can only be effective if such a state is found. Nonetheless, this second ground is more 
fragile than the reference to Article 21(3) since the doctrine of inherent power is not applicable 
when such power infringes upon the sovereign rights of a state.780 Yet the imposition of an 
obligation of cooperation regarding the hosting of a provisionally released accused might be 
considered as such.  
 
Consequently, in light of Article 21(3), it can be assumed that the ICC has the right and 
the duty, at least, to transmit such a request on the basis of Article 87 that provides for the 
submission of requests to States Parties for all forms of cooperation. Article 87 is thus Ôa central 
provision [that] must be read together with articles 86, 89 and 93: The Court is empowered to 
make requests for cooperation to States Parties (article 87) and the States Parties are obliged to 
cooperate fully (article 86) and specifically by complying with requests for surrender (article 89) 
and other forms of assistance (article 93).Õ781  
 
The obligation to answer positively to this request is less straightforward. The first basis 
to refuse a request from the Court on the basis of Article 93(1)(l) could be if it were in the 
interests of national security.782 This exception only concerns the production of documents and 
does thus not apply to requests regarding the interim release of an accused. The second ground 
of refusal could be the fact that it is prohibited by the law of the requested State Party.783 It 
should be noted that the ICC could not rely on Article 88 of the ICC Statute which states that 
ÔStates Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all of 
the forms of cooperation which are specified under this PartÕ since this assistance for interim 
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release is not specified in this Part. Kreb and Prost confirm that Ôthe word ÒspecifiedÓ was 
deliberately chosen to include all of the measures detailed in the Part, excluding those which are 
not particularized, such as the additional assistance provided for in article 93 para. 1(1)Õ.784 The 
obligation to answer positively is even less sure than the relocation programme for witnesses and 
the regime of enforcement of sentences is not obligatory. At the same time, these two 
programmes do not concern Ôassistance in relation to investigations or prosecutionsÕ so that they 
should not necessarily be put in comparison. 
 
In a nutshell, in case of lack of cooperation of states with such negotiations, according to 
Article 87 and Article 93(1)(l) of the ICC Statute, the ICC may formally request a state to accept a 
provisionally released accused and, according to Article 86 and Article 93(1)(l), the state can only 
refuse if it is prohibited by its law from doing so. Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute and the 
principle of effectiveness require this interpretation to be strict. Therefore, the ICC should not 
accept the absence of procedure as sufficient because Ôit is not an absence of procedure for the 
particular measure which can form the basis of refusalÕ but Ôan actual prohibition at lawÕ.785 Yet, 
the arguments of states to refuse the implementation of interim release on their soil were related 
to an absence of procedure rather than to a real interdiction. Article 21(3) requires though that 
the ICC react regarding this violation of the cooperation rules. But what are the recourses 
provided by the ICC cooperation regime that the ICC could use in case of a violation by the 
states of their obligations? 
 
Article 87(7) of the ICC Statute stipulates: 
 
Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court contrary to 
the provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions 
and powers under this Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the 
matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the 
matter to the Court, to the Security Council.  
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A finding Ôconstitutes the formal establishment of the existence of an internationally 
wrongful act of the non-cooperating StateÕ.786 Nevertheless, before the making of such finding, if 
the state contests the legality of the request for cooperation, Article 93(3) provides for 
consultations between the Court and the state concerned in order to find a solution. 787  In 
addition, according to Article 97, Ôwhere a State Party receives a request under this Part in relation 
to which it identifies problems which may impede or prevent the execution of the request, that 
State shall consult with the Court without delay in order to resolve the matterÕ. According to 
Article 119 of the ICC Statute, the Court will have the last word on this. Indeed, Article 119(1) of 
the ICC Statute provides that Ôany dispute concerning the judicial functions of the court shall be 
settled by the decision of the courtÕ. 788  As noted by Sluiter, Ôany questions concerning the 
cooperation with, and legal assistance to, the ICC are part of the Òjudicial functions of the courtÓÕ 
and ÔParty states conceded to the ultimate interpretation of the extent of the duty to cooperate 
when they ratified the Statutes and accepted Article 119, in particularÕ.789  
 
Two recourses thus exist at the disposal of the ICC if it wants to meet up its legal 
obligations: the consultations with the state and, in case of persistent refusal of cooperation, a 
finding of non-compliance to the Assembly of States Parties or to the Security Council. The 
situation is then in the hands of these two organs which could decide measures such as 
suspension of membership, economic sanctions etc.  
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4.2.! Specificity of the Netherlands 
 
As seen in sub-section 2.1.2., the ICC will never be able to truly respect the right to 
liberty without the cooperation of the Netherlands. Indeed, it is the only state that would allow 
the ICC to act in conformity with the right to liberty during all the trial proceedings because it is 
the only state appropriate to host accused persons while their presence is required during the trial 
hearings. As the host state, its regime of cooperation is different from that of the other states 
since there are specific provisions in the Headquarters Agreement. This agreement details the 
rules governing the relationships between the ICC and the Netherlands as the host state. Only 
the provisions related to the present topic are examined. 
 
In the Headquarters Agreement, there is one provision regarding interim release but it 
concerns an accused person who is provisionally released but not released on the soil of the 
Netherlands. Article 47 provides that Ôthe host State shall facilitate the transfer of persons granted 
interim release into a State other than the host StateÕ and that Ôthe host State shall facilitate the re-
entry into the host State of persons granted interim release and their short-term stay in the host 
State for any purpose related to proceedings before the CourtÕ. It is the only provision on this 
issue, there is not even one for an accused who is summoned. These are thus some shortcomings 
of the ICTY legal regime that were not resolved by the ICC and this despite the fact that Zappal 
had strongly emphasized them: 
 
Many problems were caused by the host countryÕs fierce opposition to an accused being 
released on bail in its territory. This is an element that should be addressed in the future 
in the relationship between the Tribunals and the host country. Moreover, it should be 
made very clear to the Netherlands, especially with a view to the actual establishment of 
the permanent Court, that it is a part of the duties of the host country to have an open attitude 
towards the possibility of releasing the accused on its territory. In addition, it may be suggested that 
the opportunity for release of defendants pending trial should be taken into account and 
possibly explicitly mentioned in the headquarters agreement between the Court and the 
host State. The unwillingness of the host country to assume the responsibility of the 
accusedÕs security does not seem to be a valid justification for withholding release to an 
accused who would otherwise be entitled to it.790 (emphasis added) 
                                                




As Strijards put it, it would be the price to pay for having the undeniable privilege of 
hosting the legal capital of the world.791 This opinion seems to be shared by Sluiter, at least 
regarding the acceptance of detained asylum seekers.792 
 
As noted earlier, the arguments employed by the Netherlands in its refusal to host any 
provisionally released accused are: the absence of obligations in the Headquarters Agreement and 
the fact that the stay of the accused would be illegal. Nonetheless, regarding the first argument, 
on the one hand, according to Article 86 and Article 93(1)(l) of the ICC Statute, the Netherlands 
has a general obligation to cooperate with the ICC in relation to investigations or prosecutions 
except if it is prohibited in its law. On the other hand, Article 47 of the Headquarters Agreement 
provides that Ôthe host State shall facilitate the re-entry in the host State of persons granted 
interim release and their short-term stay in the host State for any purpose related to proceedings 
before the CourtÕ.793 In addition, the second argument seems to be contradicted by the fact that 
Article 29 of the Headquarters Agreement could also be used to grant an authorization to stay to 
the accused. This article concerns other persons Ð victims, witnesses, experts, counsel Ð required 
to be present at the seat of the Court. It provides for privileges, immunities and facilities when 
the person has a document certifying that his or her presence is required at the seat of the Court 
and specifying a time period during which such presence is necessary.794 Article 38 adds that these 
                                                                                                                                                   
See also Schomburg (n317) 916. 
791 Strijards (n750) 1653. 
792 Sluiter (n776) 664. 
793 Emphasis added by the author. 
794 Article 29: 1. Other persons required to be present at the seat of the Court shall, to the extent necessary for their 
presence at the seat of the Court, be accorded the privileges, immunities and facilities provided for in article 27 of 
this Agreement, subject to production of the document referred to in paragraph 2 of this article. 
2. Persons referred to in this article shall be provided by the Court with a document certifying that their presence is 
required at the seat of the Court and specifying a time period during which such presence is necessary. Such 
document shall be withdrawn prior to its expiry if their presence at the seat of the Court is no longer required. 
3. The privileges, immunities and facilities referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall cease to apply after fifteen 
consecutive days following the date on which the presence of such other person concerned is no longer required by 
the Court, provided that such other person had an opportunity to leave the host State during that period. 
4. Persons referred to in this article who are nationals or permanent residents of the host State shall enjoy no 
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persons will have the right of unimpeded entry into, exit from and movement within the host 
state, as appropriate and for the purposes of the Court, with the condition that the host state may 
take the measures necessary to prevent violations of its public order or to protect the safety of 
the person concerned.795 Nothing would thus impede the application of these provisions to the 
accused, even if the travaux prparatoires rather suggest that it was more intended for his or her 
family members.796 Consequently, the Netherlands does not raise a real legal hurdle.  
 
Next to the Headquarters Agreement, the Netherlands adopted a specific law regarding 
cooperation with the ICC. It does not contain any specific provision on interim release, even in 
the chapter that provides for forms of assistance set out in Article 93 of the ICC Statute.797 The 
possibility of an interim release on the soil of the Netherlands did not even arise during the 
debate regarding the adoption of this law. Yet, interestingly, a long debate took place around the 
question of access to Dutch asylum procedures for ICC suspects and witnesses and the 
consequences for the human rights obligations of the Netherlands.798 The government concluded 
this debate by saying that a witness not in detention might apply for asylum in the same way as 
anyone else. Another conclusion was reached for witnesses in detention because, according to the 
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government, they would not be in the jurisdiction of the Netherlands so that they could only ask 
for special authorization to stay.799 It must be noted that, as seen in section 5.1.1., a Dutch judge 
did not agree with this analysis. It is striking that the eventuality of interim release or of an 
accused summoned did not arise since, as illustrated in sub-section 2.1.2., the problem of 
provisional release had already occurred with the ICTY.  
 
Admittedly, the law regarding cooperation with the ICC provides that Dutch law is not 
applicable to the persons detained by the ICC. 800  According to the travaux prparatoires, this 
provision makes clear that the applications for release have to be dealt by the ICC judge and not 
by a Dutch court. The Dutch Ministry of Justice maintained that this transfer of power was legal 
in light of the ECtHRÕs case law since the ICC offers guarantees of impartiality and 
independence,801 and since the ICC is not likely to breach human rights.802 The government also 
noted that state responsibility only arises in exceptional cases in which there is a flagrant and 
gross violation of the ECHR.803 
 
It follows from these considerations that, despite the fact that the geographical position 
of the Netherlands would require that specific measures were taken regarding a potential interim 
release on its soil, nothing was expressly provided so that the regime of cooperation concerning 
the Netherlands does not differ from that of the other states in this matter. Nonetheless, at the 
same time, in reality, some provisions could be used that would allow for the implementation of 




The preceding analysis shows that, to prevent a violation of the right to liberty, the ICC 
has an obligation to identify states that are able and willing and to facilitate the contact between 
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them and the accused. It can do so through informal negotiations, like it did with Belgium, or 
through requests for cooperation. In case of unjustifiable refusal of a state that is otherwise able, 
the ICC should use the recourses at its disposal by its cooperation regime, notably the holding of 
consultations and the making of a finding to the ASP or the SC. 
 
So far, the ICC has contented itself to request observations without requesting 
cooperation to implement a potential provisional release. In the Bemba case, PTCII took a step in 
the right direction by formally request the cooperation of states for this purpose,804 but it was 
quashed on appeal because, before ordering BembaÕs interim release, the judge should have first 
designated a state able and willing to accept the accused. Nonetheless, this ruling does not 
prevent the fact that, as just seen, the ICC cooperation regime allowed the judge to request 
cooperation in that matter. It was even an obligation given Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute.  
 
Nonetheless, as shown above, in practice, the ICC does not respect its obligations, so that 
it is important to see whether the accused is powerless in such a situation. In the following, it will 
be ascertained whether or not the accused could seek reparation for this violation directly by 
means of domestic proceedings or of referral to a human rights body, or through a state acting 
on his/her behalf, by means of diplomatic protection, or by invoking an erga omnes action. Indeed, 
if so far the analysis has focused on the obligation of the ICC and of its members states to 
respect the right to liberty of the accused because of its statute, it must not be forgotten that, as 
demonstrated, this right to liberty is also a general principle of law and recognized in several 
human rights conventions binding upon states. Consequently, the accused could try to act against 
the refusing state because of its violation of the right to liberty which the state is supposed to 
respect due to its domestic legal obligations, independently of its obligation stemming from the 
ICC Statute. 
 
5.! The means at the disposal of the accused 
 
The case is the following: an accused detained by the ICC not presenting in abstracto any 
risk of flight, of interference with justice or of recidivism but without possibility of interim 
release because of the absence of a state able and willing to present guarantees. The right of 
liberty of the accused is thus violated not only by the ICC in case it did not use all the means in 
                                                
804 Bemba interim release decision of 14 August 2009 (n124). 
189 
its possession to identify the willingness of states but also by all the refusing able states. This was, 
for example, the case for Magenda since the UK cancelled his visa although the ICC had ordered 
his provisional release.805 
 
The responsible actors of this violation would thus be the ICC and the refusing states 
that are able. But how could the accused invoke their liability? As held before, the refusing state 
is also bound as such by the right to liberty, regardless of its obligations as a member state of the 
ICC, so that the accused could try to raise its responsibility through the means provided by 
IHRL. In fact, in order to seek reparation of this violation, the accused has the choice to take his 
or her case before domestic jurisdictions and/or human rights bodies or to try to find a a state 
acting on his/her behalf willing to intercede for him or her. By doing so, he or she would be 
confronted with several hurdles which will be examined below. 
 
5.1.! Direct means: domestic jurisdictions and/or human rights institutions 
 
The accused has the possibility to seek reparation of the violation of his or her right 
against the refusing state by initiating proceedings within the jurisdiction of that state. In case of 
rejection of his or her request, the accused could eventually refer his or her case to one of the 
human rights supervisory mechanisms. The mechanisms available will thus depend on the 
defendant state. It could be the HRC, the ECtHR, the IAmCHR, the IAmCHR, the AfCmHPR 
or the AfCtHPR depending on whether the state recognized their jurisdiction. If the accused also 
wants to complain about the ICC, he or she could direct his or her action against the ICC in the 
Netherlands, invoking the fact that the violation occurred on Dutch territory, and then refer the 
case to the supervisory human rights bodies of the Netherlands. The accused would need to act 
through a state since the ICC is not party to any human rights instruments. The issue of the 
responsibility of the ICC as such Ð because it would have a distinct obligation to respect the right 
to liberty rather than the one stemming from its Statute so that the accused could use 
mechanisms of international law Ð is beyond the scope of this thesis given its limited space and 
the current debate regarding responsibility of international organizations in international law.806 
For these reasons, I made the choice to focus on IHRL mechanisms. Be that as it may, all these 
choices will confront the accused with several hurdles regarding jurisdiction and immunity. 
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So far, only the ECtHR has handled such applications.807 This section will thus focus on 
the ECtHRÕs case law. It must be noted that the ECtHR did not apply the same reasoning in 
each case in the sense that it rejected MilosevicÕs application against the Netherlands and the 
ICTY on the ground that Milosevic had failed to exhaust all internal remedies since he had 
withdrawn his appeal against the decision of a Dutch judge who had declined jurisdiction.808 By 
contrast, in the Blagojevic case,809  and in the Galic case,810  the ECtHR ruled first on its lack of 
jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione personae and then decided that it was thus not necessary to 
examine any other questions going to the admissibility or merits of the application, including 
whether the applicant has exhausted any effective domestic remedies available to him.  
 
Before analysing the means at the disposal of the accused further, it is interesting to 
present the case of witnesses detained by the ICC because it illustrates these entire issues even if 
the circumstances are quite different since it does not concern the interim release of an accused.  
 
5.1.1.! The case of detained witnesses before the ICC 
 
 On 27 March 2011, Djokaba Lambi Longo was transferred from detention in the DRC 
into the custody of the ICC to give evidence at LubangaÕs trial as a defence witness. He was 
transferred to the Court pursuant to Article 93(7) of the Statute. This article provides that the 
transferred person shall remain in custody and that when the purposes of the transfer have been 
fulfilled, the Court shall return the person without delay to the requested state, in this case the 
DRC. On 7 April 2011, Djokaba finished his testimony. On 1 June 2011, he lodged an asylum 
request with the Netherlands authorities. The Immigration and Naturalization Service ruled that, 
since the applicant was not within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands, it was not possible for him 
to request asylum. Nevertheless, they accepted to treat his request as one for protection to be 
                                                
807 From the ECtHRÕs arrest in the Galic case, it seems that Galic also tried before the HRC (ECtHR, Decision, 
Stanislav Galic v. the Netherlands (App. No. 22617/07), 9 June 2009 ¤17). Nonetheless, according to this arrest, the 
HRC stated that it Ôcannot examine petitions alleging violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) unless the State is also a party to the Optional Protocol (OP). Ð Italy [filled in by hand] Ð is not a 
State party to the Optional ProtocolÕ. It is not explained why Galic chose to complain about Italy. The case could 
not be found in the HRCÕs database. 
808 ECtHR, Decision, Slobodan Milosevic v. the Netherlands (App. No. 77631/01), 19 March 2002. 
809 ECtHR, Decision, Vidoje Blagojevic v. the Netherlands (App. No. 49032/07), 9 June 2009 ¤48. 
810 ECtHR, Decision, Stanislav Galic v. the Netherlands (App. No. 22617/07), 9 June 2009 ¤50. 
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considered in light of the prohibition of refoulement flowing from the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees and Article 3 of the ECHR.  
 
On 1 June 2011, Djokaba asked the ICC to order Ôspecial measuresÕ pursuant to Rule 
88(1) of the ICC RPE in the form of a stay of his removal to the DRC. On 9 June 2011, TCI 
granted this request, holding that it could not apply Article 93(7)(b) in consistence with 
internationally recognized human rights, as required by Article 21(3) of the Statute.811 It found 
that an immediate return to the DRC would deprive the witness of his fundamental right to an 
effective remedy because of his pending application for protection and that this return would 
force the Netherlands to violate the witnessÕs rights to invoke the non-refoulement principle.  
 
Despite this judgment, the Netherlands did not accept his release. It is interesting to 
reproduce its reasons extensively:  
 
The witness has been temporarily transferred in custody from the [DRC] to the [ICC] 
pursuant to an agreement between them under Article 93¤7 of the Statute. Under this 
agreement the witness shall remain in custody and shall be returned to the [DRC] when 
the purposes of the transfer have been fulfilled. This agreement was concluded between 
the [ICC] and the [DRC] to facilitate the prosecutions undertaken by the [ICC]. The 
Netherlands fails to understand how an obligation to accept undocumented or illegal 
foreigners into its territory would follow from a bilateral agreement to which it is not a 
party. The Court does not have the authority under the Statute or the Headquarters 
Agreement to transfer the witness to the Netherlands, nor does it have the authority to 
impose such a transfer upon the Host State. Neither, as it was acknowledged by the 
[ICC], is the Netherlands obligated to accept the transfer of the witness into its control.  
In this regard the Netherlands would also note that under the current circumstances it 
lacks jurisdiction to keep the witness in custody throughout the consideration of his 
asylum application.812 
 
 Following an application by Djokaba to be granted release, TCI stated that it Ôdischarged its 
obligations under Article 21(3) of the Statute and it is now for the Host State, to whom the 
                                                
811 Katanga and Ngudjolo Amicus Curiae decision (n121) ¤73. 
812 Note verbale du 26 August 2011 as cited in ECtHR, Decision, Bde Djokaba Lambi Longa v. the Netherlands 
(App. 33917/12), 9 October 2012 ¤22 (ÔDjokaba ECtHR decisionÕ). 
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asylum application is directed, to decide whether it is necessary to intervene in order to take 
control of the witness [i.e., the applicant] until such time as the application and any appellate 
phase in those proceedings are determinedÕ.813  
 
 DjokabaÕs attempts to secure his release with the Dutch tribunals also failed because the 
judges considered that Dutch law did not apply to deprivation of liberty undergone on the orders 
of the ICC.814 Djokaba then lodged an application before the ECtHR, arguing the unlawfulness 
of his detention. He claimed that the Congolese title for his detention, such as it was, had expired 
on 2 July 2007 and had not been renewed, that the ICC had no legal ground to keep him detained 
after he had given evidence, and that the Netherlands authorities had never even claimed that 
there was a basis for his detention in their domestic law. He also alleged a violation of Article 13 
of the ECHR since he had not had any effective remedy in the domestic legal system by which to 
challenge the legality of his detention and since, at the same time, there was no procedure within 
the ICC attended by adequate safeguards. In the meantime, he withdrew his asylum request 
before the Dutch authorities.815  
 
 Despite this withdrawal, the ECtHR considered that it should not strike the application out 
of its list.816 Nonetheless, the ECtHR declared it inadmissible because it would lack jurisdiction. 
Unfortunately, the exact grounds on which the Court rejected the application are not clear. It 
divided its reasoning into three parts to respond to each of DjokabaÕs arguments regarding its 
alleged jurisdiction.  
 
 The first pillar of DjokabaÕs arguments was that he was in the jurisdiction of the 
Netherlands since he was detained on its territory, his continued detention by the ICC lacked any 
basis in law and his continued detention was the direct and unequivocal result of acts and 
omissions imputable to the Netherlands. The ECtHR failed to answer the last part of this 
argument and contented itself to refer to its case law according to which Ôthe fact that the 
applicant is deprived of his liberty on Netherlands soil does not of itself suffice to bring 
questions touching on the lawfulness of his detention within the ÒjurisdictionÓ of the 
Netherlands as that expression is to be understood for the purposes of Article 1 of the 
                                                
813 In Djokaba ECtHR decision (n812) ¤¤16-18. 
814 Raad van State, 201111623/1/V3 ¤¤2.1.6-2.1.7. 
815 Djokaba ECtHR decision (n812)  ¤31. 
816 Djokaba ECtHR decision (n812)  ¤59. 
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ConventionÕ.817 It added that Ôthe legal ground for his detention remains the arrangement entered 
into between the [ICC] and the authorities of the [DRC]Õ.818 It must be noted that, unlike a 
detained witness, an accused is detained on the basis of an arrest warrant and not of an external 
arrangement. 
 
 DjokabaÕs second argument was that, even if the ECtHR found that he was detained under 
the authority of the ICC, the level of human rights protection offered by the ICC was insufficient 
for his needs as there was nothing in the rules governing the functioning of the ICC that covered 
his unique situation of detention. The ECtHR ruled that it was not the case since the ICC had 
powers under Rules 87 and 88 of its RPE to order protective measures, or other special 
measures, to ensure that the fundamental rights of witnesses were not violated.819 Again, this 
reasoning could not apply to a detained accused. 
 
 The third argument was that the Netherlands had accepted jurisdiction when it agreed to 
consider his request for asylum. The ECtHR failed to see any connection with the fact that the 
Netherlands should then review the legality of his detention since: member states have the right 
to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens; since the right to political asylum is not 
contained in either the Convention or its Protocols; since the Convention does not guarantee, as 
such, any right to enter, reside or remain in a state of which one is not a national; and since states 
are, in principle, under no obligation to allow foreign nationals to await the outcome of 
immigration proceedings on their territory. This reasoning of the Court is not applicable to a 
detained accused since he or she would not be on the territory of the Netherlands because of 
immigration proceedings.  
 
 If, so far, the Djokaba case is the only case regarding the ICC brought before the ECtHR, 
three other detained witnesses in the Katanga case were in a similar situation. 820  Besides, the 
ECtHR also referred to these cases in its Djokaba decision. The difference with the Djokaba case is 
                                                
817 Djokaba ECtHR decision (n812) 73. 
818 Djokaba ECtHR decision (n812) ¤75. 
819 Djokaba ECtHR decision (n812) ¤79. 
820 D. Yabasun and M. Holvoet, ÔSeeking Asylum before the International Criminal Court. Another Challenge for a 
Court in Need of CredibilityÕ (2013)13 International Criminal Law Review 727-747; E. Irving, ÔThe Relationship between 
the International Criminal Court and its Host State: Impact on Human RightsÕ (2014)27(2) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 479-493. 
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that these three other witnesses contested the fact that they were not entitled to apply for asylum 
and that their asylum application should be considered as a request for protection in light of the 
prohibition of refoulement. On 28 December 2011, the Regional Court dismissed the argument of 
the Minister for Immigration and Asylum that the Aliens Act 2000 was inapplicable to the 
applicantsÕ asylum requests and ordered the minister to give a decision on the witnessesÕ asylum 
requests within six months.821 This decision was not appealed.822 As held by Sluiter, the District 
Court decision Ôappears to take the view that Dutch law is fully applicable to individuals present 
on Dutch territory, unless there is a clear legal basis denying such applicability or when 
applicability of Dutch law would interfere with the proper functioning of the ICCÕ.823 In June 
2012, the Minister for Immigration and Asylum refused asylum to two of them. The appeals 
against these decisions were rejected.824 For health reasons, no notice was given in the third case. 
The procedure before the ICC followed a similar path as that of Djokaba.825 Applications were 
also made to a Dutch judge in order to examine their detention. Nonetheless, their applications 
were refused on the ground that a Dutch judge was not competent to review the legality of the 
detention because Article 88 of the Dutch Cooperation Act with the ICC stipulates that the 
Dutch legislation is not applicable to the detention measures executed by the ICC in the 
Netherlands.826 However, in its decision of 26 September 2012, a civil judge in The Hague, acting 
on an interlocutory basis, ordered the Dutch State to declare to the ICC that it was willing to take 
over custody of the witnesses within four weeks of the date of delivery of this judgment. The 
judge found the witnesses were in a dead-end situation since for what they wished to achieve no 
other judicial remedy offering adequate guarantees was available, the ICC being not able to 
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822 Sluiter (n776) 674. 
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01/07, TCII, ICC, 24 August 2011. 
826 Raad van State, 201111623/1/V3. 
195 
release them and the witnesses not being able to submit an application for judicial review of the 
detention by the competent Dutch body. In the opinion of The Hague Court, Ôthis means that 
the detention of the witnesses has consequently been illegal since 24 August 2011, which is the 
responsibility of the Dutch authorities since neither the ICC nor the DRC authorities were 
capable of remedying the detention situation of the witnessesÕ. 827  Nonetheless, the Dutch 
authorities won their appeal against this decision given the decision of the ECtHR in the Djokaba 
case.828  
 
 On 20 January 2014, the AC of the ICC directed the ICC Registrar to return them to the 
DRCÕs custody, after consultation with the Dutch authorities, in order to provide them with the 
opportunity to take any steps it determines to be necessary in respect of the pending asylum 
applications of the three witnesses. The Chamber considered that the ICCÕs authority to detain 
individuals was limited to situations where the detention was related to judicial proceedings 
before the Court and that the ICC could not serve as an administrative detention unit for asylum 
seekers or persons otherwise involved in judicial proceedings with the host state or any other 
state.829 On 4 June 2014, they were transferred to the custody of the Netherlands,830 and on 7 July 
2014, they were sent back to DRC.831 Their cases are pending before the ECtHR.832 
 
Contrary to Djokaba, these witnesses were thus in proper asylum proceedings and 
succeeded in some requests before a Dutch judge so that, if a Dutch judge seemed to consider 
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they were in his/her jurisdiction, could the ECtHR reach a different opinion than in the Djokaba 
case?  
 
These cases are interesting because they are enlightening for the reasoning of the Dutch 
tribunals and of the ECtHR. Both courts have found that they cannot review the detention of the 
witnesses because they are not in their jurisdiction. But could not another reasoning been devised 
for the accused detained by the ICC? Would not the ECtHR have reacted differently for the 
other detained witnesses since the Netherlands agreed to review their asylum application? In any 
case, to avoid the application of the same reasoning, the accused should demonstrate that he or 
she is under the jurisdiction of the state concerned and/or that the ICC cannot invoke its 
immunity. 
 
5.1.2.! Is the accused under the jurisdiction of the refusing state? 
 
This thesis thus focuses on a case where no able state is willing to host the accused and 
where the ICC does not contest this refusal. Admittedly, it can be argued that the violation of the 
right to liberty is only committed by the ICC since it is the ICC that ultimately refuses to free the 
accused and does not act to secure an effective power of release. Nonetheless, by refusing to host 
the accused and by refusing to negotiate or to cooperate about this issue, the able states leave the 
ICC powerless and contribute without any doubt to this violation. This situation is covered by 
Article 59 of the Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations. This article 
provides for the responsibility of a state that directs and controls an international organization in 
the commission of an internationally wrongful act if the state does so with knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and if the act would be internationally wrongful 
if committed by that state. It can be argued that the refusing state is directing and controlling the 
ICC in the commission of its violation of the right to liberty of the accused since the ICC is 
dependent on its acceptance, since the state cannot ignore the consequences of its refusal and 
since it would itself violate the right to liberty if it deprived the accused detained on its territory 
of the possibility of a provisional release. Consequently, both the refusing state and the ICC may 
be held responsible for their violation of the right to liberty. This is called shared responsibility.833 
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The fact that there might be several refusing states does not alter this conclusion. Indeed, Article 
48 of the Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations provides that, when 
there are several responsible states, their responsibility is not reduced by the fact that one or 
more other states are also responsible for the same act.834 Nevertheless, these considerations 
relate to the attribution of responsibility and the accused must first demonstrate that he or she is 
under the jurisdiction of the refusing state. 
 
It must be noted that this case has to be distinguished from cases where an organ of a 
state is put at the disposal of an international organization, for instance, in the Behrami case,835 
which concerns the responsibility of France for the acts of a multinational brigade of KFOR led 
by France in Kosovo. This situation is ruled by Article 7 of the Draft Articles on the 
responsibility of international organizations and differs from the present case since, in this case, 
the refusing state did not put any organ/territory at the disposal of the ICC.  
 
The accused could thus invoke the responsibility of the refusing states. Nonetheless, as 
shown by the detained witnesses cases, the issue of jurisdiction will arise. Indeed, whereas the 
accused would be detained by the ICC, could it be argued that the accused is under the 
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5.1.2.1.!Direct responsibility of the refusing state through its effective control/due to its 
act of refusal? 
 
If we take the Netherlands as the refusing state, the ECtHR has already several times held 
that: 
 
The Court cannot find the sole fact that the ICTY has its seat and premises in The Hague 
sufficient ground to attribute the matters complained of to the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. In arriving at that conclusion the Court has had regard to the particular 
context in which the question arises before it. The Court stresses that the present case 
involves an international tribunal established by the UN Security Council, an international 
organisation founded on the principle of respect for fundamental human rights and that 
moreover the basic legal provisions governing that tribunalÕs organisation and procedure 
are purposely designed to provide those indicted before it with all appropriate 
guarantees.836 
 
The same reasoning was transposed to the ICC in the Djokaba case.837 The ECtHR added 
that: 
 
The applicant was brought to the Netherlands as a defence witness in a criminal trial 
pending before the [ICC]. He was already detained in his country of origin and remains in 
the custody of the [ICC]. The fact that the applicant is deprived of his liberty on 
Netherlands soil does not of itself suffice to bring questions touching on the lawfulness 
of his detention within the ÔjurisdictionÕ of the Netherlands as that expression is to be 
understood for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.838  
 
Nonetheless, in this case, both the Dutch jurisdictions and the ECtHR ruled that Djokaba 
was not in the Dutch jurisdiction since Ôthe legal ground for his detention remains the 
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arrangement entered into between the [ICC] and the authorities of the [DRC]Õ. 839  Is this 
reasoning applicable to the accused? The legal ground for their detention is the arrest warrant 
issued by the ICC so why would the Netherlands or other refusing states have jurisdiction? On 
the basis of ECtHR case law, the refusing state would probably argue that the accused are 
detained under an ICC arrest warrant on Dutch territory so that they could not be in the 
jurisdiction of other states. The Netherlands would also sustain that, since the Headquarters 
Agreement provides that the Dutch law is not applicable to the persons detained by the ICC, 
they could not be under their jurisdiction either. But what could the accused argue? 
 
The problem with the ECtHR is that it does not necessarily ask the right questions. As 
Milanovic and Papic point out regarding the Behrami case, Ôthe question presented both in Behrami 
and Saramati was not whether Resolution 1244 was violated but whether the ECHR was violated 
(...) whether or not KFOR had the duty under Resolution 1244 to de-mine areas that NATO 
itself saturated with cluster bombs is not the pointÕ,840 whereas these were the issues on which the 
ECtHR focused. According to them, Ôthe issue is whether France had the obligation to do so 
under the ECHR, in the same way as France would undoubtedly have had such a positive 
obligation to secure human rights, namely the right to life, of persons within its own territory if, 
say, a fighter aircraft dropped a few cluster bombs on a vineyard in ChampagneÕ. 841  This 
reasoning can be applied to the Djokaba case as well. In this case, while the ECtHR contented 
itself to argue that there was no legal vacuum since Ôthe legal ground for his detention remains 
the arrangement entered into between the [ICC] and the authorities of the [DRC]Õ and since the 
ICC was waiting to send him back to the DRC,842 it clearly failed to examine why the ICC was 
not able to send him back, namely the fact that the Netherlands was still examining his 
application for asylum. It thus failed to examine the issue that the continuing detention of 
Djokaba resulted from an act of the Netherlands and therefore that the Netherlands might have 
had an indirect but effective control on the detention which could be a sign of jurisdiction.  
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Indeed, for the HRC, jurisdiction Ômeans that a State party must respect and ensure the 
rights laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State 
Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State PartyÕ.843 This jurisdiction would thus 
derive from control. 844  Could it be argued that the refusing state exercises effective control 
regarding the right to liberty of the accused? Admittedly the case law in which this position is 
adopted concerned mostly cases of occupation and is thus linked to a territory.845 This is what 
Milanovic calls Ôthe spatial model of jurisdiction Ð a state possesses jurisdiction whenever it has 
effective overall control of an areaÕ.846 This model could not be applied to our case since there is 
no such control of a territory. In addition, the control Ôshould be exercised over a large number 
of interdependent stakes, and not one time only and over a single matter onlyÕ.847 
 
Nonetheless, the accused could invoke the benefit of Ôthe personal model of jurisdiction Ð 
a state has jurisdiction whenever it exercises authority or control over an individualÕ.848 It could be 
argued that it is the case given the consequence of the refusal of a state to provide guarantees for 
his or her interim release. This principle was applied in cases of extra-territorial arrest and 
detention,849 of preventing asylum seekers entering the territory,850 and of attacks on a foreign 
territory.851 It must be noted that, while dealing with cases of responsibility of a state for acts 
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committed during an armed attack, the ECtHR has been more cautious because this view could 
extend considerably the jurisdiction of the states.852 For example, in its recent Al-Skeini case, 
which concerns five Iraqis allegedly killed by British troops on patrol in UK-occupied Basra and 
one Iraqi arrested and then killed in a UK detention facility, the ECtHR seems to have combined 
both criteria. As Milanovic presents it, Ôthe Court applied a personal model of jurisdiction to the 
killing of all six applicants, but it did so only exceptionally, because the UK exercised public 
powers in IraqÕ.853 Similarly, in the Jaloud v the Netherlands case, the ECtHR recognized Dutch 
jurisdiction over persons passing through the checkpoint in Iraq given the control of the 
checkpoint by the Netherlands.854 
 
The problem with that personal model of jurisdiction is that, if, in theory, the accused 
could invoke it, it would most likely be rejected because the situations are not really comparable. 
Indeed, the ICC accused have not been abducted in a foreign country and then subsequently 
detained by the refusing state nor have they been bombed or caught under fire by its armed 
forces. Objectively, Ôthe authority or controlÕ that the refusing state would have over the accused 
is not comparable. In addition, as held by Judges Spielmann and Raimondi, attribution is distinct 
from jurisdiction.855 Adopting such an extended interpretation would, as feared by the ECtHR 
Judge Nubberger, lead to Ôa real danger of the whole house being floodedÕ.856 Indeed, this could 
have consequences for numerous states since, as seen before, the state of origin is not a real 
option. In addition, the difference with all these cases is the intervention of an international 
organization, the ICC, in the equation. Indeed, if such case was ever brought to a human rights 
supervisory body, the state would most likely answer that it does not have jurisdiction because 
the accused is under the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
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Consequently, invoking the responsibility of the state just because of its refusal would 
probably fail because of the lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, would the application also fail if the 
responsibility of the state were invoked because of the transfer of the power to the ICC? 
  
5.1.2.2.!Jurisdiction of the state because of the transfer of power 
 
Another exception to the territorial jurisdiction admitted by the ECtHR is the recognition 
that: 
 
Where States establish international organizations in order to pursue or strengthen their 
cooperation in certain fields of activities, and where they attribute to these organizations 
certain competences and accord them immunities, there may be implications as to the 
protection of fundamental rights [so that] it would be incompatible with the purpose and 
object of the Convention (É) if the Contracting States were thereby absolved from their 
responsibility under the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered by such 
attribution.857 
 
No other human rights supervisory body has yet pronounced on a similar issue.  
 
The idea is that, Ôif the Convention does not (É) prohibit Contracting Parties from 
transferring sovereign power to an international (including a supranational) organisation in order 
to pursue cooperation in certain fields of activity, (É) the State is considered to retain 
Convention liability in respect of treaty commitments subsequent to the entry into force of the 
ConventionÕ and that ÔState action taken in compliance with such legal obligations is justified as 
long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the 
substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner 
which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention providesÕ. By 
ÔequivalentÕ, the Court clarified that it meant ÔcomparableÕ and not ÔidenticalÕ.858 It continued by 
saying that: 
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If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the organisation, the 
presumption will be that a State has not departed from the requirements of the 
Convention when it does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its 
membership of the organisation. However, any such presumption can be rebutted if, in 
the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention 
rights was manifestly deficient. In such cases, the interest of international cooperation 
would be outweighed by the ConventionÕs role as a Ôconstitutional instrument of 
European public orderÕ in the field of human rights.859 
 
In other words, a transfer of competence to an international organization is acceptable 
for the ECtHR only if an equivalent protection of human rights is provided by the 
organization.860 This protection must be persistent. Indeed, ÔMember States appear to be required 
to screen the [international organization]Õs human rights performance continuously. They are not 
absolved from responsibility upon acceding to an [international organization] which only at the 
time of accession provided sufficient human rights guarantees. Instead, any deterioration of 
human rights protection obliges them to bring pressure to bear on the [international 
organization] so that it changes its waysÕ.861 It is not clear whether the ECtHR requires an act of 
the state to trigger its responsibility.862 In the present case, the action could be the refusal of a 
state to host a provisionally released accused.  
 
So far, the ECtHR has never found a state responsible for the act of an organization 
because it has always ruled that there was an equivalent mechanism.863 It must be noted that, in 
the cases against the UN, the ECtHR has always attributed the contested act to the UN and held 
that the member state was not involved. It found, for example, that only the signature of the 
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Headquarters Agreement by the Netherlands with the ICTY could not lead to the responsibility 
of the Netherlands for ICTYÕs acts.864 Nonetheless, in this case, in addition to the signature, there 
would also be the act of refusal. 
 
The detained witness Djokaba tried to plead this lack of equivalent mechanism regarding 
his illegal detention. Nonetheless, the ECtHR found that the ICC had powers under Rules 87 and 
88 of its RPE to order protective measures, or other special measures, to ensure that the 
fundamental rights of witnesses were not violated.865  The ECtHR did not thus exclude the 
possibility of the responsibility of the Netherlands. These findings of the ECtHR in the Djokaba 
case cannot be transposed to this case since these rules are not applicable to the accused. As the 
ICC held in the Katanga case, Ôles tmoins dtenus ne sont pas des suspects relevant de la 
comptence de la Cour et ne peuvent donc pas invoquer les garanties qui leur sont applicables 
notamment en matire de rexamen de leur dtentionÕ.866 
 
In this case, the absence of an equivalent mechanism and the presence of a structural 
deficit could be argued against the refusing state. On the one hand, if the ICC does not assume 
its obligation to find a state able and to force it to be willing, the accused has no legal ways to act 
against it so that it does not have access to an equivalent mechanism regarding the violation of 
his or her right to liberty. On the other hand, a structural deficit exists because there is nothing 
foreseen about such cases in the ICC legal provisions. Therefore, the refusing state should have 
accepted the request in order to avoid this violation of the right of the accused. At the same time, 
it could be argued that there is an equivalent mechanism since the detention of the accused is 
regularly reviewed and since, if an able and willing state is found, the right to liberty of the 
accused could be respected. Similarly, it could be argued that no structural deficit would exist 
since there could be a chance of interim release if an able state is found as in the Bemba case. This 
position is supported by Henquet. According to him, since an accused can move before the 
judges of the ICC to seek redress for an alleged violation of his rights, the states negotiating the 
ICC Statute decided to make the Court competent to safeguard these rights and established an 
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equivalent mechanism.867 Nevertheless, since the effectiveness of this mechanism depends on the 
will of states, it should not be considered as equivalent. 
 
The issue of the consequences for the Netherlands in case of violation by the ICC of its 
human rights obligations arose in the parliamentary debates related to the signature of the ICC 
Statute.868 The Dutch politicians concluded that such situation would be very unlikely and that 
the findings of the Naletilic case in which the ECtHR found that the ICTY presented all the 
necessary human rights safeguards could apply to the ICC as well.869 The Dutch Minister of 
Justice added that, should such a situation arise, it would have consequences not only for the 
Netherlands but also for each member state that is also member of the ECHR.870 
 
As shown by the ECtHRÕs case law, a position similar to the Dutch one is more likely to 
prevail. Indeed, as argued by Ryngaert, the ECtHR has been more than cautious not to pierce the 
veil of the international organizations too much and is thus more prone to conclude as to the 
existence of an equivalent mechanism.871 In the present case, the accused has access to a judge, 
controlled by an appeals chamber, that reviews regularly his or her detention and that would 
have, in theory, the power to force a state to cooperate. The issue only arises when, as in this 
theoretical case, the judge does not use this power and no able and willing state is found.  
 
In order to determine whether this control by the judge is supposed to be an equivalent 
mechanism, the case law of the ECtHR regarding Article 13 of the ECHR, namely the right to an 
effective remedy, is enlightening. Indeed, it is stipulated that Ôthe effect of Article 13 is thus to 
require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an Òarguable complaintÓ 
under the Convention and to grant appropriate reliefÕ. 872  As seen before, the issue of the 
cooperation of states may be addressed before the ICC judge and the judge may require 
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observations or could require the active cooperation of the state. The issue is when it does not do 
so. Article 13 also requires the remedy to be effective. The ECtHR is clear about the fact that: 
 
The ÔeffectivenessÕ of a ÔremedyÕ within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the 
certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. Nor does the ÔauthorityÕ referred to in 
that provision necessarily have to be a judicial authority; but if it is not, its powers and the 
guarantees which it affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is 
effective. Also, even if a single remedy does not by itself entirely satisfy the requirements 
of Article 13, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so.873  
 
It cannot really be contested that the control of the detention of the accused by the ICC 
judge fulfils these requirements and that the issue is rather the outcome of the remedy, namely 
the way the judge decides to exercise his or her power to coerce a state to cooperate. In that case, 
it would mean that the ECtHR would have to control the appropriateness of the action of the 
judge, which it is not its role. Consequently, it is likely that an accusedÕs application would 
ultimately fail because of the lack of jurisdiction of the refusing state. In addition, this control of 
the ICC action leads to another issue, that of immunity. What if the accused is actually directing 
his or her request against the ICC and using the refusing state also as a means to have access to a 
human rights supervisory organ?  
 
5.1.3.! Could the ICC hide behind its immunity? 
 
In that case, independently of the issue of jurisdiction, the refusing state used to reach the 
ICC could invoke the immunity of the ICC guaranteed by Article 48 of the ICC Statute. This is 
among others illustrated by the Blagojevic case and the Galic case in which the ECtHR held that:  
 
The United Nations is an intergovernmental international organisation with a legal 
personality separate from that of its member states and is not itself a Contracting Party 
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(É). Plainly, therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction ratione personae to examine complaints 
directed against the ICTY itself or against the United Nations as a respondent.874 
 
Like the UN, the ICC has a legal personality separate from that of its member states,875 
and is not a member of the ECHR.  
 
The fact that the ICC enjoys immunities in its member states is not per se against the right 
to a fair trial. Indeed, as held by the ECtHR, Ôthe attribution of privileges and immunities to 
international organisations is an essential means of ensuring the proper functioning of such 
organisations free from unilateral interference by individual governmentsÕ. 876  Nonetheless, 
according to the ECtHR, the state can hide behind this immunity only when the applicants have 
available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the 
Convention.877 The issue is thus again that of the existence of an equivalent mechanism, which, as 




It stems from these considerations that, if the accused wants to contest directly the fact 
that no able state is willing to host him or her during his or her interim release and the fact that 
the ICC does not do anything about it, he or she is not likely to find any support from the 
national jurisdictions or their human rights supervisory mechanisms. Indeed, on the one hand, it 
will be difficult for the accused to assert directly the jurisdiction of the refusing state because it is 
quite doubtful that the refusing state exercises an effective authority and control on the accused. 
On the other hand, if the accused wanted to trigger the responsibility of the refusing state 
through its membership of the ICC, the ECtHR will probably say that the ICC has an equivalent 
mechanism to assess this kind of claim so that the state or the ICC cannot be held responsible.  
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Admittedly, the positions of human rights mechanisms other than the ECtHR are not 
known but the same principles would probably be applied since they are close to the regime of 
international responsibility.878 
 
Nonetheless, if the accused cannot directly find relief for the violation of his or her right 
to liberty because no state would accept to act as host during his or her interim release, he or she 
could still try to find a state willing to intercede for him or her near the ICC or the refusing state. 
This option is examined in the next section. 
 
5.2.!  Indirect means: through a state acting on his/her behalf 
 
The accused could seek reparation for the violation of his or her right to liberty by 
finding a state that would embrace his or her cause. The first issue is obviously to find such state 
as an accused cannot force a state to intercede in his or her favour. Therefore, the state must be 
willing. The difficulty in finding such state is that, a priori, if the state cared, it would be willing to 
accept the accused on its territory. Nonetheless, that does not mean that the willing state would 
necessarily be able to accept the accused. The obvious choice would be the state of origin. 
Nonetheless, as seen in section 2, other states could also be envisaged. This state willing but 
unable could try to act in favour of the accused through two means, the diplomatic protection or 
an action erga omnes partes.  
 
If the state of origin is willing to side with the accused, it could act through diplomatic 
protection. Article 1 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection provides that, for the 
purposes of the draft articles, diplomatic protection consists of the invocation by a state, through 
diplomatic action or other means or peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another state for 
an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that state to a natural or legal person that is 
a national of the former state with a view to the implementation of such responsibility. As held 
by Shaw, Ôsuch diplomatic protection is not a right of the national concerned, but a right of the 
state which it may or may not choose to exerciseÕ so that the natural or legal person has no 
remedy if the state refuses to act. 879  The prerequisites for diplomatic protection are an 
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international wrong, an exhaustion of the domestic remedies if they are effective and a link of 
nationality.880 In this case, these prerequisites would be fulfilled since the refusal of the state leads 
to a violation of the right to liberty of the accused by the ICC, since the domestic remedies would 
not be effective given the absence of jurisdiction and since it is the state of origin that would act. 
Diplomatic protection could indeed be used for the protection of human rights. In fact, in the 
Diallo case, the ICJ established that: 
 
Owing to the substantive development of international law over recent decades in respect 
of the rights it accords to individuals, the scope ratione materiae of diplomatic protection, 
originally limited to alleged violations of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens, 
has subsequently widened to include, inter alia, internationally guaranteed human rights.881 
 
Diplomatic protection Ôincludes, in a broad sense, consular action, negotiation, mediation, 
judicial and arbitral proceedings, reprisals, a retort, severance of diplomatic relations, and 
economic pressuresÕ.882 Regarding the ICC, these means would be useless since the protecting 
state could not pressure a judge to take action against a state. The only thing it could do is act 
through amicus curiae briefs to suggest the ICC should use its cooperation regime to force the 
refusing state.883 By contrast, regarding the refusing state, the protecting state could choose all 
these means subject to their legality in international law. Their effectiveness would then depend 
on the case. Interestingly, Kujit, a Dutch national, initiated action in a Dutch jurisdiction to force 
the Netherlands to issue in his favour guarantees addressed to Thailand so that he could be 
provisionally released while waiting for his trial for drug-trafficking to start. Since he was in pre-
trial detention for six years, he also requested that the Netherlands do everything to obtain 
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redress from the Thai government for the violation of his human rights. The Dutch court 
rejected the application because it found the Dutch government unable to dictate to the Thai 
government how to treat its prisoners. Nonetheless, the court concluded that it expects the 
Dutch government to continue to make an effort to assist the applicant and to take all possible 
measures to secure the release of the applicant as soon as possible.884 It implies that there would 
be an obligation at least to try without probably effective results. Could the accused hope for 
something more from a protecting state than trying? Could he or she, for example, hope for 
judicial proceedings? 
 
Indeed, only judicial and arbitral proceedings could lead to an obligation of the refusing 
state to change its stance. The issue with the use of such proceedings is that they would be 
submitted to the acceptance of jurisdiction of the refusing state.885 For example, regarding the 
ICJ, there are no compromissory clauses in any human rights treaty protecting the right to liberty 
so that the two states should consent. Admittedly, the HRC as well as the three regional human 
rights mechanisms accept inter-state complaints when both states agree to this possibility. 
Nonetheless, provided that both the protecting and the refusing states agreed to these 
mechanisms, it would still be needed to demonstrate that the accused is under the jurisdiction of 
the refusing state and, as seen in section 5.1.2.2., it is probably going to fail.  
 
Diplomatic protection would thus not be very satisfactory if the refusing state is not 
willing to negotiate with the protecting state since, a fortiori, it would not be willing to accept the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ or of an arbitral tribunal either. Nonetheless, such support from the state 
of origin would not hurt. 
 
But if the state of origin is not willing to help, could another state act on the behalf of the 
accused?886 Obviously, no legal ground would prevent any state from trying to negotiate. The 
issue is rather whether any state would have the right to initiate legal proceedings. It could not do 
so under the umbrella of diplomatic protection since it is only available for the state of nationality 
of the accused. Nonetheless, it could do it under the umbrella of the rights erga omnes. Indeed, if 
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the protecting state is part of one of the four human rights treaties protecting the right to liberty 
and if both states accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ in case of the ICCPR or of the regional 
human rights mechanisms in case of the other conventions, according to some authors, it could 
act on the basis of a right erga omnes partes. According to them, in this case, each state party has a 
legal interest to see the treaty respected. 887  Besides, the human rights regional mechanisms 
provide for the possibility to file a complaint against another state even if they are not directly 
injured. Nonetheless, it is still controversial for the ICCPR. In the Barcelona Traction case, the ICJ 
explicitly held that Ôon the universal level, the instruments which embody human rights do not 
confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringements of such rights irrespective of 
their nationality. It is therefore still on the regional level that a solution to this problem has had to 
be sought.Õ888 In any case, independently of this admissibility issue due to the lack of nationality 
link between the accused and the protecting state and independently of the requirement of 
consent for the jurisdiction of the body, the accused would probably again not be found to be in 
the jurisdiction of the refusing state.   
 
If neither the protecting state nor the refusing party is party to one of these conventions, 
to bring the case before the ICJ, the protecting state should demonstrate that the right to liberty 
is a right erga omnes, so that its legal interest to act for the accused who is not one of its nationals 
could be established. In addition, both states should accept the ICJÕs jurisdiction. It is important 
to stress that the Ôquestion of legal interest and standing, even if it concerns a peremptory norm, 
should however not be confounded with the question of the availability of a judicial forum: 
having a legal interest in a certain matter does not imply access to a certain judicial forumÕ.889 As 
Tams argued, the fact that Ôall States have standing to institute ICJ proceedings in response to erga 
omnes breaches cannot overcome the necessity of StatesÕ consent to the relevant dispute 
settlement mechanismÕ.890 Even then, the issue would be that Article 48 of the Articles on State 
Responsibility provides that there should be a serious breach of peremptory norms for any state 
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to act when it is not injured. Yet, the violation of the right to liberty regarding provisional release 
could not be considered as a serious breach. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to deepen the 
use of rights erga omnes,891 since, in any case, this thesis does not deal with serious breaches of 
peremptory norms but the possibility to use them is interesting to be mentioned. 
 
It stems from these considerations that, could the accused find a protecting state willing 
to intercede for him or her and capable of it because of the nationality link, or of the adherence 
to human rights supervisory mechanisms, the issue of jurisdisction would still arise to trigger a 
judicial proceeding. Nonetheless, it could be very helpful for an accused to have a state 
interceding for him or her. 
 
5.3.!  Conclusion 
 
What matters for the accused to find remedies for the violation of his or her right to 
liberty is thus to demonstrate the jurisdiction of the refusing state and/or find a state willing to 
intercede for him or her. Even if it seems from this legal analysis that states have not consented 
to such jurisdiction, it is still important to keep in mind remedies available within the framework 
of human rights law. Consent of states can indeed evolve. Condemning existing mechanisms of 
human rights for being ineffective without having at first recourse of them will not help 
evolution of IHRL. Some remedies available in the context of IHRL may provide guidance for 
the negotiations. It may well be that because of such human rights remedies, other states think 
twice before refusing a request from the ICC to admit an accused provisionally released on their 
soil. 
 
Such request of the accused could also help the ICC to reflect on the issue and provide a 
remedy to the accused. An option could be a reduction of sentence. This was the path chosen by 
the ICTR in order to remedy the violation of the right of fair trial committed against Barayagwiza 
or Kajelijeli.892 It was also done in the Gatete case. In this case, the AC of the ICTR held that Ôthe 
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protracted delay and resulting prolonged pre-trial detention of more than seven years violated 
GateteÕs right to be tried without undue delay and constituted prejudice per seÕ and that Ôa 
reduction of the sentence of life imprisonment to a term of 40 yearsÕ imprisonment was the 
appropriate remedyÕ.893 Nonetheless, as Naymark puts it, Ôit is difficult to impose a practically 
meaningful remedy when the accused is convicted on charges infinitely more serious than those 
carrying maximum sentences in domestic criminal law schemes. Where is the practical remedy in 
sentencing an accused found to be responsible for the deaths of 500,000 people as if he had only 
been responsible for the deaths of 100,000 people, for example?Õ894 And what if the accused is in 
the end acquitted? Another possibility could be financial compensation. This right is indeed 
recognized for persons unlawfully detained by Articles 9(5) and 14(6) of the ICCPR, Article 3 of 
the seventh Protocol of the ECtHR or Article 10 of the AmCHR. The ICC also recognized this 
right but only in case of a miscarriage of justice.895A stay of proceedings could be another remedy 
but, according to the ICC, a permanent stay could lead to the release of the accused only if a fair 
trial becomes impossible, which is not the case.896  
 
These remedies could be incentives for states to cooperate. Nonetheless, given the gravity 
of the charges, it could be also risky, especially if the accused is then convicted. It could have an 
opposite effect by upsetting states, which could adversely impact on cooperation, as 
demonstrated by the Barayagwiza case,897 or by upsetting the international community because, for 
example, compensation should primarily go to the victims.  
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6. Conclusion: is this an issue of ability or an issue of willingness? 
 
As seen in the first part of this thesis, if the obligation of the ICC to respect the right to 
liberty regarding the applications for interim release clearly stems from the combination of 
Articles 21(1)(a) and 21(3) of the ICC Statute, some scholars have voiced some doubts regarding 
the pertinence of the requirement of a strict respect of the right to ilberty as foreseen in IHRL. 
The rationales given on this score have been two-fold: the gravity of the crimes the ICC is 
dealing with; and the specific context in which the ICC is operating. It has been demonstrated, 
however, that, contrary to this impression, these two elements are not an hurdle for a strict 
application when an able and willing state was found. The practice of the ICTY was illustrative to 
corroborate this conclusion.  
 
The study has turned then to the analysis of the issues linked to the obtaining of state 
guarantees. The first analysis focused on the difficulty of finding voluntary states willing to accept 
provisionally released accused. The second part of the analysis shows that, despite its obligations 
to find such states and to enable the accused to contact them, the ICC was rather passive on this 
matter. It has been demonstrated that the ICC could nonetheless make use of its cooperation 
regime in case of lack of positive answer to its efforts of identification and contact. It has also 
been shown that the accused had at his or her disposal several mechanisms to try to force the 
ICC to respect its obligations and to try to force a refusing state not to violate its obligation to 
respect the right to liberty stemming from the IHRL instruments by which it would be bound. 
Nonetheless, it can be concluded that these mechanisms, whether triggered directly by the 
accused or by a state acting on his/her behalf, are unlikely to lead to a judgment of 
condemnation of the ICC or of the refusing state, namely because of an issue of jurisdiction 
and/or of immunity. Acting through a protecting state is even less satisfactory in that, 
independently of the difficulty of finding such state willing to trigger diplomatic protection or an 
action erga omnes partes, it would also have to show its legal capacity to act in name of the accused. 
 
Consequently, this analysis demonstrates that, since the ICC would actually be able to 
respect the right to liberty as prescribed by its legal regime and since it has, contrary to the 
accused, different effective means at its disposal, ie. negotiations and requests for cooperation to 
reach this ability, the low number of willing states seems rather an issue of unwillingness by the 
ICC than one of unability. Admittedly, the states are also at fault when they raise unconvincing 
arguments to refuse an accused on their soil. Nonetheless, when the ICC accepts these 
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arguments, the ramification is that it may be considered unwilling and unable to respect one of 




































In this thesis I have endeavoured to answer the research question: Does the ICC have the 
legal obligation to respect the right to liberty and, if so, does it have the capacity to do so? I 
deemed a positivist approach to be most appropriate and most convincing for the analysis of this 
question. With the use of a formalist method, it was demonstrated that the ICC has a legal 
obligation to respect the right to liberty when ruling on issues of interim release from detention. 
Indeed, the ICC Statute, more precisely Articles 58 and 60, provides for a regime of interim 
release that does not suffer any lacunae. Therefore, according to Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute, 
these provisions, which protect indirectly the right to liberty of the accused, must be interpreted 
and applied in conformity with this right as internationally recognized. Although the application 
of IHRL through Article 21(3) is not contested as such, given its a priori clear phrasing, it was 
shown that the expression Ôinternationally recognizedÕ was actually far from clear, and 
furthermore that the ICC judges have not resolved this issue. In fact, the judgesÕ use of IHRL in 
the CourtÕs decisions cannot be rationalized since it is not always coherent and since no legal 
justification for such use is given. From their practice, it can only be concluded that IHRL is 
applicable in general without any indication regarding the content of IHRL. This lack of legal 
reasoning is to be regretted since, as held by Cassese regarding the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, 
a clear standpoint of the ICC judges regarding the law applicable to them is Ônecessary not only 
for reasons of legal rigour, but also to satisfy the fundamental requirements of the principle of fair 
trialÕ. If the reasoning of the judges is not foreseeable, Ôthe defence is deprived of the means to 
reasonably anticipate the judgesÕ conclusionsÕ.898 This is the reason why in this thesis I have found 
it necessary to explain clearly the interpretation of Article 21(3) adopted for its analysis.  
 
The standard of the right to liberty, as internationally recognized and as required by 
Article 21(3), can be ascertained through the use of general principles of law, which, 
notwithstanding the point of view of many authors, are more adequate than the other sources of 
international law provided by Article 38 of the ICJ Statue. In fact, I took the stance that the trend 
of many scholars to adapt the definition of customary international law so that it would be an 
appropriate source for IHRL is unnecessary, and even undesirable, given the general principle of 
law as existing source of international law. It has been revealed that the minority trend, 
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represented among others by Simma, 899 Meron900 and De Schutter901, rightly advocates for the 
use of such a source for establishing IHRL. I argued that there is no need to rely upon Article 38 
of the Statute of the ICJ to identify the law applicable to the ICC, on the ground that the Rome 
Statute itself provides for the applicable law under Article 21. Even so, it is submitted that it is 
still necessary to invoke Article 38 in order to ascertain the normative content and standards of 
the right to liberty, on the basis that Article 21(3) itself makes a reference to Ôinternationally 
recognized human rightsÕ. Such an ÔexternalÕ reference to the general source of international law 
shows in turn that the ICC legal regime is not self-sufficient, much less self-contained. This may 
explain why some scholars, when analysing the application of IHRL to the ICC, invoke both 
Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ and Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute in order to rationalise the 
application of IHRL to international criminal proceedings. 902  Nonetheless, since, as 
demonstrated, Article 21 of the ICC Statute is lex specialis in relation to Article 38 of the ICJ 
Statute, such a proposed combined use of those provisions on sources of law is confusing. It is 
submitted that a distinction should be made between the law applicable to the ICC pursuant to 
Article 21 of the ICC Statute on the one hand, and the applicable law under Article 38 of the ICJ 
Statute which can be ascertained by way of reference to this provision by Article 21(3), on the 
other. It must be noted, however, that this combination could be useful if the accused aims to 
demonstrate a breach of an international obligation in order to trigger the responsibility of the 
ICC in international law. This argument could not been explored in this thesis since, as explained 
in Part II, section 5, its scope had to be limited to IHRL mechanisms. 
 
It has been submitted that the right to liberty, as internationally recognized, should be 
defined as admitting the possibility to detain someone who has allegedly committed an offence 
but as requiring it to be provided for by law and to be strictly necessary since the presumption is 
in favour of release. The necessity of the detention has to be assessed in light of potential 
alternative measures and in light of a potential risk of flight, of prejudicing the administration of 
justice and of committing new offences. These grounds need to be expressly demonstrated by the 
detaining authorities. In addition, these authorities must ensure a procedure to control 
automatically and regularly the necessity of the detention. This control must be carried out 
promptly by an independent authority with the power to order the release of the detainee. Finally, 
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the procedure must be conducted with special diligence; where it is not, the accused must be 
released. The fact that a ius commune could be reached through the different human rights 
conventions and their interpretative mechanisms demonstrates that, if, as once held by 
Brownlie,903 IHRL appears to be fragmented, this is not necessarily the case for every right. 
 
With this definition of the right to liberty, the ICC regime regarding interim release has 
been studied and it is concluded that the regime of interim release appears to fulfil the 
requirement of the right to liberty as previously defined. The analysis of the case law 
demonstrates in addition that the application of this regime by the ICC judges is also roughly in 
conformity with this right. The use of ÔroughlyÕ is due to the fact that, although the ICC judges 
recognize both the exceptional character of detention and the obligation to assess alternatives or 
to issue a summons to appear when possible, and although they always control the 
reasonableness of the length of detention and interpret the criteria justifying detention in light of 
the right to liberty, there are still some efforts to be made regarding the burden of proof and the 
influence of the disclosure of evidence and the expected sentence.  
 
Despite these findings of apparent respect of the right to liberty, I considered that the 
legal analysis in this thesis also required an examination of whether the practice of the ICC 
proves it to be capable of respecting that right. Indeed, this issue has been raised as none of the 
individuals charged with international crimes has ever been released and by the criticisms of the 
majority of scholars regarding the requirement for international criminal tribunals to respect 
IHRL. For these scholars,904 in a nutshell, the fact that IHRL was originally intended for states 
means that it cannot be applied as such to international criminal tribunals because of the gravity 
of the crimes that they are dealing with, and of the specific context in which they operate. This 
thesis has demonstrated that such a strict application has in reality been possible, at least 
regarding the right to liberty, since these elements do not constitute genuine hurdles for such 
application. Indeed, the numerous conditional provisional releases before the ICTY speak for 
themselves. The analysis of the practice of the ICTY has demonstrated that these hurdles could 
be cleared, among others, by states guarantees.  Yet, the practice of the ICTR has shown that 
obtaining such guarantees was not so straightforward. This finding was corroborated by the 
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analysis of the arguments raised by some states, especially Belgium and the Netherlands, in their 
observations to the ICC. 
 
Going further, this study has also found that the combination of Article 21(1)(a) and 
Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute has led to an obligation of conduct imposed on the ICC to 
obtain these statesÕ guarantees. In fact only then would it be entitled to claim it truly respects the 
right to liberty even though, in the end, the statesÕ guarantees do not give rise to the release of the 
accused. The respect of the right to liberty lies in the possibility of release, not necessarily in the 
actual release. It has been argued that the ICC, through the presidency and the registry, is under 
an obligation, through negotiations, to identify eligible states and to enable the accused to contact 
them. The record of the ICCÕs compliance with this obligation is difficult to assess since the only 
real tangible result so far is the agreement concluded with Belgium. It was then contended that, 
where the results of these negotiations prove inconclusive because of the unwillingness of the 
states, in order to meet its obligations, the ICC should exercise the power to persuade them to 
show willingness to accept the accused through the use of its cooperation regime. The ICC has 
never gone that far, however. I acknowledge that my analysis is not corroborated by any other 
scholarly studies, the reason being that, to my knowledge, this thesis is the first to analyse the 
obligations of the ICC stemming from the right to liberty. Nonetheless, the use of a formalist 
method implies that all of the reasoning is legally based, and that, save for a different valid 
interpretation, this reasoning is tangible. As held by Simma and Paulus, Ôonly when linked to 
formal sources recognized as binding by the international community does law serve the decision 
maker in the search for a balance between idealism and realism, common values and ideological 
neutrality, apology and utopia.Õ905 If, as stated in the introduction, the study of the extra-legal 
factors influencing the requests for cooperation of the ICC and the reaction of the states to the 
requests is outside the scope of this legal analysis, it would be interesting to deepen further this 
issue with regard to interim release.  
 
Admittedly, those obligations incumbent upon the ICC and the obligations incumbent 
upon the member states stem from the obligations built into the ICC regime as such. Still, it has 
also been demonstrated that, independently of these obligations and their membership of the 
ICC, because the member states are also bound by the right to liberty recognised in the context 
of IHRL, the accused has the possibility to trigger the mechanisms of IHRL in seeking 
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reparations for the violation of his or her right to liberty. These mechanisms are, mainly, the 
opening of a procedure, after the exhaustion of internal remedies, before a human rights 
supervisory body that would sanction the actions of the refusing state and the finding of a 
protecting state that would try to influence the refusing state through informal means such as 
negotiations or through the triggering of judicial proceedings. Nonetheless, it has been shown 
that judicial proceedings are not a real option since the accused would need to prove that the act 
of refusal or the transfer of power to the ICC would bring him or her under the jurisdiction of 
the refusing state and therefore under the jurisdiction of the judicial body which is, as the matter 
now stands, rather unlikely to succeed. The immunity of the ICC may also be one reason 
preventing the review of its acts. 
 
This conclusion as to the lack of effective mechanisms at the disposal of the accused 
raises the more general issue of enforcement of IHRL when an international organization is in 
play. In fact, it is well-known that it is difficult to raise the responsibility of an international 
organization in IHRL.906 So far, cases regarding international criminal tribunals have only been 
brought before the ECtHR. The situation is left with scope of evolution in this context. In 
addition, this thesis has demonstrated that, as a matter of law, the reasoning of the ECtHR 
regarding the detained witness may not be the same for an accused of the ICC. This thesis has 
also examined other possibilities to draw on, where the conditions are appropriate, such as 
diplomatic protection or the intercession of a protecting state. Moreover, although it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to deepen the topic of the responsibility of an international organization 
in international law, I am of the opinion that that avenue should be further explored, and that it 
might turn out to be useful in ensuring respect of the right to liberty of the accused before the 
ICC. 
 
The main values of this analysis are twofold. On the one hand, and in contrast to the 
interpretations offered by the ICC judges, it provides clear legal reasoning regarding the 
applicability of IHRL and a definition of the right to liberty illustrating the possibility of finding a 
ius commune in IHRL. On the other hand, it deconstructs the growing point of view shared by 
numerous scholars according to which IHRL cannot apply as such to international criminal 
proceedings. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that, at least for the right to liberty, it can be 
strictly applied so that, as for other human rights, it would be also useful to question this 
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assumption. It has also been shown that the fact that the ICC and its member states have proven 
unwilling to accept such strict application does not reduce their legal obligation to respect the 
rights they have committed themselves to upholding. Indeed, the ICC has a legal obligation to 
act, and the application of IHRL to international criminal proceedings comes with the crucial 
implication that its enforcement mechanisms can be applied and that independently of the likely 
result, they could at least be activated. It is important to stress that, before the ICC, there is 
already one acquittal after 22 months of pre-trial detention 907  and 38 months of detention 
pending trial and one case of declining to confirm the charges after 14 months in detention 
without compensation.908 Therefore, I would advocate, in concordance with the Ôinternational 
expert framework on international criminal procedure lawÕ, that the obligation to respect the right 
to liberty should be inserted into the ICC rules since Ôit would serve to demonstrate the [ICC]Õs 
strong adherence to this right and also function as a safety net in case there are gaps in the 
[ICC]Õs positive lawÕ.909  
 
In conclusion, if this analysis corroborates the statement of the then Judge Tulkens that 
Ôissues of Òdtentions prventivesÓ are among the most problematic ones in so far as application 
of human rights in international criminal proceedings is concernedÕ,910 it also demonstrates that 
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71412/01), 2 May 2007  
¥ ECtHR, Judgment, Govorushko v. Russia (App. No. 42940/06), 25 October 2007  
¥ ECtHR, Judgment, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey (App. No. 34503/97), 12 November 2008   
¥ ECtHR, Judgment, Kauczor v. Poland (App. No. 45219/06), 3 February 2009  
¥ ECtHR, Judgment, Bykov v. Russia (App. No. 4378/02), 10 March 2009  
¥ ECtHR, Judgment, Aleksandr Makarov v. Russia (App. No. 15217/07), 12 March 2009  
¥ ECtHR, Decision, Stanislav Galic v. the Netherlands (App. No. 22617/07), 9 June 2009  
¥ ECtHR, Decision, Vidoje Blagojevic v. the Netherlands (App. No. 49032/07), 9 June 2009  
¥ ECtHR, Judgment, Ivan Atanasov v. Bulgaria (App. No. 12853), 2 December 2010  
¥ ECtHR, Judgment, Cudak v. Lithuania (App. No. 15869/02), 23 March 2010   
¥ ECtHR, Judgment, Medvedyev and others v. France (App. No. 3394/03), 29 March 2010  
¥ ECtHR, Judgment, Case of Bernobic v. Croatia (App. No. 57180/09), 21 June 2011  
¥ ECtHR, Judgment, Al-Skeini and others v. the United Kingdom (App. No. 55721/07), 7 July 
2011  
¥ ECtHR, Decision, Bde Djokaba Lambi Longa v. the Netherlands (App. 33917/12), 9 October 
2012  
¥ ECtHR, Judgment, El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (App. No. 
39630/09), 13 December 2012   
¥ ECtHR, Judgment, Sopin v. Russia (App. No. 57319/10), 18 December 2012  
¥ ECtHR, Decision, Stichting Mother of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (App. No. 
65542/12), 11 June 2013  
¥ ECtHR, Judgment, Jaloud v. the Netherlands (App. No. 47708/08), 20 November 2014  
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2.4.! Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights 
  
¥ IACmHR, Gimnez v. Argentina (Case No. 11.245), 1 March 1996 
¥ IACmHR, Bronstein and Al. v. Argentina (Case No. 11.205), 11 March 1997  
¥ IACmHR, The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. United States (Case No. 10.675), 13 
March 1997  
¥ IACtHR, Judgment, Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, 17 September 1997  
¥ IACtHR, Judgment, Suarez Rosero v. Ecuador, 17 November 1997  
¥ IACmHR, Coard  v. United States (Case No 109/9), 29 September 1999  
¥ IACtHR, Judgment, Constitutional court v. Peru, 31 January 2001   
¥ IACtHR, Judgment, Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, 31 August 2004   
¥ IACtHR, Judgment, The ÇJuvenile Reeducation InstituteÈ v. Paraguay, 2 September 2004  
¥ IACtHR, Judgment, Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, 6 May 2008  
¥ IACtHR, Judgment, Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, 12 August 2008  
¥ IACtHR, Judgment, Bayarri v. Argentina, 30 October 2008  
 
2.5.! African Commission on Human and PeoplesÕ Rights 
 
¥ AfCmHR, Constitutional Rights Project and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, (Comm. No. 
102/93), 1998  
¥ AfCmHPR, Article 19 v. Eritrea (Comm. No. 275/2003), 16-30 May 2007  
¥ AfCmHR, Shumba v. Zimbabwe (Comm. No. 288/2004), 2012   
¥ AfCmHR, Jawara v. Gambia (Comm. Nos. 147/95 and 149/96), 2010  
¥ AfCmHR, Civil Liberties Organization (in respect of Nigeria Bar Association) v. Nigeria (Comm. 
No. 101/93), 1995  
 
2.6.! International Criminal Court 
 
2.6.1. The Uganda cases 
 
¥ Warrant of Arrest for Vincent Otti, Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05, PTCII, ICC, 8 July 
2005  
230 
¥ Warrant of Arrest for Okot Odhiambo, Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05, PTCII, ICC, 8 
July 2005  
¥ Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen, Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05, PTCII, ICC, 8 
July 2005  
¥ Warrant of Arrest for Raska Lukwiya, Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05, PTCII, ICC, 8 July 
2005  
¥ Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8 July 2005 as amended on 27 September 2005, 
Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05, PTCII, ICC, 27 September 2005  
¥ Decison on the Ç Defence Request for the Interim Release of Dominic Ongwen È, Prosecutor 
v. Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, PTCII, ICC, 27 November 2015  
 
2.6.2 Situation in the DRC 
 
¥ Dcision sur les demandes de participation  la procdure de VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, 
VPRS 5et VPRS 6, Situation in the DRC, ICC-01/04, PTCI, ICC, 17 January 2006  
¥ Judgment on the ProsecutorÕs Application of Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber IÕs 31 
March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, Situation in the DRC, ICC-01/04, AC, ICC, 13 
July 2006  
 
2.6.3.  The Lubanga case 
 
¥ Decision on the ProsecutorÕs Application for a warrant of arrest, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 10 February 2006  
¥ Order on the application for release, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
PTCI, ICC, 29 May 2006  
¥ Submissions relative to the Order of 29.5.2006, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 31 May 2006  
¥ Decision on the application for the interim release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 18 October 2006  
¥ Decision on the Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 8 November 2006  
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¥ Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence 
Challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute of 3 October 
2006, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, AC, ICC, 14 December 2006  
¥ Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, PTCI, ICC, 27 January 2007  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I entitled ÒDcision sur la demande de mise en libert provisoire de Thomas Lubanga 
DyiloÓ, dissenting opinion of Judge Pikis, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/06, AC, ICC, 13 February 2007  
¥ Review of the ÒDecision on the application for the interim release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, 14 February 2007  
¥ Second review of the ÒDecision on the application for the interim release of Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 11 June 2007  
¥ Decision reviewing the ÒDecision on the application for the interim release of Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, TCI, ICC, 9 October 2007  
¥ Decision regarding the Practices Used to Prepare and Familiarise Witnesses for Giving 
Testimony at Trial, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 30 
November 2007  
¥ Decision on victims' participation, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
PTCI, ICC, 18 January 2008  
¥ Decision reviewing the Trial ChamberÕs ruling on the detention of Thomas Lubango Dyilo in 
accordance with Rule 118-2, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, TCI, 
ICC, 31 January 2008  
¥ Decision reviewing the Trial ChamberÕs ruling on the detention of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo in 
accordance with Rule 118(2), Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, TCI, 
ICC, 29 May 2008 
¥ Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled 
ÒDecision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 
54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with 
certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008Ó, Prosecutor v. Lubanga 
Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, AC, ICC, 21 October 2008  
¥ Decision on the applications by victims to participate in the proceedings, Prosecutor v. Lubanga 
Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, PTCI, ICC, 15 December 2008  
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¥ Judgment, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, TCI, ICC, 14 March 2012 
 
2.6.4. The Katanga case 
 
¥ Decision on the evidence and information provided by the Prosecution for the issuance of a 
warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07, PTCI, ICC, 6 July 2007  
¥ Decision on the Joinder of the Cases against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-
01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 10 March 2008  
¥ Decision on the powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber to review proprio motu the pretrial detention 
of Germain Katanga, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 18 March 2008  
¥ Defence observations relative to Germain KatangaÕs pre-trial detention, Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-
01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 1 April 2008  
¥ Decision on the conditions of the pre-trial detention of Germain Katanga, Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and 
ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 21 April 2008  
¥ Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial 
Stage of the Case, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 13 May 2008  
¥ Review of the Òdecision on the conditions of the pre-trial detention of Germain KatangaÓ, 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-
01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 18 August 2008  
¥ Second Review of the Decision on the conditions of Detention of Germain Katanga, Prosecutor 
v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and 
ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 12 December 2008  
¥ Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Germain Katanga, pursuant 
to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 11 March 2009  
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¥ Troisime examen de la decision sur les conditions du maintien en detention de Germain 
Katanga, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. 
ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 16 April 2009  
¥ Fourth review of the Pre-Trial ChamberÕs Decision Concerning the Pre-Trial Detention of 
Germain Katanga pursuant to rule 118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and 
ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 21 July 2009  
¥ Fifth review of the Pre-Trial ChamberÕs decision concerning the pre-trial detention of Germain 
Katanga pursuant to rule 118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-
01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 20 November 2009  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Katanga against the decision of Trial Chamber II of 20 November 
2009 entitled ÒDecision on the motion of the defence for Germain Katanga for a declaration on 
unlawful detention and stay of proceedingsÓ, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, AC, ICC, 19 July 
2010  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Katanga against the decision of Trial Chamber II of 20 November 
2009 entitled ÒDecision on the motion of the defence for Germain Katanga for a declaration on 
unlawful detention and stay of proceedingsÓ, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, AC, ICC, 7 
December 2010  
¥ Decision on an Amicus Curiae application and on the ÒRequte tendant  obtenir prsentations 
des tmoins DRC-D02-P-0350, DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 aux autorits 
nerlandaises aux fins dÕasileÓ (articles 68 and 93(7) of the Statute), Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-
01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 9 June 2011  
¥ Decision on the security situation of three detained witnesses in relation to their testimony before 
the Court (Art. 68 of the Statute) and Order to request cooperation from the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo to provide assistance in ensuring their protection in accordance with 
Article 93(l)(j) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 22 June 2011  
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¥ Decision on the Security Situation of witnesses DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 and DRC-
D02-P-0350, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases 
No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 24 August 2011  
¥ Amicus Curiae Observations by mr. Schller and mr. Sluiter, Counsel in Dutch asylum 
proceedings of witnesses DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 and DRC-D02-P-0350, 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 14 March 2013  
¥ Dcision relative  la demande de mise en libert des tmoins dtenus DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-
D02-P-0228 et DRC-D02-P-0350, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, 
TCII, ICC, 1 October 2013  
¥ Order on the implementation of the cooperation agreement between the Court and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo concluded pursuant article 93 (7) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and 
ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 20 January 2014  
¥ Jugement rendu en application de lÕarticle 74 du Statut, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 7 March 2014  
¥ Dcision relative  la peine (article 76 du Statut), Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 23 May 2014  
 
2.6.5. The Ngudjolo case 
 
¥ The United Kingdom for Ngudjolo, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 22 February 
2008  
¥ France for Ngudjolo, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 25 February 2008  
¥ The NetherlandÕs observations, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 27 February 
2008  
¥ Observations of States, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 22, 25, 27, 28 February 
2008  
¥ Belgium for Ngudjolo, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 28 February 2008  
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¥ Decision on the application for interim release of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and 
ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 27 March 2008  
¥ Judgment in the Appeal by Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui of 27 March 2008 against the Decision of 
Pre-Trial Chamber 1 on the Application of the Appellant for Interim Release, Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and 
ICC-01/04-01/07, AC, ICC, 9 June 2008  
¥ Review of the decision on the application for interim release of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-
01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, PTCI, ICC, 23 July 2008  
¥ Second review of the decision on the application for interim release of Mathieu Ngudjolo (rule 
118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor 
v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 19 
November 2008  
¥ Decision on ÒMr Mathieu NgudjoloÕs Complaint Under Regulation 221(1) of the Regulations of 
the Registry Against the Registrar's Decision of 18 November 2008Ó, Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-
01/04-01/07, Presidency, ICC, 10 March 2009  
¥ Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Germain Katanga, pursuant 
to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 11 March 2009  
¥ Third review of the decision on the application for interim release of Mathieu Ngudjolo (rule 
118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor 
v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 17 
March 2009  
¥ Fourth review of the decision on the application for interim release of Mathieu Ngudjolo (rule 
118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor 
v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 10 
July 2009  
¥ Fifth review of the decision on the application for interim release of Mathieu Ngudjolo (rule 
118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor 
v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 4 
November 2009  
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¥ Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 18 December 2012  
¥ Decision on Mr NgudjoloÕs request to order the Victims and Witnesses Unit to execute and the 
Host State to comply with the acquittal judgment of 18 December 2012 issued by Trial Chamber 
II of the International Criminal Court, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Prosecutor v. 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Cases No. ICC-01/04-01/07 and ICC-01/04-01/07, TCII, ICC, 12 June 
2013  
¥ Judgment on the ProsecutorÕs appeal against the decision of Trial Chamber II entitled ÒJudgment 
pursuant to article 74 of the StatuteÓ, Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07, AC, ICC, 7 April 2015  
 
2.6.6. The Ntaganda case 
 
¥ Warrant of arrest, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, PTCI, ICC, 22 
August 2006 
¥ Decision on the ProsecutorÕs Application under Article 58, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-02/06, PTCII, ICC, 13 July 2012  
¥  Decision on the DefenceÕs Application for Interim Release, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-02/06, PTCII, ICC, 18 November 2013  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Bosco Ntaganda against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 
18 November 2013 entitled ÒDecision on the Defence's Application for Interim ReleaseÓ, 
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, AC, ICC, 5 March 2014  
¥ Second Decision on Bosco NtagandaÕs Interim Release, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-02/06, PTCII, ICC, 17 March 2014  
¥ Third Decision on Bosco NtagandaÕs Interim Release, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-02/06, PTCII, ICC, 17 July 2014  
¥ Fourth decision on Mr NtagandaÕs interim release, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-
01/04-02/06, TCVI, ICC, 31 October 2014  
¥ Fifth decision on Mr NtagandaÕs interim release, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-





2.6.7. The Mbarushimana case 
 
¥ Decision on the ProsecutorÕs Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Callixte Mbarushimana, 
Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, PTCI, ICC, 28 September 
2010  
¥ Decision on the Ôdefence request for interim releaseÕ, Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/10, PTCI, ICC, 19 May 2011  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Callixte Mbarushimana against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 
19 May 2011 entitled ÒDecision on the Ôdefence request for interim releaseÕÓ, Prosecutor v. 
Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, AC, ICC, 14 July 2011  
¥ Decision on Òsecond defence request for interim releaseÓ, Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, PTCI, ICC, 28 July 2011  
¥ Review of detention and decision on the Òthird defence request for interim releaseÓ, Prosecutor 
v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, PTCI, ICC, 16 September 2011  
¥ Decision on the confirmation of charges, Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/10, PTCI, ICC, 16 December 2011  
 
2.6.8. The Mudacumura case 
 
¥ Decision on the ProsecutorÕs Application under Article 58, Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Mudacumura, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/12, PTCII, ICC, 13 July 2012  
 
2.6.9. The Bemba case 
 
¥ Dcision relative  la Requte du Procureur aux fins de dlivrance dÕun mandat dÕarrt  
lÕencontre de Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/08, PTCIII, ICC, 10 June 2008  
¥ Application for interim release, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-
01/08, PTCII, ICC, 23 July 2008  
¥ Decision on application for interim release, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/08, PTCIII, ICC, 21 August 2008  
¥ Fourth Decision on VictimsÕ Participation, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/08, PTCIII, ICC, 12 December 2008  
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¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber III entitled ÒDecision on application for interim releaseÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 16 December 2008  
¥ Decision on application for interim release, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/08, PTCIII, ICC, 16 December 2008  
¥ Decision on application for interim release, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/08, PTCII, ICC, 14 April 2009  
¥ Decision on the DefenceÕs urgent request concerning Mr. Jean-Pierre BembaÕs attendance of his 
fatherÕs funeral, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, PTCII, 
ICC, 4 July 2009  
¥ Decision on the interim release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and convening hearings with the 
Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Italian Republic, and the Republic of South Africa, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, PTCII, ICC, 14 August 2009  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of the prosecutor against Pre-Trial Chamber IIÕs ÒDecision on the 
interim release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and convening hearings with the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Italian Republic, and the Republic of South Africa, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 2 December 2009  
¥ Dcision relative au rexamen de la dtention de Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo conformment  la 
Rgle 118(2) du Rglement de Procdure et de preuve, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, TCIII, ICC, 1 April 2010  
¥ Decision on the review of detention of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo pursuant to Rule 118(2) 
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/08, TCIII, ICC, 28 July 2010  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber 
III of 28 July 2010 entitled ÒDecision on the review of the detention of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo pursuant to Rule 118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and EvidenceÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 19 November 2010  
¥ Decision on the defence request for Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba to attend his stepmotherÕs funeral, 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, TCIII, ICC, 12 January 
2011  
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¥ Decision on applications for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case 
No. ICC-01/05-01/08, TCIII, ICC, 16 August 2011  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber 
III of 27 June 2011 entitled ÒDecision on applications for provisional releaseÓ, Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 19 August 2011  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber 
III of 27 June 2011 entitled ÒDecision on applications for provisional releaseÓ, Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 12 September 2011  
¥ Decision on the accusedÕs application for provisional release in light of the Appeals ChamberÕs 
judgment of 19 August 2011, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-
01/08, AC, ICC, 27 September 2011  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber 
III of 26 September 2011 entitled ÒDecision on the accusedÕs application for provisional release 
in light of the Appeals ChamberÕs judgment of 19 August 2011Ó, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 15 December 2011  
¥ Decision on the ÔRequte de mise en libert provisoire de M. Jean-Pierre Bemba GomboÓ, 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, TCIII, ICC, 3 January 
2012  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber 
III of 6 January 2012 entitled ÒDecision on the defenceÕs 28 December 2011 ÔRequte de mise en 
libert provisoire de M. Jean-Pierre Bemba GomboÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 5 March 2012  
¥ Defence Request to Trial Chamber to request [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] for their 
submissions regarding the potential provisional release of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba, Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, TCIII, ICC, 9 June 2014  
¥ Decision on defence request for observations regarding the potential provisional release of Mr 
Jean-Pierre Bemba, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 
TCIII, ICC, 11 June 2014  
¥ Decision on ÒDefence Urgent Motion for Provisional ReleaseÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, TCIII, ICC, 23 December 2014  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber 
III of 23 December 2014 entitled ÒDecision on ÔDefence Urgent Motion for Provisional 
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ReleaseÕÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, AC, ICC, 20 
May 2015  
¥ Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/08, TCIII, ICC, 21 March 2016. 
 
2.6.10.!The case against Bemba, Kilolo, Mangenda, Babala and Arido 
 
¥ Warrants of arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and 
Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 20 November 2013  
¥ Warrants of arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and 
Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 28 November 2013  
¥ Decision on the ÒDemande de mise en libert provisoire de Matre Aim Kilolo MusambaÓ, 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda 
Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 
14 March 2014  
¥ Decision on the ÒRequte urgente de la Dfense sollicitant la mise en libert provisoire de 
monsieur Fidle Babala WanduÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo 
Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 14 March 2014  
¥ Decision on the ÒRequte de mise en libertÓ submitted by the Defence for Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, 
PTCII, ICC, 17 March 2014  
¥ Dcision sur la ÒRequte de la Dfense sollicitant de la Chambre prliminaire II une nouvelle et 
urgente approche des autorits congolaises comptentes en vue d'obtenir une position prcise et 
non-quivoque relativement  l'accueil de M. Fidle BabalaÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and 
Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 5 June 2014  
¥ Decision requesting observations on the ÒNarcisse AridoÕs request for interim releaseÓ, 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda 
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Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 
12 June 2014  
¥ Order requesting observations for the purposes of the periodic review of the state of detention 
of Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo and Fidle Babala Wandu pursuant 
to rule 118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse 
Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 13 June 2014  
¥ Narcisse AridoÕs Request for Interim Release filed on 10 June 2014, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu 
and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 17 June 2014  
¥ Observations de la Dfense de monsieur Fidle Babala Wandu  ÒOrder requesting observations 
for the purposes of the periodic review of the state of the detention of Aim Kilolo Musamba, 
Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo and Fidle Babala WanduÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and 
Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 30 June 2014  
¥ Decision on the first review of Fidle Babala WanduÕs detention pursuant to article 60(3) of the 
Statute, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, 
PTCII, ICC, 4 July 2014  
¥ Decision requesting the Kingdom of Belgium to provide its views for the purposes of the review 
of Aim Kilolo MusambaÕs and Jean-Jacques MangendaÕs detention pursuant to article 60(3) of 
the Statute, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, 
PTCII, ICC, 4 July 2014  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II of 17 March 2014 entitled ÒDecision on the 'Requte de mise en libert' submitted 
by the Defence for Jean-Jacques MangendaÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim 
Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, 
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, AC, ICC, 11 July 2014  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Fidele Babala Wandu against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II 
of 14 March 2014 entitled ÒDecision on the ÔRequte urgente de la Defense sollicitant la mise en 
liberte provisoire de monsieur Fidele Babala WanduÕÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse 
Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, AC, ICC, 11 July 2014   
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¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Aim Kilolo Musamba against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber 
II of 14 March 2014 entitled ÒDecision on the ÔDemande de mise en libert provisoire de Matre 
Aim Kilolo MusambaÕÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-
Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-
01/13, AC, ICC, 11 July 2014  
¥ Decision on ÒNarcisse Arido's request for interim releaseÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and 
Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 24 July 2014  
¥ Decision on the first review of Jean-Jacques Mangenda KabongoÕs detention pursuant to article 
60(3) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-
Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-
01/13, PTCII, ICC, 5 August 2014  
¥ Decision on the first review of Aim Kilolo MusambaÕs detention pursuant to article 60(3) of the 
Statute, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, 
PTCII, ICC, 5 August 2014  
¥ Requte URGENTE de la Dfense sollicitant de la Chambre prliminaire lÕapproche des 
autorits comptentes de la Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo aux fins de connatre les 
motivations juridiques du refus de lÕapplication  M. Fidle Babala Wandu des dispositions 
constitutionnelles et legislatives en vigueur relativement  son accueil dans son pays en cas de lise 
en libert provisoire, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-
Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-
01/13, PTCII, ICC, 15 September 2014  
¥ Decision requesting observations from States for the purposes of the review of the detention of 
the suspects pursuant to regulation 51 of the Regulations of the Court, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu 
and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 26 September 2014  
¥ Rponse de la Dfense  la ÒDecision requesting observations from States for the purposes of 
the review of the detention of the suspects pursuant to regulation 51 of the Regulations of the 
CourtÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, 
PTCII, ICC, 26 September 2014  
¥ Transmission of the observations submitted by the Belgian, Dutch, French, Congolese and 
British authorities on the ÒDecision requesting observations from States for the purpose of the 
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review of the detention of the suspects pursuant to regulation 51Ó, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu 
and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 10 October 2014  
¥ Decision ordering the release of Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, 
Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo 
Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. 
ICC-01/05-01/13, AC, ICC, 21 October 2014  
¥ Transmission of the observations submitted by the Dutch and French authorities on the ÒOrder 
to consult with the authorities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and French RepublicÓ, 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda 
Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 
21 October 2014  
¥ Urgent Submission of the Authorities of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques 
Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, 
PTCII, ICC, 22 October 2014  
¥ Decision on ÒMr BembaÕs Request for Provisional ReleaseÓ, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and 
Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, PTCII, ICC, 23 January 2015  
¥ Request for Compensation for Unlawful Detention, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle Babala Wandu and Narcisse 
Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, Presidency, ICC, 1 May 2015  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 23 
January 2015 entitled "Decision on ÔMr BembaÕs Request for Provisional ReleaseÕ", Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aim Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidle 
Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, AC, ICC, 29 May 2015  
 
2.6.11.  The Ahmad Harun and the Ali Kushayb case 
 
¥ Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Ahmad 
Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, PTCI, 
ICC, 27 April 2007  
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¥ Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Ahmad 
Muhammad Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, PTCI, 
ICC, 27 September 2008  
 
2.6.13. The Al Bashir case 
 
¥ Decision on the ProsecutionÕs Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad 
Al Bashir, Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, PTCI, 
ICC, 4 March 2009  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the ÒDecision on the ProsecutionÕs Application 
for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al BashirÓ, Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan 




2.6.14. The Abu Garda case 
 
¥ Summons to Appear for Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-
02/05-02/09, PTCI, ICC, 7 May 2009  
¥ Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-
02/09, PTCI, ICC, 8 February 2010  
¥ Decision on the ÒProsecutionÕs Application for Leave to Appeal the 'Decision on the 
Confirmation of ChargesÕÓ, Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09, PTCI, 
ICC, 23 April 2010  
 
2.6.15.!The Nourain and Jamus case 
 
¥ Warrant of Arrest for Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer 
Nourain, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, TCIV, ICC, 11 September 2014  
¥ Second Decision on the ProsecutorÕs Application under Article 58, Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda 
Abakaer Nourain, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, PTCI, ICC, 11 September 2014 
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain against Trial Chamber IVÕs 
issuance of a warrant of arrest, Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, Case No. ICC-
02/05-03/09, AC, ICC, 3 March 2015  
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2.6.16. The Hussein case 
 
¥ Decision on the ProsecutorÕs application under article 58 relating to Abdel Raheem Muhammad 
Hussein, Prosecutor v. Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, ICC-02/05-01/12, PTCI, ICC, 1 
March 2012  
 
2.6.17. The Laurent Gbagbo case 
 
¥ Decision on the ProsecutorÕs Application Pursuant to Article 58 for a warrant of arrest against 
Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, PTCIII, 
ICC, 30 November 2011  
¥ Decision on the ÔRequte de la Dfense demandant la mise en libert provisoire du prsident 
GbagboÕ, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, PTCI, ICC, 13 July 2012  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Laurent Koudou Gbagbo against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I of 13 July 2012 entitled ÒDecision on the ÔRequte de la Dfense demandant la mise 
en libert provisoire du prsident GbagboÕÓ, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-
02/11-01/11, AC, ICC, 26 October 2012  
¥ Decision on the review of Laurent GbagboÕs detention pursuant to article 60(3) of the Rome 
Statute, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, PTCI, ICC, 12 November 
2012  
¥ Decision on the request for the conditional release of Laurent Gbagbo and on his medical 
treatment, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, PTCI, ICC, 18 January 
2013  
¥ Second decision on the review of Laurent GbagboÕs detention pursuant to article 60(3) of the 
Rome Statute, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, PTCI, ICC, 12 March 
2013  
¥ Third decision on the review of Laurent GbagboÕs detention pursuant to article 60(3) of the 
Rome Statute, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, PTCI, ICC, 11 July 
2013  
¥ Judgment on the appeal of Mr Laurent Gbagbo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 
July 2013 entitled ÒThird decision on the review of Laurent Gbagbo's detention pursuant to 
article 60(3) of the Rome StatuteÓ, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, 
AC, ICC, 29 October 2013  
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¥ Fourth decision on the review of Laurent GbagboÕs detention pursuant to article 60(3) of the 
Rome Statute, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, PTCI, ICC, 11 
November 2013  
¥ Fifth decision on the review of Laurent GbagboÕs detention pursuant to article 60(3) of the Rome 
Statute, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, PTCI, ICC, 12 March 2014  
¥ Sixth decision on the review of Laurent GbagboÕs detention pursuant to article 60(3) of the 
Rome Statute, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, PTCI, ICC, 11 July 
2014  
¥ Decision on the urgent request of the Defence for Mr Gbagbo to attend his motherÕs funeral, 
Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, TCI, ICC, 29 October 2014  
¥ Seventh decision on the review of Mr Laurent GbagboÕs detention pursuant to Article 60(3) of 
the Statute, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, TCI, ICC, 11 November 
2014  
¥ Eighth decision on the review of Mr Laurent GbagboÕs detention pursuant to Article 60(3) of the 
Statute, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, TCI, ICC, 11 March 2015  
¥ Ninth decision on the review of Mr Laurent GbagboÕs detention pursuant to Article 60(3) of the 
Statute, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, TCI, ICC, 8 July 2015  
¥ Judgment on the appel of Mr Laurent Gbagbo against the decision of Trial Chamber I of 8 July 
2015 entitled ÒNinth decision on the review of Mr Laurent GbagboÕs detention pursuant to 
Article 60(3) of the StatuteÓ, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Bl Goud, Case No. 
ICC-02/11-01/11, AC, ICC, 8 September 2015  
¥ Tenth decision on the review of Mr Laurent GbagboÕs detention pursuant to Article 60(3) of the 
Statute, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and v. Charles Bl Goud, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, 
TCI, ICC, 2 November 2015  
 
2.6.18. The Simone Gbagbo case 
 
¥ Decision on the ProsecutorÕs Application Pursuant to Article 58 for a warrant of arrest against 






2.6.19. The Bl case 
 
¥ Decision on the ProsecutorÕs Application Pursuant to Article 58 for a warrant of arrest against 
Charles Bl Goud, Prosecutor v. Charles Bl Goud, ICC-02/11-02/11, PTCIII, ICC, 6 January 
2012  
 
2.6.20. The Kenya cases 
 
¥ Decision on the ProsecutorÕs Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, 
Henri Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua 
Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11, PTCII, ICC, 8 March 2011  
¥ Decision on the ProsecutorÕs Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, PTCII, ICC, 8 March 2011  
¥ Decision on variation of summons conditions, Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta & Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11, PTCII, ICC, 4 April 2011  
¥ Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute, 2 Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11, PTCII, 
ICC, 3 January 2012  
¥ Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute, Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, PTCII, ICC, 23 January 2012  
¥ Decision on the withdrawal of charges against Mr Kenyatta, Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, TCV, ICC, 13 March 2015 
 
2.6.21. The Libya cases 
 
¥ Decision on the ÒProsecutorÕs Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed 
Abu Minyar GADDAFI, Saif Al-Islam GADDAFI and Abdullah AL-SENUSSIÓ, Prosecutor v. 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11, PTCI, ICC, 27 June 2011  
  
2.7.! International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 
 
¥ Decision on the Motion of the Defence Seeking Modification to the Conditions of Detention of 
Tihomir Blaskic, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, President, ICTY, 3 April 1996  
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¥ Decision Rejecting the Application to Withdraw the Indictment and Order for Provisional 
Release, Prosecutor v. Dorde Dukic, Case No. 1T-96-20-T, TC, ICTY, 24 April 1996  
¥ Transcript, Prosecutor v. Dukic, Case No. IT-96-20, TC, ICTY, 24 April 1996  
¥ Decision on motion for provisional release filed by the accused Zejnil Delalic, Prosecutor v. 
Mucic et al., Case No. IT-96-21, TC, ICTY, 25 September 1996  
¥ Decision on Provisional Release of the Accused, Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case No. IT-95-9-PT, 
TC, ICTY, 26 March 1998  
¥ Decision on the Motion of Defense Counsel for Drago Josipovic, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., 
Case No. IT-95-16-T, TC, ICTY, 6 May 1999  
¥ Order on Motion of the Accused Mario Cerkez for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Kordic & 
Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, TC, ICTY, 14 September 1999  
¥ Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No.  IT-95-16-T, TC, ICTY, 14 January 2000    
¥ Decision on Miroslav TadicÕs application for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case 
No. IT-95-9, TC, ICTY, 4 April 2000  
¥ Decision on Milan SimicÕs application for provisional release Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Case No. 
IT-95-9, TC, ICTY, 29 May 2000  
¥ Decision on Motion by Radsilav Brdanin for Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin 
and Momir Talic, Case No. IT-99-36, TCII, ICTY, 25 July 2000  
¥ Decision on Momcilo KrajisnikÕs notice of motion for provisional release, Prosecutor v. 
Momcilo Krajisnic, Case No. IT-00-39, TC, ICTY, 8 October 2001  
¥ Decision on request for pre-trial provisional release, Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48, 
TC, ICTY, 13 December 2001  
¥ Decision granting provisional release to Amir Kubura, Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic & Kubura, 
Case No. IT-01-47, TC, ICTY, 19 December 2001  
¥ Decision granting provisional release to Enver Hadzihasanovic, Prosecutor v. Hadzhasanovic & 
Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47, TC, ICTY, 19 December 2001  
¥ Order on motion for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78, TC, 
ICTY, 20 February 2002  
¥ Order on Miodrag JokicÕs motion for provisional release, Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-
42/1, TC, ICTY, 20 February 2002  
¥ Decision on Request for Provisional Release of Accused Jokic, Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic, 
Dragan Obrenovic, Dragan Jokic, Case No. IT-02-53-PT, TCII, ICTY, 28 March 2002  
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¥ Decision on Provisional Release, Prosecutor v. Mrđa, Case No. IT-02-59-PT, TC, ICTY, 15 April 
2002  
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September 2007 
¥ Provisional Detention Order, Prosecutor v. Thirit Ieng, Case No. 002, OCOIJ, ECCC, 14 
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2.11.! Domestic cases: The Netherlands 
 
¥ Raad van State, 201111623/1/V3 
¥ Raad van State, 201405219/1/V1 
¥ Rechtbank Kuijt, Kort Geding, KG 03/137 
¥ Rechtbank Ôs-Gravenhage, Kort Geding, 424426  




¥ Acquaviva G., ÔHuman Rights Violations before International Tribunals: Reflections on 
Responsibility of International OrganizationsÕ (2007)20(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 613-
636  
¥ Addo M., The Legal Nature of International Human Rights (Martinus Nijfhoff, 2010)  
¥ Akande D., ÔSources of International Criminal LawÕ in Cassese A. (ed.), The Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice (OUP, 2009)  
¥ Ahlborn C., ÔTo Share or Not to Share? The Allocation of Responsibility between International 
Organizations and their Member StatesÕ (2013)28 SHARES Research Paper available at 
http://www.sharesproject.nl/publication/to-share-or-not-to-share-the-allocation-of-
254 
responsibility-between-international-organizations-and-their-member-states/ (last accessed 21 
March 2015)  
¥ Appazov A., ÔAnalysis of Decisions on Interim Release at the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)Õ in Klip A. and Freeland S. (eds.), Annotated Leading Cases of 
International Criminal Tribunals (Vol. 43) (Intersentia, 2015)  
¥ Arai-Takahashi Y., ÔFair Trial Guarantees in Occupied Territory Ð The Interplay between 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights LawÕ in Arnold R. and Qunivet N., 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law. Towards a New Merger in International Law 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 449-474  
¥ Arai-Takahashi Y., The Law of Occupation (Brill, 2009)  
¥ Arajrvi N., ÔIs There a Need for a New Sources Theory in International Law? A Proposal for an 
Inclusive Positivist ModelÕ (2012)106 American Society International Law Proceedings 370-373  
¥ Ashworth A., ÔFour threats to the presumption of innocenceÕ (2006)10 International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 241-279  
¥ dÕAspremont J. and Brlmann C., ÔChallenging International Criminal Tribunals before Domestic 
CourtsÕ in Reinisch A., Challenges of Acts of International Organizations before National Courts (OUP, 
2010) 111-136  
¥ Bailey S., ÔArticle 21(3) of the Rome Statute: A Plea for ClarityÕ (2014)14 International Criminal Law 
Review 513-550 
¥ Bassiouni M. C., ÔA Functional Approach to ÒGeneral Principles of International LawÓÕ (1989-
1990)11 Michigan Journal of International Law 768-818  
¥ Bassiouni M. C., The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court Statute (Transnational 
Publishers, 2005)  
¥ Bassiouni M. C., Introduction to International Criminal Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2013, 2nd Edition)  
¥ Beckett J. A., ÔRebel Without a Cause? Martti Koskenniemi and the Critique Legal ProjectÕ 
(2006)7(12) German Law Journal  1045-1088 
¥ Bekou O. and Cryer  R., ÔThe International Criminal Court and Universal Jurisdiction: A Close 
Encounter?Õ (2007)56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49-68  
¥ Bekou O. and Birkett D. (eds.), Cooperation and the International Criminal Court. Perspectives from Theory 
and Practice (Brill, 2016) 
¥ Beresford S., ÔRedressing the Wrongs of the International Justice System: Compensation for 
Persons Erroneously Detained, Prosecuted, or Convicted by the Ad Hoc TribunalsÕ (2002)96(3) 
The American Journal of International Law 628-646  
255 
¥ Bergsmo M., Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden. Essays in Honour of Asbjom Eide 
(Martinus Nijoff, 2003)  
¥ Bertrand A-A. and Schauder N., ÔPractical Cooperation Challenge Faced by the Registry of the 
International Criminal CourtÕ in Bekou O. and Birkett D. (eds.), Cooperation and the International 
Criminal Court. Perspectives from Theory and Practice (Brill, 2016) 152-184 
¥ Besson S., ÔThe Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human 
Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts toÕ (2012)25(4) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 857-884  
¥ Bevers H., Blokker N. and Roording J., ÔThe Netherlands and the International Criminal Court: 
On Statute Obligations and HospitalityÕ (2003)16(1) Leiden Journal of International Law 135-156  
¥ Bitti G., ÔArticle 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the treatment of 
sources of law in the jurisprudence of the ICCÕ in Stahn C. and Sluiter G. (eds.), The Emerging 
Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 285-304  
¥ Bjorge E., The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (OUP, 2014)  
¥ Boas G., ÔDevelopments in the Law of Procedure and Evidence at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal CourtÕ (2001)12(2) Criminal 
Law Forum 137-165  
¥ Boas G. and McCormack T.L.H., ÔLearning the Lessons of the Milošević TrialÕ (2006)9 Yearbook 
of International Humanitarian Law 65-86  
¥ Bodnar A., ÔRes Interpretata: Legal Effect of the European Court of Human RightsÕ Judgments 
for Other States Than Those Which Were Party to the ProceedingsÕ in Haeck Y. and Brems 
E.  (eds.), Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the 21st Century (Springer, 2014) 223-262 
¥ Bosco D., Rough Justice: the International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics (OUP, 2014) 
¥ Brown Weiss E., ÔInvoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-first CenturyÕ (2002)96 American 
Journal of International Law 798-816  
¥ Brownlie I., Principles of Public International Law (OUP, 2008, 7th edition)  
¥ Bufalini A., ÔInternational Law in the Interpretation of the ICC StatuteÕ (2015) The Law and 
Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 233-254  
¥ Cabranes J., ÔCustomary International Law: What It Is and What It Is NotÕ (2011)22 Duke Journal 
of Comparative and International Law 143-152  
¥ Caianiello M., ÔModels of Judicial Cooperation with Ad Hoc Tribunals and with the Permanent 
International Criminal Court in EuropeÕ in Ruggeri S. (ed.), Transnational Inquiries and the Protection 
of Fundamental Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Springer, 2013) 111-123  
256 
¥ Cassese A., ÔThe Influence of the European Court of Human Rights on International Criminal 
Tribunals Ð Some Methodological RemarksÕ in Bergsmo M. (ed.), Human Rights for the Downtrodden: 
Essays in Honour of Asbiorn Eide (Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) 19-52  
¥ Chatzivassiliou D., ÔThe guarantees of judicial control with respect to deprivation of liberty under 
Article 5 of the European Convention of human rights: An overview of the Strasbourg case-lawÕ 
(2004)5(4) ERA- Forum 499-519  
¥ Chaumont C. M., ÔLa signification du principe de spcialit des organisations internationalesÕ in 
Baugniet J. (ed.), Mlanges offerts  Henri Rolin. Problmes de droit des gens (Pedone, 1964)  
¥ Chodosh H. E., ÔNeither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International LawÕ 
(1991)26 Texas International Law Journal 87-124  
¥ Ciampi A., ÔLegal Rules, Policcy Choices and Political Realities in the Functioning of the 
Cooperation Regime of the International Criminal CourtÕ in Bekou O. and Birkett D. (eds.), 
Cooperation and the International Criminal Court. Perspectives from Theory and Practice (Brill, 2016) 7-57 
¥ Clapham A., Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP, 2006)  
¥ Cohen H. G., ÔFinding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of SourcesÕ (2007)93 Iowa Law 
Review 65-129  
¥ Cohen H. G., ÔFrom Fragmentation to ConstitutionalizationÕ, (2012) Scholarly Works. Paper 854, 
available at http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/854 (last accessed 21 March 2015)  
¥ Conte A., ÔHuman Rights Beyond Borders: A New Era in Human Rights Accountability for 
Transnational Counter-Terrorism Operations?Õ (2013) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 1-26  
¥ Coomans F., Grnfeld F. and Kamminga M. T. (eds.), Methods of Human Rights Research 
(Intersentia, 2009)  
¥ Corten O., Mthodologie du droit international public (Editions de lÕULB, 2009)  
¥ Crawford J., The International Law CommissionÕs Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentaries (CUP, 2005)  
¥ Crawford J., BrownlieÕs Principles of Public International Law (OUP, 2012 8th edition) 
¥ Croquet N., ÔThe International Criminal Court and the Treatment of Defence Rights: A Mirror 
of the European Court of Human RightsÕ Jurisprudence?Õ (2011)11(1) Human Rights Law Review 
91-131  
¥ Cryer R., ÔDj vu in International LawÕ (2002)65 The Modern Law Review 931-949 
¥ Cryer R., ÔOf Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the Gavel: The Influence of the International 
Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law StudyÕ (2006)11(2) Journal of Conflict & Security 
Law 239-263  
257 
¥ Cryer R., ÔRoyalism and the King: Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the Politics of SourcesÕ 
(2009)12 New Criminal Law Review 390-405  
¥ Cryer R., ÔNeither Here Nor There? The Status of International Criminal Jurisprudence in the 
International and UK Legal OrdersÕ in Kaikobad K. and Bohlander M. (eds.), International Law 
and Power Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice (Brill, 2009) 183-206  
¥ Cryer R., Hervey T., Sokhi-Bulley B. and Bohm A., Research Methodologies in EU and International 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2011)  
¥ Cryer R., ÔThe philosophy of international criminal lawÕ in A. Orakhelashvili (ed.), Research 
Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (Elgar Publishing, 2011) 232-268 
¥ Cryer R., ÔInternational Criminal Tribunals and the Sources of International Law. Antonio 
CasseseÕs Contribution to the CanonÕ, (2012)10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1045-1061 
¥ Damaska M., ÔThe Competing Visions of Fairness: The Basic Choice for International Criminal 
TribunalsÕ (2010-2011)36 North Carolina journal of international law and commercial regulation 365-388  
¥ Damaska M., ÔReflections on Fairness in International Criminal JusticeÕ (2012)10 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 611-620  
¥ DÕAmato A., ÔHuman Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for Change of 
ParadigmsÕ (1995-1996)25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 47-98  
¥ DÕAmato A., ÔTrashing Customary International LawÕ (1987)81 American Journal of International 
Law 101-109  
¥ David Ohlin J., ÔA Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating the Rule of 
LawÕ (2009)14 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 77-120  
¥ Davidson C. L., ÔNo Shortcuts on Human Rights: Bail and the International Criminal TrialÕ 
(2011)60(1) American University Law Review 1-67   
¥ Davidson C. L., ÔMay It Please the Crowd? Ð The Role of Public Confidence, Public Order and 
Public Opinion in Bail for International Criminal DefendantsÕ (2011) available at 
http://works.bepress.com/caroline_davidson/2/ (last accessed 21 March 2015)  
¥ Davidson A., ÔHuman Rights Protection before the International Criminal Court, Assessing the 
Scope and Application of Article 21(3) of the Rome StatuteÕ (2016)18 International Community Law 
Review 72-101 
¥ de Boer T. and Zieck M., ÔICC Witnesses and Acquitted Suspects Seeking Asylum in the 
Netherlands: An Overview of the Jurisdictional Battles between the ICC and Its Host StateÕ 
(2015) International Journal of Refugee Law 1-34  
258 
¥ De Feyter K., ÔTreaty Interpretation and the Social SciencesÕ in Coomans F., Grnfeld F. and 
Kamminga M. T. (eds.), Methods of Human Rights Research (Intersentia, 2009) 213-231  
¥ DeFrancia C., ÔDue Process in International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure MattersÕ (Nov. 
2001)87(7) Virginia Law Review 1381-1439  
¥ DeFranck M., ÔProvisional Release: Current Practice, a Dissenting Voice and the Case for a Rule 
ChangeÕ (2002)80 Texas Law Review 1429-1464  
¥ Degan V-D., ÔOn the Sources of International Criminal LawÕ (2005)4(1) Chinese Journal of 
International Law 45-83  
¥ de Meester K., Pitcher K., Rastan R. and Sluiter G., ÔInvestigation, Coercive Measures, Arrest, 
and SurrenderÕ in Sluiter G. and others (eds.), International Criminal Procedure. Principles and Rules 
(OUP, 2013)   
¥ Den Heijer M., ÔProcedural Aspects of Shared Responsibility in the European Court of Human 
RightsÕ (2013)4(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 361-383  
¥ Deprez C., ÔExtent of Applicability of Human Rights Standards to Proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court: On Possible Reductive FactorsÕ (2012)12 International Criminal Law 
Review 721-741  
¥ Deprez C., ÔLa mise en libert avant jugement dans la pratique de la Cour pnale internationale: 
une rupture avec lÕhritage des tribunaux ad hoc?Õ in Bernard D. and Scalia D., Vingt ans de justice 
internationale pnale (La Charte, 2014)   
¥ Deprez C., ÔThe Authority of Strasbourg Jurisprudence from the Perspective of the International 
Criminal CourtÕ (2015)3 European Journal of Human Rights 278-296  
¥ De Schutter O., International Human Rights Law (CUP, 2010)  
¥ De Schutter O., ÔHuman Rights and the Rise of International Organisations: the Logic of Sliding 
Scales in the Law of International ResponsibilityÕ in Wouters J., Brems E., Smis S. and Schmitt P. 
(eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations (Intersentia, 2010) 51-
128  
¥ De Vos C., Kendall S. and Stahn C. (eds.), Contested Justice. The Politics and Practice of International 
Criminal Court Interventions (CUP, 2015) 
¥ De Wet E. and Vidmar J. (eds.), Hierarchy in International Law. The Place of Human Rights (OUP, 
2012)  
¥ Dimitrijevic V. and Milanovic M., ÔHuman Rights before International Criminal CourtsÕ in 
Grimheden J. and Ring R. (eds.), Human Rights Law: From Dissemination to Application: Essays in 
Honour of Goran Melander (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006)  
259 
¥ Doran K., ÔProvisional Release in International Human Rights Law and International Criminal 
LawÕ (2011)11 International Criminal Law Review 707-743  
¥ Drr O., ÔDetention, ArbitraryÕ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law  
¥ Doswald-Beck L., Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism (OSAIL, 2011)  
¥ Dubuisson M., Bertrand A-A. and Schauder N., ÔContribution of the Registry to greater respect 
for the principles of fairness and expeditious proceedings before the International Criminal 
CourtÕ in Stahn C. and Sluiter G. (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 565-584  
¥ Dupuy P., ÔReviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On AgoÕs Classification of Obligations of 
Means and Obligations of Result in Relation to State ResponsibilityÕ (1999)10(2) European Journal 
of International Law 371-385  
¥ Elewa Badar M. and Higgins N., ÔGeneral principles of law in the early jurisprudence of the  ICCÕ 
in Mariniello T., The International Criminal Court in Search of Its Purpose and Identity (Routledge, 2015) 
264-281  
¥ El Zeidy M. M., ÔCritical Thoughts on Article 59(2) of the ICC StatuteÕ (2006)4 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 448-465  
¥ Fairlie M. A., ÔThe Precedent of Pretrial Release at the ICTY: A Road Better Left Less TraveledÕ 
(2010)33(4) Fordham International Law Journal 1101-1178  
¥ Farrel B., ÔThe Right to a Speedy Trial before International Criminal TribunalsÕ (2003)19 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 98-117  
¥ Fauveau N. and Moriceau P., ÔLa dtention et la mise en libert provisoire devant les juridictions 
internationalesÕ (2011) Recueil Dalloz 1368  
¥ Fedorova M., Verhoeven S., Wouters J., ÔSafeguarding the Rights of Suspects and Accused 
Persons in International Criminal ProceedingsÕ (June 2009) Working Paper n¡27 available at 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/wp137e.pdf (last accessed 21 March 2015)  
¥ Fedorova M. and Sluiter G., ÔHuman Rights as Minimum Standards in International Criminal 
ProceedingsÕ (2009)1 Human Rights and International Legal Discourse 9-56  
¥ Ferdinandusse W., ÔThe Dutch ExperienceÕ in Bassiouni M. C. (ed.) International Criminal Law. 
Volume III International Enforcement (Transnational Publishers, 2008) 385-397   
¥ Forcese C., ÔThe Capacity to Protect: Diplomatic Protection in the ÔWar on TerrorÕ (2006)17(2) 
European Journal of International Law 369-394  
¥ Forrest Martin F., ÔDelineating a Hierarchical Outline of International Law Sources and NormsÕ 
(2002)65 Saskatchewan Law Review 333-368  
260 
¥ Forsythe D., ÔHuman Rights Studies : On the Dangers of Legalistic AssumptionsÕ in Coomans 
F., Grnfeld F. and Kamminga M. T. (eds.), Methods of Human Rights Research (Intersentia, 2009) 
59-74  
¥ Friman H., ÔRights of Persons Suspected or Accused of a CrimeÕ in R. Lee (ed.), The International 
Criminal Court: the making of the Rome Statute (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 247-260  
¥ Fuller L. L., ÔPositivism and Fidelity of Law Ð A Reply to Professor HartÕ (1958)71 Harvard Law 
Review 630-672 
¥ Gaja G., ÔGeneral Principles of LawÕ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law  
¥ Gallant K., ÔIndividual Human Rights in a New International Organization: The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal CourtÕ in Bassiouni M. C., International Criminal Law- Volume II. 
Enforcement (Transnational Publishers, 1999) 693-722  
¥ Gaynor F., ÔProvisional Release in the Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
YugoslaviaÕ in Doria J. (ed.), The Legal Regime of the ICC: Essays in Honour of the Professor J. P. 
Blishchenko (Koninklijke Brill N.V., 2008) 183-207  
¥ Geneuss J., ÔObstacles to Cross-fertilisation: The International Criminal TribunalsÕ ÔUnique 
ContextÕ and the Flexibility of the European Court of Human RightsÕ Case LawÕ (2015)84 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 404-427  
¥ Gillich I., ÔThe Normativity of Principles. Within the Positivist Theory of International LawÕ 
(2015-2016)41 North Carolina Journal of International Law 1-31 
¥ Gillet M. and Schuster M., ÔThe Special Tribunal for Lebanon swiftly adopts its Rules of 
Procedure and EvidenceÕ (2009)7(5) Journal of International Criminal Justice 885-909  
¥ Goldsworthy J. D., ÔThe Self-Destruction of Legal PositivismÕ (1990) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
449-486 
¥ Golubok S., ÔPre-Conviction Detention before the International Criminal Court: Compliance or 
Fragmentation?Õ (2010)9(2) Law & Practice of International Courts & Tribunals 295-311  
¥ Gradoni L., ÔInternational Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Bound by Human Rights Norms É or 
Tied DownÕ (2006)19(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 847-873  
¥ Gradoni L., ÔÔYou will receive a fair trial elsewhereÕ The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals 
Acting as Human Rights JurisdictionsÕ (2007)54(1) Netherlands International Law Review 1-49  
¥ Gradoni L., Lewis D. A., Mgret F., Nouwen S. M. H., David Ohlin J., Reisinger-Coracini A. and 
Zappal S., ÔGeneral Framework of International Criminal ProcedureÕ in Sluiter G. and others 
(eds.), International Criminal Procedure. Principles and Rules (OUP, 2013)  
261 
¥ Grover S. C., The European Court of Human Rights as a Pathway to Impunity for International Crimes 
(Springer, 2010)  
¥ Gunning I. R., ÔModernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human RightsÕ 
(1991)31(2) Virginia Journal of International Law 211-245  
¥ Guzman A. T., ÔSaving Customary International LawÕ (2005)27 Michigan Journal of International Law 
116-177  
¥ Hafner G. and Binder C., ÔThe Interpretation of Article 21 (3) ICC Statute Opinion ReviewedÕ 
(2004)9 Austrian Review of International and European Law 163-190  
¥ Hall C. K., ÔArticle 58Õ in Triffterer O. (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Beck/Hart, 2008) 1133-1145  
¥ Hannum H., ÔThe Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International LawÕ (1995/96)25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 287-397 
¥ Hart H. L. A., ÔPositivism and the Separation of Law and MoralsÕ (1958)71(4) Harvard Law 
Review 593-629 
¥ Hartwig A., ÔPre-Trial Detention of the SuspectÕ in Safferling C. (ed.), International Criminal 
Procedure (OUP, 2012) 291-310  
¥ Harmon M., ÔThe pre-trial process at the ICTY as a means of ensuring expeditious trials: a 
potential unrealizedÕ (2007)5(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 377-393  
¥ Harris D. J., ÔRecent Cases on Pre-Trial Detention and Delay in Criminal Proceedings in the 
European Court of Human RightsÕ (1970)44 British Yearbook of International Law 87- 110  
¥ Hayden P., ÔCosmopolitanism and the Need for Transnational Criminal Justice. The Case of the 
International Criminal CourtÕ (2004) Theoria 69-95  
¥ Heller K. J., ÔWhat Happens to the Acquitted?Õ (2008)21(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 663-
680  
¥ Henquet T., ÔInternational Organisations in The Netherlands: Immunity from the Jurisdiction of 
the Dutch CourtsÕ (2010)57(2) Netherlands International Law Review 267-301  
¥ Henry B., ÔThe Acquitted Accused, a Forgotten Party at the ICTRÕ (2005)12 New England Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 81  
¥ Hochmayr G., ÔApplicable Law in Practice and TheoryÕ (2014)12 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 655-679  
¥ Hol B. and van Wijk J., ÔLife after Conviction at International Criminal Tribunals. An Empirical 
OverviewÕ (2014)12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 109-132  
262 
¥ Irving E., ÔThe Relationship between the International Criminal Court and its Host State: Impact 
on Human RightsÕ (2014)27(2) Leiden Journal of International Law 479-493  
¥ Jackson J. D. and Summers S. J., The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law 
and Civil Law Traditions (CUP, 2012)  
¥ Jenks C., ÔNotice Otherwise Given: Will in Absentia Trials at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
Violate Human Rights?Õ (2009)33(1) Fordham International Law Journal 57-100  
¥ Kadens E. and Young E., ÔHow Customary is Customary International Law?Õ (2012-2013)54 
William & Mary Law Review 885-920  
¥ Kambale P. K., ÔA story of missed opportunities: the role of the International Criminal Court in 
the Democratic Republic of CongoÕ in De Vos C., Kendall S. and Stahn C. (eds.), Contested Justice. 
The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (CUP, 2015) 171-197 
¥ Kammerhofer J., ÔInternational Legal PositivismÕ August 2014, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477317 (last accessed 6 September 2016) 
¥ Kaufman Hevener N. and Steven Mosher A., ÔGeneral Principles of Law and the UN Covenant 
on Civil and Political RightsÕ (1978)27(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 596-613  
¥ Kaul H-P. and Kreb C., ÔJurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Principles and CompromisesÕ (1999)2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 143-175  
¥ Kersten M., ÔBetween justice and politics: the ICCÕs intervention in LibyaÕ in De Vos C., Kendall 
S. and Stahn C.  (eds.), Contested Justice. The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court 
Interventions (CUP, 2015) 456-479 
¥ Khan K. A. A., ÔArticle 60Õ in Triffterer O. (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Beck/Hart, 2008) 1159-1169  
¥ Killander M., ÔInterpreting Regional Human Rights TreatiesÕ (2010)13(7) SUR International Journal 
on Human Rights 145-169  
¥ Kitai R., ÔPresuming innocenceÕ (2002)55 Oklahoma Law Review 257-295  
¥ Klamberg M., ÔWhat are the Objectives of International Criminal Procedure? Ð Reflections on the 
Fragmentation of a Legal RegimeÕ (2010)79(2) Nordic Journal of International Law 279-302  
¥ Knoops G-J. A., Theory and Practice of International and Internationalized Criminal Proceedings (Kluwer 
Law International, 2005)   
¥ Kolb R., ÔSelected problems in the theory of customary international lawÕ (2003)50(2) Netherlands 
International Law Review 119-150  
¥ Koskenniemi M., ÔThe Politics of International LawÕ (1990)1 European Journal of International Law 
4-32 
263 
¥ Koskenniemi M., The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
(CUP, 2001) 
¥ Koskenniemi M., The Politics of International Law (Hart, 2011) 
¥ Kreb C. and Prost K., ÔArticle 86Õ in Triffterer O. (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Beck/Hart, 2008) 1513-1516  
¥ Kreb C. and Prost K., ÔArticle 88Õ in Triffterer O. (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Beck/Hart, 2008) 1532-1536  
¥ Kreb C. and Prost K., ÔArticle 93Õ in Triffterer O. (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Beck/Hart, 2008) 1569-1588  
¥ La Rosa A-M., ÔA tremendous challenge for the International Criminal Tribunals: reconciling the 
requirements of international humanitarian law with those of fair trialÕ (1997)321 International 
Review of the Red Cross 635-650  
¥ Lepard B. D., Customary International Law: A New Theory with Practical Applications (CUP, 2010)  
¥ Lillich R. B., ÔThe Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights LawÕ (1995-
1996)25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 1-30  
¥ Lock T., ÔBeyond Bosphorus: The European Court of Human RightsÕ Case Law on the 
Responsibility of Member States of International Organisations under the European Convention 
on Human RightsÕ (2010)10(3) Human Rights Law Review 529-545  
¥ Macovei M., The right to liberty and security of the person. A guide to the implementation of Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 2004)  
¥ Maki L. J., ÔGeneral Principles of Human Rights Law Recognized by All Nations: Freedom from 
Arbitrary Arrest and DetentionÕ (1980)10 California Western International Law Review 272-313  
¥ May R. and others (eds.), Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald 
(Brill, 2000)  
¥ McAuliffe deGuzman M., ÔArticle 21Õ in Triffterer O. (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Beck/Hart, 2008) 701-712  
¥ McAuliffe P., ÔFrom Watchdog to Workhorse: Explaining the Emergence of the ICCÕs Burden-
sharing Policy as an Example of Creeping CosmopolitanismÕ (2014)13 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 259-296  
¥ McCorqodale R., ÔInternational Organisations and International Human Rights Law: One Giant 
Leap for HumankindÕ in Kaikobad K. and Bohlander M. (eds.), International Law and Power 
Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice (Brill, 2009) 141-162  
264 
¥ McIntyre G., ÔDefining Human Rights in the Arena of International Humanitarian Law: Human 
Rights in the Jurisprudence of the ICTYÕ in Boas G. (ed.), International criminal law developments in 
the case law of the ICTY (Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) 193-238  
¥ Mechlem K., ÔTreaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human RightsÕ (2009)42 Vanderbilt Journal 
of Transnational Law 905-947  
¥ Meernik J. A., ÔIs Justice Delayed at the International Criminal Court?Õ (2008-2009)91 Judicature 
276-287  
¥ Mgret F., ÔBeyond ÒFairnessÓ: Understanding the Determinants of International Criminal 
ProcedureÕ (2009)14 UCLA Journal International Law and Foreign Affairs 37-76  
¥ Mgret F., ÔIn Search of the ÔVerticalÕ: Towards an Institutional Theory of International Criminal 
JusticeÕs CoreÕ in Stahn C. and van den Herik L. (eds.), Future Perspectives on International Criminal 
Justice (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010) 178-224  
¥ Mgret F., ÔInternational Human Rights LawÕ in A. Orakhelashvili (ed.), Research Handbook on the 
Theory and History of International Law (Elgar Publishing, 2011) 199-232 
¥ Mgret F., ÔThe Apology of Utopia: Some Thoughts on Koskenniemian Themes, with Particular 
Emphasis on Massively Institutionalized International Human Rights LawÕ (2013)27 Temple 
International & Comparative Law Journal 455-497 
¥ Meron T., ÔOn a Hierarchy of International Human RightsÕ (1986)80(1) American Journal of 
International Law 1-23  
¥ Meron T., ÔThe Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian 
LawÕ (1996)90(2) American Journal of International Law 238-249  
¥ Meron T., ÔRevival of Customary International LawÕ (2005)99(4) American Journal of International 
Law 817-834  
¥ Michaels R. and Pauwelyn J., ÔConflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques in 
the Fragmentation of Public International LawÕ (2011-2012)22 Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 349-376  
¥ Michels J. D., ÔCompensating Acquitted Defendants For Detention Before International Criminal 
CourtsÕ (2010)8(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 407-424  
¥ Milano E., ÔDiplomatic protection and human rights before the International Court of Justice: re-
fashioning tradition?Õ (2004)35 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 85-142  
¥ Milanovic M. and Papic T., ÔAs bad as it gets: the European Court of Human RightsÕs Behrami 
and Saramati decision and general international lawÕ (2009)58 International Comparative Law 
Quarterly 267-296  
265 
¥ Milanovic M., ÔNorm Conflict in International Law: Wither Human Rights?Õ (2009-2010)20 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 69-132  
¥ Milanovic M., ÔAl-Skeini and Al-Jedda in StrasbourgÕ (2012)23(1) European Journal of International 
Law 121-139  
¥ Mills A., ÔRethinking Jurisdiction in International LawÕ (2014) British Yearbook of International Law 
187-239  
¥ Mowbray A., ÔThe Creativity of the European Court of Human RightsÕ (2005)5(1) Human Rights 
law Review 57-79  
¥ Mller C. A., ÔThe Law of Interim Release in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
TribunalsÕ (2008)3 International Criminal Law Review 589-626  
¥ Murphy S. D., ÔProgress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
YugoslaviaÕ (1999)93(1) American Journal of International Law 57-97  
¥ Naert F., ÔBinding International Organisations to Member State Treaties or Responsibility of 
Member States for their Own Actions in the Framework of International OrganisationsÕ in 
Wouters J., Brems E., Smis S. and Schmitt P. (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by 
International Organisations (Intersentia, 2010) 129-168  
¥ Naymark D., ÔViolations of Rights of the Accused at International Criminal Tribunals: the 
Problems of RemedyÕ (2008)4(2) Journal of International Law and International Relations 1-18  
¥ Nicholls J., ÔEvidence: Hearsay and Anonymous WitnessesÕ in Haveman R. and others (eds.), 
Supranational Criminal Law: A System Sui Generis (Intersentia, 2003) 239-303  
¥ Nicol-Wilson M. C., ÔThe realization of the right to bail in the Special Court for Sierra Leone: 
Problems and prospectsÕ (2007)7 African Human Rights Law Journal 496-521  
¥ Nollkaemper A. and van Alebeek R., ÔThe Legal Status of Decision by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies in National LawÕ Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper n¡2011-02, 21 April 
2011 available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1817532 (last accessed 21 March 2015)  
¥ Nubberger A., ÔThe Concept of ÔJurisdictionÕ in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human RightsÕ (2012)65 Current Legal Problems 241-268  
¥ OÕBoyle M. and Lafferty M., ÔGeneral Principles and Constitutions as Sources of Human Rights 
LawÕ in Shelton D. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (OUP, 2013)  
¥ Ochoa J.C., ÔThe Settlement of Disputes Concerning States Arising From the Application of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Balancing Sovereignty and the Need for an Effective 
and Independent ICCÕ (2007)7 International Criminal Law Review 1-43  
266 
¥ Oluwatoyin Okebukola E., ÔA Universal Procedural Framework for War Crimes TribunalsÕ 
(2012)14 International Community Law Review 85-116  
¥ Orakhelashvili A., Peremptory Norms in International Law (OUP, 2006)  
¥ Panezi M., ÔSources of Law in Transition. Re-visiting General Principles of International LawÕ 
(2007) Ancilla Iuris 66-79  
¥ Parker T., ÔPollyannas Need Not Apply: International Justice is, to a Certain Extent, Political 
JusticeÕ in Steinberg R. H. (ed.), Contemporary Issues Facing the International Criminal Court (Brill, 
2016) 445-452 
¥ Pati R., ÔFair Trial Standards under Human Rights Treaty Law and the ICTY: A Process of 
Cross-Fertilization?Õ in Kruesmann T. (ed.), ICTY: Towards a Fair Trial? (Neuer 
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2008) 147-184  
¥ Pellet A., ÔApplicable LawÕ in Cassese A., Gaeta P. and Jones J.R.W.D. (eds.), The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Vol. II (OUP, 2002) 1051-1083   
¥ Peskin, V. International Justice and the Balkans (CUP, 2008) 
¥ Peskin V., ÔCaution and Confrontation in the International Criminal CourtÕs Pursuit of 
Accountability in Uganda and SudanÕ (2009)31 Human Rights Quarterly 655-691 
¥ Peskin V., ÔAssessing the Contemporary International Criminal Tribunals: Performance, 
Persuasion, and PoliticsÕ (2014)108 ASIL Proceedings 122-125 
¥ Pitea C., ÔInterpreting the ECHR in the Light of ÒOtherÓ International Instruments: Systemic 
Integration or Fragmentation of Rules on Treaty Interpretation?Õ in Boschiero N., Scovazzi T., 
Pitea C. and Ragni C. (eds.), International Courts and the Development of International Law. Essays in 
Honour of Tullio Treves (Springer, 2013) 545-559  
¥ Pogge T. W., ÔCosmopolitanism and SovereigntyÕ (1992) 103 Ethics 48-75  
¥ Ramsden M. and Chung C., ÒReasonable Grounds to BelieveÕ An Unreasonably Unclear 
Evidentiary Threshold in the ICC StatuteÕ (2015)13(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 555-
577 
¥ Rastan R., ÔTesting Co-operation: The International Criminal Court and National AuthoritiesÕ 
(2008)21(2) Leiden Journal of International Law 431-456  
¥ Ratner S., ÔFrom Enlightened Positivism to Cosmopolitan Justice: Obstacles and OpportunitiesÕ 
in Fastenrath U. (eds.) From Bilateralism to Community Interest. Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma 
(OUP, 2011) 155-171 
¥ Rearick D. J., ÔInnocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTRÕ (2003)44 Harvard 
International Law Journal 577-595  
267 
¥ Rietiker D., ÔThe Principle of ÒEffectivenessÓ in the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights: Its Different Dimensions and Its Consistency with Public International Law Ð 
No Need for the Concept of Treaty Sui GenerisÕ (2010)79 Nordic Journal of International Law 245-
277  
¥ Roach S. C., ÔHow Political Is the ICC? Pressing Challenges and the Need for Diplomatic 
EfficacyÕ (2013)19 Global Governance 507-523 
¥ Roberts A. E., ÔTraditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
ReconciliationÕ (2001)95 American Journal of International Law 757-791  
¥ Robinson P. L., ÔEnsuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former YugoslaviaÕ (2000)11(3) European Journal of International Law 569-589  
¥ Robinson D., ÔThe Identity Crisis of International Criminal LawÕ (2008)21(4) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 925-963  
¥ Roth R. and Tulkens F., ÔThe influence of the European Court of Human RightsÕ case law on 
(international) criminal law: introductionÕ (2011)9(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 571-575  
¥ Rckert W., ÔArticle 4Õ in Triffterer O. (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Beck/Hart, 2008) 121-127  
¥ Ryngaert C., ÒThe International Prosecutor: Arrest and DetentionÓ, (2009)24 Working Paper n¡ 
24, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies  
¥ Ryngaert C., ÔThe Responsibility of Member States in connection with Acts of International 
Organizations: Assessing the Recent Case Law of the European Court of Human RightsÕ 
(2011)60 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 997-1017  
¥ Safferling C., International Criminal Procedure (OUP, 2012)   
¥ Saland P., ÔInternational Criminal Law PrinciplesÕ in Lee R. (ed.), The International Criminal Court: 
The Making of the Rome Statute (Kluwer Law International, 1999)  
¥ Schabas W., ÔDroit pnal international et droit international des droits de lÕhomme: faux frres?Õ 
in Henzelin M. and Roth R. (eds.), Le droit pnal  lÕpreuve de lÕinternationalisation (Bruylant, 2002) 
165-181  
¥ Schabas W., The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone 
(CUP, 2006)   
¥ Schabas W., The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (OUP, 2010)  
¥ Schachter O., International Law in Theory and Practice (Springer, 1991)  
268 
¥ Schomburg W., ÔDevelopment of Human Rights before International Criminal Tribunals: A 
European PerspectiveÕ available at hrcak.srce.hr/file/129734 (last accessed 21 March 2015) 909-
938  
¥ Schnteig M., ÔThe overuse of pre-trial detention: causes and consequencesÕ (2013)92(1) Criminal 
Justice Matters 18-19  
¥ Scott S. V., ÔInternational Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship between International 
Law and International PoliticsÕ (1994)5 European Journal of International Law 313-325 
¥ Shaw M., International Law (CUP, 2008 6th edition)  
¥ Shelton D., ÔHierarchy of Norms and Human Rights: Of Trumps and WinnersÕ (2002)65 
Saskatchewan Law Review 301-331  
¥ Shelton D., ÔThe Legal Status of Normative Pronouncements of Human Rights Treaty BodiesÕ in 
Hestermeyer H. P. and others (eds.), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity (Martinus Nijhoff, 2011)  
¥ Sheppard D., ÔThe International Criminal Court and ÒInternationally Recognized Human 
RightsÓ: Understanding Article 21(3) of the Rome StatuteÕ (2010)1 International Criminal Law 
Review 43-71  
¥ Simma B. and Alston P., ÔThe Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General 
PrinciplesÕ (1988-1989)12 Australian Year Book of International Law 82-108  
¥ Simma B. and Paulus A. L., ÔThe Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in 
Internal Conflicts: A Positivist ViewÕ (1999)93 American Journal of International Law 302-316  
¥ Simma B. and Pulkowski D., ÔOf Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in 
International LawÕ (2006)17(3) European Journal of International Law 483-529  
¥ Sluiter G., ÔNaleving van de rechten van de mens door internationale straftribunalenÕ (2002)27 
NJCM-bulletin 699-713  
¥ Sluiter G., ÔThe Surrender of War Criminals to the International Criminal CourtÕ (2003)25 Loyola 
of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review 605- 652  
¥ Sluiter G., ÔInternational Criminal Proceedings and the Protection of Human RightsÕ (2002-
2003)37 New England Law Review 935-948  
¥ Sluiter G., ÔImplementation of the ICC Statute in the Dutch Legal OrderÕ (2004)2 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 158-178  
¥ Sluiter G., ÔHuman rights protection in the ICC pre-trial phaseÕ in Stahn C. and Sluiter G. (eds.), 
The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 459-474  
¥ Sluiter G., ÔCooperation of States with International Criminal TribunalsÕ in Cassese A. (ed.), The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (OUP, 2009)  
269 
¥ Sluiter G., ÔAtrocity Crimes Litigation: Some Human Rights Concerns Occasioned by Selected 
2009 Case LawÕ (2010)8(3) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 248-268  
¥ Sluiter G., ÔShared Responsibility in International Criminal Justice. The ICC and AsylumÕ 
(2012)10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 661-676  
¥ Smith-van Lin L., ÔNon-Compliance and the Law and Politics of State Cooperation: Lessons 
from the Al Bashir and Kenyatta CasesÕ in Bekou O. and Birkett D. (eds.), Cooperation and the 
International Criminal Court. Perspectives from Theory and Practice (Brill, 2016) 114-151 
¥ Soares P. P., ÔTackling human rights and international criminal law: the practice of international 
tribunals and the call for rationalized legal pluralismÕ (2012)23(1) Criminal Law Forum 161-191  
¥ Stahn C. and Sluiter G. (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2009)  
¥ Stahn C. and van den Herik L., ÔFragmentationÕ, Diversification and Ô3DÕ Legal Pluralism, 
International Criminal Law as the Jack-in-the-Box?Õ in Stahn C. and van den Herik L. (eds.), The 
Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012)  
¥ Stahn C., ÔBetween ÔFaithÕ and ÔFactsÕ: By What Standards Should We Assess International 
Criminal Justice?Õ (2012)25(2) Leiden Journal of International Law 251-282  
¥ Stapleton S., ÔEnsuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court: Statutory Interpretation 
and the Impermissibility of DerogationÕ (1998-1999)31 New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics 535-610  
¥ Starygin S., ÔJudicial Discretion in ECCC Decisions on Pre-trial Detention against the Backdrop 
of the Case-law of the International Criminal TribunalsÕ (2011)11(2) International Criminal Law 
Review 315-358  
¥ E. Stein, ÔBruno Simma, The Positivist?Õ in U. Fastenrath (eds.) From Bilateralism to Community 
Interest. Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (OUP, 2011) 19-31 
¥ Steiner H. J., Alston P. and Goodman R., International Human Rights in Context. Law Politics Moral 
(OUP, 2007 3d edition)  
¥ Stevens L., ÔPre-Trial Detention: The Presumption of Innocence and Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Cannot and Does Not Limit its Increasing UseÕ (2009)17 European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 165-180  
¥ Strijards G. A. M., ÔArticle 103Õ in Triffterer O. (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Beck/Hart, 2008) 1647-1657  
¥ Swart B., ÔDamaska and the Faces of International Criminal JusticeÕ (2008)6(1) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 87-114  
270 
¥ Sznajder R., ÔProvisional Release at the ICTY : Rights of the Accused and the Debate that 
Amended a RuleÕ (2013)11(1) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 108-144  
¥ Talmon S., ÔDetermining Customary International Law: The ICJÕs Methodology between 
Induction, Deduction and AssertionÕ (2015)26(2) European Journal of International Law 417-443  
¥ Tams C. J., Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes  in International Law (CUP, 2005)   
¥ Teraya K., ÔEmerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond: From the 
Perspective of Non-derogable RightsÕ (2001)12(5) European Journal of International Law 917-941  
¥ Thirlway H., ÔHuman rights in customary law: an attempt to define some of the issuesÕ 
(2015)28(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 495-506  
¥ Tho Pesch S., ÔThe Influence of Human Rights on Diplomatic Protection: Reviving an Old 
Instrument of Public International LawÕ in Weiss N. and Thouvenin J-M. (eds.), The influence of 
Human Rights on International Law (Springer, 2015) 55-67  
¥ Tobin J., ÔSeeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human Rights Treaty InterpretationÕ 
(2010)23 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1-50  
¥ Tochilovsky V., Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court and the European Court of Human Rights: 
Procedure and Evidence (Martinus Nijoff, 2007)   
¥ Tomuschat C. and Thouvenin J-M., The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order. Jus Cogens 
and Obligations Erga Omnes (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006)  
¥ Tondini M., ÔThe ÔItalian JobÕ: How to Make International Organisations Compliant with Human 
Rights and Accountable for Their Violation by Targeting Member StatesÕ in Wouters J., Brems 
E., Smis S. and Schmitt P. (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International 
Organisations (Intersentia, 2010) 169-212   
¥ Trechsel S., ÔRights in Criminal Proceedings under the ECHR and the ICTYÕ in Swart B., Zahar 
A. and Sluiter G. (eds.), The Legacy of the ICTY (OUP, 2011) 149-188  
¥ Treves T., Customary International Law, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law   
¥ Triffterer O. (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Beck/Hart, 
2008)   
¥ Trotter A., ÔInnocence, Liberty and Provisional Release at the ICTY: A Post-Mortem of 
ÔCompelling Humanitarian GroundsÕ in ContextÕ (2012)2 Human Rights Law Review 353-374  
¥ Trotter A., ÔPre-Conviction Detention in International Criminal TrialsÕ (2013)11 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 351-377   
¥ Van Der Borght E., ÔProsecution of International Crimes in The Netherlands: An Analysis of 
Recent Case LawÕ (2007)18 Criminal Law Forum 87-136  
271 
¥ van der Wilt H., ÔOn the Hierarchy between Extradition and Human RightsÕ in De Wet E. and 
Vidmar J. (eds.), Hierarchy in International Law. The Place of Human Rights (OUP, 2012) 148-175  
¥ Van Wijk J., ÔWhen international criminal justice collides with principles of international 
protection: assessing the consequences of ICC witnesses seeking asylum, defendants being 
acquitted, and convicted being releasedÕ (2013)26(1) Leiden Journal of International Law 173-191  
¥ Vasiliev S., ÔApplicability of International Fair Trial Standards in International Criminal 
Proceedings: Between Universalism and ContextualityÕ (Toogdag Seminar, Utrecht University, 18 
April 2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1718960 (last accessed 21 March 2015)  
¥ Vasiliev S., ÔFairness and its Metric in International Criminal ProcedureÕ 18 April 2013, available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2253177 (last accessed 21 March 2013)  
¥ Vasiliev S., ÔInternational Criminal Tribunals in the Shadow of Strasbourg and Politics of Cross-
fertilisationÕ (2015)84 Nordic Journal of International Law 371-403  
¥ Vaurs-Chaumette A-L., ÔProvisional Release in International Criminal Proceedings: The Limits of 
the Influence of Human Rights LawÕ in Weiss N. and Thouvenin J-M. (eds.), The influence of 
Human Rights on International Law (Springer, 2015) 131-144  
¥ Verhoeven J., ÔArticle 21 of the Rome Statute and the Ambiguities of Applicable LawÕ (2002)33 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 2-22  
¥ Vermeer-Knzli A., ÔA Matter of Interest: Diplomatic Protection and State Responsibility Erga 
OmnesÕ (2007)56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 553-581  
¥ Vidmar J., ÔNorm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a Vertical International 
Legal System?Õ in De Wet E. and Vidmar J. (eds.), Hierarchy in International Law. The Place of Human 
Rights (OUP, 2012) 13-41  
¥ Vitanyi B., ÔLes positions doctrinales concernant le sens de la notion de Òprincipes gnraux du 
droit reconnu par les nations civilisesÓÕ (1982) Revue gnrale de droit international public 48   
¥ Voyiakis E., ÔA Theory of Customary International LawÕ (25 January 2008) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=895462 (last accessed 5 January 2016)  
¥ Wald P. and Martinez J., ÔProvisional Release at the ICTY: a Work in ProgressÕ in May R. and 
others (eds.), Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in Honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (Brill, 2000) 
229-242  
¥ Waldron J., ÔNormative (or Ethical) PositivismÕ in Coleman J. (ed), Hart's Postscript. Essays on the 
Postscript to the Concept of Law (OUP, 2001) 410-433 
¥ Warbrick C., ÔInternational Criminal Rights and Fair TrialÕ (1998)3 Journal of Armed Conflict 43-65  
272 
¥ Weisbord N. and Smith M. A., ÔThe Reason Behind the Rules: From Description to Normativity 
in International Criminal ProcedureÕ (2011) North Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Commercial Regulation 253- 275  
¥ Wessel J., ÔJudicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal Court: An Institutional Guide to 
Analyzing International AdjudicationÕ (2005-2006)44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 377-
452  
¥ Wouters J., Brems E., Smis S.  and Schmitt P. (eds.), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by 
International Organisations (Intersentia, 2010)  
¥ Yabasun D. and Holvoet M., ÔSeeking Asylum before the International Criminal Court. Another 
Challenge for a Court in Need of CredibilityÕ (2013)13 International Criminal Law Review 727-747  
¥ Young R., ÔInternationally recognised human rights before the International Criminal CourtÕ 
(2011)60(1) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 189-208  
¥ Zammit A., ÔA Formal Approach to Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute from the Perspective of 
the International Criminal Courts and TribunalsÕ (2013)24(2) European Journal of International Law 
649-661  
¥ Zammit A., ÔThe Direct and Indirect Approaches to Precedent in International Criminal Courts 
and TribunalsÕ (2013)14(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 608-642  
¥ Zappal S., Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (OUP, 2003) 280p.  
¥ Zeegers K., ÔDe Invloed van Internationale Mensenrechten op Internationaal StrafprocesrechtÕ in 
Abels D., Dolman M. M. and Vriend K.C.J. (eds), Dialectiek van Nationaal en Internationaal Strafrecht 
(Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2013)  
¥ Zeegers K., ÔProvisional Release before the Ad Hoc TribunalsÕ available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2323468 (last accessed 14 February 2016)  
 
4.! International OrganizationsÕ Reports 
 
¥ OSCE, ÔWar Crimes Trials Before the Domestic Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Progress 
and ObstaclesÕ (March 2005) available at 
http://www.oscebih.org/documents/osce_bih_doc_2010122311024992eng.pdf (last accessed 8 
April 2015)  
¥ Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, ÔFinal Report on Statement 
of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International LawÕ in 
International Law Association Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference (London 2000) (ILA, 2000)  
273 
¥ Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice, ÔFinal Report on the Impact of 
Findings of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty BodiesÕ in International Law Association 
Report of the Seventy-First Conference (Berlin 2004) (ILA, 2004) 626   
 
